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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois, Chairman

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas
RUDY BOSCHWITZ, Minnesota
LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska

CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
JOHN GLENN, Ohio

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska
PAUL E. TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ALAN CRANSTON, California
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

EDWARD G. SANDERS, Staff Director
GERYLD B. CHRISTIANSON, Minority Staff Director

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1983 ~CONTENTS

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Bar weapons in space-reprinted from the New York Times, Janu-
ary 13, 1983____

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It may be plausible and it may be ineffective-reprinted from the
Washington Post, March 27, 1983..

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Insertions for the record-Continued

An expensive technological risk-reprinted from the Washington Post,
March 27, 1983_.

100 percent defense? Hardly-reprinted from the Washington Post,
March 27, 1983----.

Excerpts from Secretary of State William Rogers' letter transmitting
the ABM Treaty to President Richard Nixon (June 1972)__
Excerpt of statement by Secretary of State William Rogers before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (June 1972) –

Excerpt of statement by Ambassador Gerard Smith, before the Senate
Armed Services Committee (June 1972) __.

Heading off bad space policies-reprinted from the Christian Science
Monitor, April 19, 1983-_-

Prepared statement of Hon. Paul E. Tsongas_.

Prepared statement of Hon. Kenneth L. Adelman__.

The hole in Andropov's Space-Weapons Treaty, a letter to the editor,

Prepared statement of Hon. Fred C. Ikle..

by Senator Pressler-reprinted from the New York Times, May 8,
1983

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102

Prepared statement of Kurt Gottfried and the report of the Union of
Concerned Scientists---.

114

Biographical data of Richard L. Garwin_.
Prepared statement of Richard L. Garwin__.

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132

Scientists fault charges of Soviet cheating-reprinted from Science,
May 13, 1983__

145

Prepared statement of Carol Rosin__

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ACDA's responses to additional questions submitted for the record___ Dr. Gottfried, Admiral Gayler and Dr. Garwin's responses to additional questions submitted for the record___.

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Appendix:

War and peace in the space age-address to the U.N. Committee on Disarmament, Geneva, September 31, 1982, by Arthur C. Clark, chancellor, University of Moratuwa, Sri Lanka.

The High Frontier proposal: a CDI Critique___.

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CONTROLLING SPACE WEAPONS

THURSDAY, APRIL 14, 1983

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Larry Pressler presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Pressler, and Pell.

Senator PRESSLER. I will call the committee meeting to order and thank our witnesses for their patience. We had a vote. We thank you very much for being here and we appreciate your patience. I have an opening statement and then I will call on my colleague, Senator Helms, for his statement and then we will proceed, if that is agreeable. This is the second in a series of hearings that will consider the direction of United States and Soviet space weapons programs and their arms control implication. I opened the first hearing last September by noting that since the time I had initially offered a Senate resolution on space arms control in May 1981, there has been little movement toward negotiations and a great deal of activity indicating that we are on the verge of a United States-Soviet space weapons race. This race is not confined to killer satellites alone. Both countries are now developing a number of exotic space-based and space-related weapons. Events in recent weeks and months have reinforced this conclusion. Indeed, space weapons activities continue to accelerate and still there is no movement to the negotiating table.

Before turning to the main theme of this hearing, I should note that since the first hearing on space arms control issues and today's hearing, the United States crossed the quarter century mark in space exploration. In these 25 years, space technology has made a major impact upon our way of life. Besides applications in the military field, satellites are playing important roles in science and in commerce. Space systems are assisting our search for new sources of energy and meteorological satellites have aided farms production. Communications satellites not only provide rapid access to our troops abroad, but they help our business leaders to conduct financial transactions.

In the next quarter century, this trend can continue. But much depends upon our ability to develop policies and policymaking tools which will maximize developments in space technology. Unfortunately, it seems that technology has begun to outpace our ability to manage it. This can lead to inefficient use of this technology and illconceived notions on how best to utilize its potential.

The move toward space weapons is only one example of this. We seem to be entering a space weapons race before fully assessing

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whether such a race is in our interest, or whether a space arms race can be avoided. In another field, that of remote sensing satellites and weather satellites, we seem to be moving away from Government leadership well before the private sector has demonstrated that it can operate these programs in a cost-effective manner. Internationally, there are efforts by some of the world's developing states to politicize the process of allocating orbital space assignments. Using international bodies, such as the International Telecommunications Union [ITU], these nations are blocking the application of new technologies, such as direct satellite broadcasting. Increasingly, the ITU looks like the Law of the Sea negotiations, with some nations seeking a free ride on American shoulders.

We in the United States lack a coherent policy to meet these challenges. Unless we begin to conceive a comprehensive approach that covers all the dimension of space utilization-military, scientific, and commercial-we cannot hope to maintain U.S. leadership in space. Today's hearing will focus on one segment of this important area: The role of arms control in space. Let me begin this session by saying that a space weapons race could have grave consequence and we must not engage in it lightly, if we are to serve the interests of the American people and of our allies. A move toward space arms represents the most revolutionary shift in strategy since the advent of nuclear weapons. In this regard, this hearing is scheduled at a most propitious time. At the moment that we meet here, a group of distinguished scientists are meeting in Los Alamos, N. Mex., to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Manhattan project that produced the world's first atomic bomb. It is important that we keep that development and its implications in mind as we assess the possible consequences of a space weapons race.

I fully support a strong defense for America, but it is far from certain that a space arms competition is a way to assure it. A space arms competition would be very expensive, and it could undermine our ability to correct existing deficiencies in our Armed Forces. Given our Nation's dependence on space systems for keeping the peace, space weapons would compromise many valuable U.S. military assets in

space.

Let me cite some statistics. The U.S. F-15 based antisatellite [ASAT] weapon, which, according to press reports, will be tested this summer, will cost tens of billions of dollars, according to a GAO study. But we are now informed by Aviation Week, that Space Command no longer regards this conventionally armed ASAT as good enough and that we must move toward a laser ASAT weapon. Last year a Defense Department study put a price tag of $50 billion on such a laser weapon. That estimate is probably too low, given the many uncertainties that will have to be tackled in deploying laser weapons.

The President has helped to focus attention on the future of space weapons by his March 23 speech. The hope of moving away from deterrence toward a policy that would end the tyranny of nuclear weapons is admirable. But as President Reagan noted, unless we can significantly reduce nuclear weapons before we deploy a laser defense, such a defense could be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy. In considering the development and deployment of space-based weapons, we must give serious consideration to this and to other long-term implications for strategic stability.

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