would be consistent with this view and I would support it because of the desirable effects in limiting the arms competition and in dealing with crises and actual conflict, should we get into war.

Let me turn now to the question of ballistic missile defense. It is fundamentally a much more difficult problem than that of destroying satellites, especially if in considering destruction of ballistic missiles, one has in mind, as the President suggested, a 100-percent effective defense. The technical problems have by now been widely noted and I shall simply mention some without much discussion.

Perhaps the first point to make is that destruction of adversary reentry vehicles or boosters is not the only-indeed, not even the major-problem in ballistic missile defense. More fundamental is deciding what to attack and being able to cope with a very large number of objects at the same time.

Lasers or particle beams offer no apparent advantage in this respect, and as means for destroying targets are in some respects inferior to projectiles carrying explosive warheads. The latter can be effective even if they miss their targets by some distance; quite a large distance if they carry nuclear warheads. In contrast with the laser or particle beam, a miss by a millimeter is as bad as a miss by a mile. Thus, with these exotic systems, there will be a requirement for extraordinary precision in pointing, the equivalent of being able to hit a grain of rice at a mile. And there is much that can be done to make the target difficult to destroy. Even if the laser or particle beam can be aimed with sufficient precision, the surface of a missile or reentry vehicle can be made reflective or ablative, and the warhead or missile can be made to rotate so that all of the energy of the beam will not have to be absorbed in one small area.

As many commentators have noted, one is confronted with the prospect of having a very expensive and complex system; one based on X-rav lasers driven by nuclear explosions, or one involving enormous mirrors and energy sources, if based on more conventional lasers. Not just one but dozens, possibly hundreds, of such space vehicles would be required to defend against even a single ballistic missile launch. This is because celestial mechanics dictate that any satellite will be in a position where it can engage a given target only a small fraction of the time.

Let me move on to my final remarks, if I mav. I conclude that in sharp contrast to the situation with respect to ASATs, where dynamic competition is likely, in the case of ballistic missile defense, it is not less likely. Space-based ballistic missile defense is not sufficiently promising.

Yet, I am deeply troubled by the President's announcement. It suggests to me that he is ill-informed on military matters and perhaps out of touch with the scientific community.

My own view is that, notwithstanding his opinion and that of Secretary Weinberger, we had all better realize that security in the nuclear age is not to be found through technical fixes. Rather, to the extent we can have it at all, it must be largely through arms control, arms reduction, and the prudent resolution of political differences.

Thank you.

[Mr. Rathjens' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE RATHJENS

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I welcome the opportunity to appear before you to comment on the possibility of an extension of the SovietAmerican arms competition into space. As I see it, there are four issues:

1. The importance of space-based military systems in peacetime.

2. The role of such systems during conflict, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union.

3. The possibility and implications of interference with such systems through the development and use of anti-satellite weapons.

4. The question of space-based anti-ballistic missile systems.

I shall comment very briefly on the first two issues to set the stage for discussion of the third.

Years ago, President Johnson noted that the intelligence information obtained from photosatellites alone had been worth more to us than the cost of our whole space program. Without such information (and that from electronic intercepts as well) we would have had to hedge against uncertainties in Soviet military capabilities by greater efforts ourselves, particularly in the strategic arms area. This, we could have, and would have done, but our efforts would very likely have led to greater expenditures on their part, still more by us, and so on. Costly as it has been, the arms race would, then, have been worse without such information. Important arms control agreements such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the SALT agreements would also have been impossible, considering the difficulties, without satellites, of verification of compliance. And, without satellites, we would also have had to live with more expensive, less adequate military communications systems.

Clearly, we have benefitted from these uses of space much more than have the Soviets. This is because theirs is a closed society, making it hard for us to obtain information by means other than satellites; and because, in respect of communications, they can rely more on internal means, whereas we, being the leaders of a global alliance with world-wide commitments, have much greater need for intercontinental capabilities.

In war-time too, we will be more dependent than they on satellite capabilities; and with time, our dependence will almost certainly increase.

This brings me to the ASAT problem. As I am sure you are aware, the Soviets have had some success, but also a number of failures, with a very primitive antisatellite system they have been testing. It will be extraordinarily limited in its capabilities, even if they improve it so that it can operate reliably, so if it were all that were in prospect with respect to ASAT systems, we would not have much to worry about. The prospects are, however, more ominous. Destruction or blinding of satellites is likely to be relatively easy: their locations will be known to the adversary; they are inherently quite vulnerable, considering the kinds of sensors or communications equipment they carry, and many are so expensive that it is unlikely that great redundancy will be affordable. Costeffectiveness considerations suggest, then, that an action-reaction kind of competition is a very realistic possibility: as one side develops an ASAT capability the other will, within limits, deploy redundant satellites; it will make its satellites less vulnerable; and it will develop decoys and other countermeasures. Moreover, if either acquires any significant ASAT capability, or even threatens to, the other will develop not only countermeasures but an ASAT capability of its own. Then, the first side will develop a still better system, and so on. In the development by the United States of its F-15 based system-a system which incidentally promises to be much more flexible and effective than the Soviet system-the competition is well underway.

But there is still another side to the story. Suppose that ASAT capabilities turn out to be effective enough so that, notwithstanding countermeasures, they can actually destroy a number of satellites in war. Such destruction could result in a drastic erosion in intelligence and command. control and communication capabilities. This could make it difficult for the leadership of either country to make intelligent decisions, to communicate them to field commanders, and to communicate with the leadership of the other side so as to try to bring about a cessation of hostilities. And, destruction of satellites in the early stages of conflict could lead to its rapid, and likely catastrophic, escalation.

These considerations lead me to believe that an agreement not to interefere with satellites would be in the interest of both the United States and the

Soviet Union; more in ours than in theirs. We should get on with trying to secure such an agreement because of the desirable effect in both limiting the arms competition and in dealing with crises and actual conflict, should it occur.

Let me turn now to the question of ballistic missile defense, particularly to the possibility suggested by the President of developing defenses based on lasers or particle beams that might be so effective as to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." While he was not explicit in saying he had space-based systems in mind, I assume that that was the case inasmuch as there appears to be more promise in such systems than in those that might be based on the earth's surface and so would have to penetrate the atmosphere.

The problem of space-based ballistic missile defense is fundamentally very different from that of destroying satellites, especially if, in considering destruction of ballistic missiles, one has in mind, as the President suggested, a 100 percent effective defense. True, some of the same capabilities might be relevant to both problems, and agreements that limit or proscribe one kind of defense might apply to the other, but meeting the technical requirements for ballistic missile defense will be much more difficult than for the destruction of satellites. Those technical problems have by now been widely noted, and I shall simply enumerate them without much discussion.

Perhaps the first point to make is that destruction of adversary reentry vehicles or boosters is not the only-indeed, not even the major-problem in ballistic missile defense. More fundamental is deciding what to attack and being able to cope with a very large number of objects at the same time. Lasers or particle beams offer no apparent advantage in this respect, and, as means for destroying targets are in some respects inferior to projectiles carrying explosive warheads. The latter can be effective even if they miss their targets by some distance quite a large distance if they carry nuclear warheads. In contrast, with a laser or particle beam, a miss by a millimeter is as bad as a miss by a mile. Thus, with these exotic systems, there will be a requirement for extraordinary precision in pointing: the equivalent of being able to hit, say, a grain of rice or match stick at a mile. And, there is much that can be done to make the target difficult to destroy, even if the laser or particle beam can be aimed with sufficient precision. The surface of a missile or reentry vehicle can be made reflective or ablative, and the warhead or missile can be made to rotate so that all of the energy of the beam will not have to be absorbed in one small area.

As many commentators have noted, one is confronted with the prospect of having to have a very expensive and complex system, one based on X-ray lasers driven by nuclear explosions or one involving enormous mirrors and energy sources if based on more conventional lasers. Not just one but many-dozens, possibly hundreds of such space vehicles would be required to defend against even a single ballistic missile launch. This is because celestial mechanics dictate that any satellite will be in a position where it can engage a given target only a small fraction of the time.

Even if it proves possible to deploy a system capable of destroying a missile or reentry vehicle at several hundred miles distance, there is the possibility of saturation of the defense with more targets-real or decoys-than it can handle; and with the high cost of the defense compared with the relatively low cost of ballistic missiles-much less, decoys-any offense-defense cost competition is likely to greatly favor the offense.

Then, there is the possibility of the defense itself being attacked by ASAT systems, e.g. the F-15 type, or by mines orbited in close proximity.

Finally, space-based laser or particle beam systems can be expected to be ineffective against aerodynamic vehicles: aircraft or cruise missiles of the kind now flying.

One has to conclude that even with very optimistic projections space-based laser or particle beam systems that might be deployed in the early part of the next century would not likely be very effective against capabilities now available, much less against those that might be developed by that time.

The President's announcement should not, then be seen as particularly significant because of any direct impact on military capabilities or on arms control prospects. We are not even likely to spend much money on such defenses-at least not much by Department of Defense standards-during the remainder of Mr. Reagan's tenure in office; and, this will be true, even should he be reelected. There is not much that can usefully be done. During that period-and for at least as far into the future as I can see-the military impact of moving in the direction outlined by the President will be small. The prospects are, indeed, so

poor that neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. is likely even to feel much need during this time frame to improve its offenses to counter such a system.

All this is in sharp contrast to the situation with respect to ASATs, where a dynamic arms competition seems likely, and where there is the possibility of systems being deployed that could actually make a difference in the event of crises or conflict.

But notwithstanding these judgments, I found the President's announcement deeply troubling; perhaps, as much so as any that has come out of the White House during this Administration, or during the previous couple as well. It suggests that the President is ill-informed on military matters and out of touch with the scientific community of the country-or, perhaps even more troublesome, that if he is informed, he is willing to raise. for political purroses, an unrealistic hope that we can return to an earlier era in American history: to a Fortress America. While that might be comforting in the short term, to the uninformed it is surely misleading for Americans and it must be deeply troubling to those abroad who depend in some measure on us for their security.

Let me conclude by observing that, notwithstanding the optimism of the President and Secretary Weinberger, we had all better realize that security in the nuclear age is not to be found through technical fixes. Rather, to the extent it can be had, it must be largely through arms control, arms reduction and the prudent resolution of political differences.

Senator PRESSLER. Our chairman has arrived. Do you have an opening statement?

The CHAIRMAN. With the indulgence of my colleagues, I would very much like that opportunity. I regretfully have a few other commitments that have piled up because of our floor work.

I am first of all very appreciative of the ranking minority member and the second ranking member of the majority, the chairman of our Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, for being at this important hearing. I particularly commend you, Senator Pressler, for the really persistent efforts that you have made to focus more public attention and more attention of the U.S. Senate on the urgent problem posed by the growing militarization of space.

No Senator has ever been more conclusively and quickly proven true than to have a President of the United States give the speech that President Reagan gave, pointing out some of the potentials for the future and the necessity for doing some research work on it. As chairman of the Arms Control Subcommittee, you have shown leadership and initiative in addressing a particular threat raised by the imminent deployment of highly capable antisatellite weapons by both sides. Now, in the aftermath of President Reagan's speech calling for a full exploration of the antiballistic missile capabilities, I am very confident that you will be equally vigilant in leading the subcommittee's oversight of this proposal.

Today's hearing is a first step in this review and we are very pleased indeed to have such a distinguished panel. I understand that the administration was not prepared to come before the committee this afternoon to discuss the implementation of the President's proposal because the Defense Department and other agencies are only just now beginning to try to figure out what can be done, at what cost and on what kind of a timetable.

As a result, I look forward to another hearing to review the interagency recommendations, once their deliberations are complete. Until such time as we know exactly what the administration may be proposing in the way of new space or land-based ABMs and other strategic defensive systems, it would be premature to make a final judgment about the President's initiative.

Certainly there is little disagreement that the United States must maintain a vigorous research and development program in laser and beam weapons if we are to remain abreast of the massive Soviet investment in these areas. I have always maintained that we must keep abreast in research and development on ABM systems and other systems to know at least what could be used against us. We must stay in the forefront in those fields.

As one Senator who vigorously opposed the proposed ABM deployment and deployment is an entirely different thing in the late 1960's, I must say that I approach the question of actual deployments of new ABM weapons with considerable skepticism and reserve. I know at least one member of our distinguished panel who helped to counsel us when we struggled with this problem, the ABM, in the late 1960's. We were searching for the truth, and we reached deep into the scientific community to get all the guidance and help that we possibly could.

A majority of the Senate and a majority of this committee came to the conclusion, and certainly Senator Cooper was in the forefront of that effort at the time, that the ABM was not the right system to deploy. If we could mutually agree to not deploy, and it had to be a mutual agreement on both sides and be fully verifiable, we would be better off.

I don't know what the estimates are, but we would have spent about $150 billion on that system to date. We would have spent billions each and every year to just maintain it and keep it up to date. But it would still have become obsolete.

I don't know of any decision that we have made that has been proven more accurate and right. I will couple that with saying we have to keep up our research and development constantly in this area.

I will not belabor my concerns at this time with the deployment problems of new ABM weapons. However, I would like to cite one point that was underscored in a hearing on space arms control which Senator Pressler chaired last September. In his prepared statement, Dr. Richard DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering noted that in 1981 the Defense Department had reported to Congress on the conclusions it reached in its major review of spacebased laser weapons. According to Dr. DeLauer, the Pentagon found that space-based lasers offered possible-and I repeat the word possible-military potential in a number of areas. But, and I quote now directly, "there are areas of major uncertainty in our ability to predict with confidence their ultimate utility." And that is a skeptical

statement.

In light of these uncertainties, the Under Secretary testified that it would be 1987 at the earliest before "an informed decision" could be made on the prospects for going ahead with these weapons.

A few weeks ago, on the very day that President Reagan made his speech, DOD officials testified before the Armed Services Committee on space-based antimissile systems. In that hearing, Major General Lamberson, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Directed Energy Programs, revealed that due to funding cuts, the Pentagon would not be in a position to make a decision on going forward with such systems until 1988.