To conclude, I would suggest that we are still years, if not a decade or more, away from knowing what might even be possible in the area of space-based ABMs. This leaves us time for careful review, and I am sure that you will play a leading role in keeping this committee, and your particular subcommittee, closely involved in studying whatever proposals might eventually be forthcoming.

I look forward to working with you, as all members of the committee do, in this endeavor and again commend you on your outstanding leadership in this particular area.

Senator PRESSLER. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, I too would like to join the chairman of our full committee in making my opening statement, and join him too in congratulating the chairman of the subcommittee. For a good many years I was chairman of the same subcommittee and know full well the scope of work and the responsibility that falls to the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment. We have a very wide mandate, indeed, practically the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Just three-fourths of the world and all of outer space.

Senator PELL. That is right, exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. But it is all under water on earth.

Senator PELL. Some of it is, 70 percent, but it ought to be treated like any of the other geographic bureaus, in the same serious approach. It is more than a decade ago that as the United States and the Soviet Union were preparing to embark on a massive program to deploy MIRVs [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles], that the Senate cautioned that such a step should not be taken. Unfortunately, the advice was ignored and the prohibition on MIRVS was never treated seriously in the SALT talks. As a result, we now face that problem of trying to control and reduce arsenals, including thousands of strategic nuclear warheads.

I remember personally being on the committee and arguing with the then administration about the lack of wisdom of moving ahead with MIRVS. We had an edge of 5 years over the Soviets at that time, but we knew they would catch up with us. So the question was raised: Why go ahead if we could ban those weapons or place strict limits on them?

And we are somewhat in the same situation now when it comes to outer space, and I hope we will not be blind to the threat that will be posed by an arms race in outer space. We should do all that we can on an urgent basis to achieve an agreement on antisatellite weapons, and also explore seriously and quickly the possibilities for prohibiting the costly and counterproductive development and deployment of weapons in space.

I am sorry in this regard that the executive branch is not prepared to discuss these issues in the hearing today. I would have thought they would have been, in view of the President's speech concerning outer space just a couple of weeks ago. I trust, however, that the administration will be present to provide witnesses at an early date. In the meantime, I join in welcoming the witnesses who are with us today. Senator PRESSLER. Thank you.

We will now call on Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, USA, Retired.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DANIEL O. GRAHAM, U.S. ARMY (RET.), DIRECTOR, HIGH FRONTIER, WASHINGTON, D.C.

General GRAHAM. Thank you, gentlemen. I really appreciate the opportunity to talk to you about this matter.

The first thing I would like to do is read you a letter from a young lady in San Diego, Calif. I wish Senator Cranston were here. She writes, and has nice handwriting, as a matter of fact. She says,

My name is Michelle Rico. I am nine years old. I heard my grandpa tell my Daddy that General Graham has figured out a way to stop Russian missiles from landing in our country and killing American boys and girls. If he could do that, then the Russians wouldn't shoot their missiles at us and you wouldn't have to shoot your missiles back at them and kill Russian boys and girls. Please, Mr. President, will you listen to what General Graham has to say. I don't want anybody killed. Please write to me. Your friend, Michelle Rico.

She says,

P.S. I have $5 which I saved out of my Christmas money. I am going to send it to General Graham so he can tell everybody how the High Frontier can keep American boys and girls and Russian boys and girls from getting killed.

I wish sometimes that we would listen to what comes out of the mouths of babes because that little girl is right.

I believe it would be a tragedy indeed for the United States to follow the Soviet lead in banning all weapons in space. Two weeks after the first flight of the U.S. space shuttle Columbia, Premier Breshnev of the Soviet Union came forward with a public announcement that a treaty should be signed banning all military weapons in space.

From the Soviet point of view, this was a smart move, and indeed it was followed up later by the Soviet proposal for a U.N. treaty to that effect. It was good strategy for the Soviets because they recognize the fact that the United States had reached a position in space technology where the Soviet advantage in nuclear first strike capability residing in their superior force of long-range ballistic missiles could be nullified. The Soviets knew that the shuttle represented a transportation system to space over which the United States could move the men and material necessary to protect the free world from Soviet nuclear first strike or nuclear blackmail.

To follow the Soviet lead by banning all weapons in space, as opposed to banning nuclear weapons in space which has previously been agreed to, would be to deny to the United States our only chance to deliver ourselves and our posterity from the brooding menace of the balance of terror doctrines of mutual assured destruction. By putting into space a nonnuclear defensive system, we can deny to the Soviet Union anv hope of an effective first strike with their huge intercontinental ballistic missiles.

A system such as that proposed by High Frontier would have no capability whatever of killing a single Russian, but could deny to the Soviet Union its first strike capability, not an effective retaliatory capability. Such a system could be deploved quickly and at reasonable cost if we use the technology currently available to us, already paid for by the taxpavers.

Once in place, we can discard the awesome doctrine of mutual assured destruction and base our deterrence on a new strategy of assured survival. As President Reagan has said. we will then be able to save lives, rather than merely threaten to avenge them.

The historic opportunity will surely be lost if the Senate of the United States persuades the Government to adopt the policy of banning even such patently defensive nonnuclear systems in space. Indeed, such a policy will perpetuate the mutual assured destruction doctrine and force us for the foreseeable future to live as hostages in the balance of terror strategic situation in which we find ourselves today.

For those who are most interested in arms control, I should point out that our arms control negotiations to date have been based on the attempt to maintain a balance within the balance of terror. If indeed we go to space-borne defense, it is perfectly logical to approach the Soviet Union this way to say Ivan, you have said that you do not wish to first strike the United States. You will excuse us if we worry about that since many of your weapons systems seem to be designed to do just that.

We are therefore going to put into space a defensive system which will deny any country the capability of first-striking the United States with nuclear ballistic missiles. Since you have no intention of doing that, you won't mind, of course, will you?

Further, you may not believe the United States when we say we have no intention of first-striking the Soviet Union. But if you Soviets don't believe us, then we invite you to put a similar system in space yourself.

This kind of arms control effort may have some chance of success. And it certainly in my view would have more chance of success than the efforts we have conducted thus far to try to maintain a balance in the balance of terror.

I should point out that the High Frontier system that I have spoken of does not employ lasers and does not employ particle beam weapons or any futuristic Buck Rogers system. In fact, High Frontier uses kinetic energy kill; that is, a kill of the Soviet weapons with pellets, like buckshot.

If you worry that this is not technically feasible, I would like to call your attention and the attention of your staffs to a document recently declassified by the Department of Defense which was Project Defender. In Project Defender, in 1962, 20 of the best scientists within the Department of Defense, backed by a staff of 5,000 technicians and administrative personnel, came to the conclusion that a defense such as High Frontier's could have been deployed by 1968.

So we are not talking Buck Rogers when we back the President's call for a defense in space. We do not have to have lasers or particle beam weapons, although High Frontier has no objections to such weapons and a second generation may include them. The fact of the matter is that within 5 or 6 years, at a cost not of many billions but of $15 billion, a strategic defense can be had by this country. If President Reagan runs again. he may see a space-borne defense against the long-range Soviet ballistic missiles during the period of his Presidency. Now we have had contests that what we say will cost much more. As a matter of fact, we had correspondence from Mr. Carlucci, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who said that we were wrong, that in fact it would cest $50 billion.

Well, we don't agree with Mr. Carlucci or the Department of Defense. We think it will cost far less. But even if it did cost $50 billion, this is less than it would have cost us to deploy the MX in Jimmy

Carter's racetrack deployment scheme for MX. And all that would have done is to add 200 more missiles to our inventory.

So we say that we propose a strategic bargain. Even if our detractors' figures for how much it cost are correct-we do not believe that, but even if they are correct, we offer this country not just a strategic bargain. We offer to this country once again what the country should be able to expect from its government, which is protection against the worst threat that the United States of America has ever faced, and that is the threat of destruction within 35 minutes of a Soviet decision to fire its long-range ballistic missiles.

That this is technically feasible was proved 20 years ago. All that is required today is the political will to do so. But also required is a realization that this new arena of human activity called space must be used to its utmost by the United States for the defense of this country and of its allies and for the promotion of industry in space and this should be done as quickly as technology will allow.

Thank you.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you. We will now call upon Dr. Daniel Deudney, senior researcher, Worldwatch Institute. You have 10 minutes.

[Mr. Deudney's biographical data follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF DANIEL DEUDNEY

Daniel Deudney is a Senior Researcher at the Worldwatch Institute and author of Space: The High Frontier in Perspective, as well as numerous articles on space war, the peaceful use of outer space and alternative security systems. Mr. Deudney holds a B.A. degree in Political Science and Philosophy and has studied science, technology and public policy, with an emphasis on space, at the George Washington University. Mr. Deudney is also the co-author (with Christopher Flavin) of Renewable Energy: The Power to Choose (W. W. Norton, 1983) and is at work on a new study, Whole Earth Security: A Geopolitics of Peace. He is also co-chairman of The Institute for Security in Cooperation in Outer Space (ISCOS), a new public interest research organization group devoted to exploring alternative space-based security systems.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL DEUDNEY, SENIOR RESEARCHER, WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. DEUDNEY. Thank you. Buffeted by MAD [mutually assured destruction] men telling him to perpetually assure our destruction and NUTS [nuclear utilization theorists] telling him to prepare to fight nuclear wars, President Reagan looked to the heavens in the hope of finding salvation.

He looked in the right direction. Space technology can be the cornerstone of an alternative security system that does not rely upon evermore massive nuclear arsenals. We must avoid using space as another arena of competition, and instead use it as a medium for mutual benefit to build a system of mutual assured survival.

Space technology is not new to the arms race. Ballistic missiles use outer space as a corridor for high speed attack. Reconnaissance satellites are used to monitor the superpowers' military machines. And over the last decade the trend toward fighting nuclear wars is rooted in satellite force multipliers, such as geodetic communication and navigation satellites.

The present effort to upgrade surveillance satellites by giving them real time data links through relay satellites will turn this important arms control monitoring system into a war-fighting system. Unfortunately, regulating these war-fighting information services without constraining civilian and verification technologies is impossible. Therefore, this makes all the more important early agreements limiting longrange ballistic missiles.

We are today at a major turning point in outer space military use, the beginning of a race to put weapons in space. The first antisatellite weapon, an ASAT using nuclear weapons, was tested and deployed by the United States and then dismantled. A second ASAT, an orbital rendevous system tested by the Soviet Union, cannot reach most U.S. military satellites, is launched from a large, distinctly configured Soviet rocket requiring extensive support facilities, and provides plenty of warning time.

The third leg is about to begin as the United States tests an airlaunched, direct ascent system that will destroy through high-speed collision. This system will be capable of striking a high percentage of Soviet satellites, is small and difficult to distinguish from other airlaunched missiles, and will give little warning of attack.

If history is any guide, the next move in this game of leapfrog will probably be a Soviet laser battle station. It will probably not be very effective. It will have the effect in the United States of psychological panic, such as we had with Sputnik, and the result will probably be a large-scale space arms race.

What would these weapons be for and how will they affect our security? ASATs will be an important part of a first strike strategy against early warning satellites. Far less plausible is their use in an extended nuclear war. ASATs will, however, increase the chances for accidental nuclear war by putting into jeopardy the various surveillance and early warning systems.

Predicting how the more elaborate systems will work is very difficult because there are so many unknowns. However, it does seem improbable that they will be capable of shooting down a full scale preplanned first strike. Far more likely is that they would be used as a component of a first strike to mop up those missiles which are not destroyed on the ground.

In other words, as with accurate ICBMs, the advantage in space war will go to the side which strikes first.

Space war will largely preclude the peaceful use of outer space. We think of space as infinitely vast, but in fact it is subject to many of the same crowding and resource problems we have on Earth. Space junk is already a growing problem and further ASAT tests involving explosions or collisions will greatly add to this problem. Even testing the X-ray laser system proposed by Dr. Teller would damage important civilian satellites such as the more than 100 communication satellites that will be in geosynchronous by the end of this decade.

In a very real sense, we face an either-or choice: Science, information, and Earth monitoring from space or space war.

The present arms control regime in space, the test ban, ABM and outer space treaties have worked well, but they contain important loopholes. However, to abandon these treaties because of their loopholes would be like dynamiting a leaky dike at high flood rather than plugging the leaks.