 But despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don't see any reason why we should have less...  A Logical Journey: From Gödel to Philosophy - Pagina 226door Hao Wang - 1997 - 408 pagina’sGedeeltelijke weergave - Over dit boek
 | Kathleen E. Smith, David Ray Griffin - 2001 - 444 pagina’s
...sensationist doctrine was rejected by one famous mathematician and logician, Kurt Godei, who said: [D]espite their remoteness from sense experience,...should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception. (1990, 268) However, many philosophers of... | |
 | Eugene Thomas Long - 2001 - 228 pagina’s
...‘we do have something like a perception ... of the objects of set theory', he added that he could not ‘see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception'.¿ Most philosophers of mathematics, however,... | |
 | Kurt Gödel - 1986 - 692 pagina’s
...by adding the sentence which opened the first of the two paragraphs from which it was taken, namely: But, despite their remoteness from sense experience,...the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. “For the reader's convenience, this and the further quotations below from 1964 that were in question... | |
 | Andrzej Bargiela, Witold Pedrycz - 2002 - 484 pagina’s
...Goedel (1940): despite the remoteness from sense-experience, we do have something like a perception of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the...the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don ‘t see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ie in mathematical... | |
 | David Foster Wallace - 2004 - 372 pagina’s
...would be forever inaccessible to us. —and a rather delicious rebuttal from the Platonist K. Gödel: Despite their remoteness from sense experience, we...should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ie in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception, which induces us to build up physical theories... | |
 | David Foster Wallace - 2003 - 340 pagina’s
...would be forever inaccessible to us. —and a rather delicious rebuttal from the Platonist K. Gödel: Despite their remoteness from sense experience, we...should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ie in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception, which induces us to build up physical theories... | |
 | Steve Awodey, Carsten Klein - 2004 - 412 pagina’s
...theory were part of "absolute mathematics." Despite their "remoteness from sense experience," he said, "we do have something like a perception also of the...the axioms force themselves upon us as being true" (Godei 1964, pp. 267-68). But this idea of "forcing themselves upon us" is given an important qualification:... | |
 | Steve Awodey, Carsten Klein - 2004 - 404 pagina’s
...theory were part of "absolute mathematics." Despite their "remoteness from sense experience," he said, "we do have something like a perception also of the...the axioms force themselves upon us as being true" (Godei 1964, pp. 267-68). But this idea of "forcing themselves upon us" is given an important qualification:... | |
 | Luciano Boi, Pierre Kerszberg, Frédéric Patras - 2007 - 401 pagina’s
...mathematical and sense objects, analogy which concerns both their reality and their perception: "[...] despite their remoteness from sense experience, we...like a perception also of the objects of set theory [...] I don't see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, 422 Godel's... | |
 | John Cornwell - 2004 - 284 pagina’s
...and science, was a tool that would one day be valued just as formally and reverently as logic itself: I don't see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ie in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception, which induces us to build up physical theories... | |
| |
