 But despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don't see any reason why we should have less...  A Logical Journey: From Gödel to Philosophy - Pagina 226door Hao Wang - 1997 - 408 pagina’sGedeeltelijke weergave - Over dit boek
 | Thomas Tymoczko - 1998 - 458 pagina’s
...mathematicians have only an incomplete and fragmentary view of this world of ideas" [26].) and K. Godel ("Despite their remoteness from sense experience,...should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception. . . . They, too, may represent an aspect of... | |
 | Dionysios Anapolitanos, Aristeidēs Baltas, Stavroula Tsinorema - 1998 - 328 pagina’s
...thing as the Platonic universe of mathematical objects. And suppose that, as Godel puts it: ". . . we do have something like a perception also of the...should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ie in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception, . . ." (Godel, p. 484). Granted that this form... | |
 | Matthias Schirn - 2003 - 654 pagina’s
...mathematical realm, a claim which Frege probably would have rejected out of hand. GOdel argues that ‘despite their remoteness from sense experience,...the axioms force themselves upon us as being true.' 5 However, I shall refrain here from trying to analyse the loose parallel GOdel proposes between our... | |
 | James Robert Brown - 1999 - 240 pagina’s
...physical bodies are necessary for a satisfactory theory of our sense perceptions. (Godel 1944: 456f.) despite their remoteness from sense experience, we...being true. I don't see any reason why we should have any less confidence in this kind of perception, ie in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception.... | |
 | James Robert Brown - 1999 - 240 pagina’s
...physical bodies are necessary for a satisfactory theory of our sense perceptions. (Gödel 1944: 456f.) despite their remoteness from sense experience, we...being true. I don't see any reason why we should have any less confidence in this kind of perception, ie in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception.... | |
 | Michael D. Resnik - 1997 - 300 pagina’s
...objects as being given directly to reason and ‘utterly transparent to it',2 while Gödel wrote that ‘despite their remoteness from sense experience,...the axioms force themselves upon us as being true'. 3 None of these pronouncements have been very helpful, since they have remained sketches at best, closer... | |
 | Philip J. Davis, Reuben Hersh - 1998 - 470 pagina’s
...mathematicians have only an incomplete and fragmentary view of this world of ideas. And here is Gödel, Despite their remoteness from sense experience, we...objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that she axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don't see any reason why we should have less confidence... | |
 | John D. Barrow - 1998 - 298 pagina’s
...and science, was a tool that would one day be valued just as formally and reverently as logic itself: I don't see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception, which induces us to build up physical theories... | |
 | Minoru Fukui - 2003 - 882 pagina’s
...to sense perception. Kurt GOdel (in a frequently quoted passage) expresses this notion as follows: But, despite their remoteness from sense experience,...should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception. (1947/1983, pp. 483-84) It is clear that the... | |
 | John Kadvany - 2001 - 400 pagina’s
...of Mathematics, ed. Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964): “But, despite their remoteness from sense experience,...should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception” (271—72). In fairness to GOdel, it was... | |
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