...physical senses, but it need not be infallible. Godel, the foremost platonist of recent times, writes despite their remoteness from sense experience, we...being true. I don't see any reason why we should have any less confidence in this kind of perception, ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception....

...physical senses, but it need not be infallible. Godel, the foremost platonist of recent times, writes despite their remoteness from sense experience, we...being true. I don't see any reason why we should have any less confidence in this kind of perception, ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception....

..."natural generalization" set theory. In a supplement to the article, Godel added [G6d47, pp. 483^484], But, despite their remoteness from sense experience,...the axioms force themselves upon us as being true . . . The set-theoretical paradoxes are hardly any more troublesome for mathematics than deceptions...

...to the fact that set-theoretical concepts play only a minor role in the physical theories of today). But, despite their remoteness from sense experience,...should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception, which induces us to build up physical theories...

...objects. In one famous passage he seems to pass, without any justification, from the first to the second: But, despite their remoteness from sense experience,...should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ie in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception, which induces us to build up physical theories...

...mathematicians have only an incomplete and fragmentary view of this world of ideas. And here is GOdel, Despite their remoteness from sense experience, we...should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception. . . . They, too, may represent an aspect of...

...compares mathematical intuition to sense perception and says that we have something like a perception of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the...the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. Godei leaves it unclear here whether he thinks that the objects of mathematical intuition are propositions,...

...lines structurally similar to those of justification in the natural sciences. 73 In his own words: despite their remoteness from sense experience, we...should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception... It should be noted that mathematical intuition...

...from sense experience' of any and all axioms, Gödel's mathematician has something like 'a perception of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the...should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception, which induces us to build up physical theories...

...chain. The preeminent logician, Kurt Gtidel: “Despite their remoteness from sense experience, sn-c do have something like a perception also of the objects...themselves upon us as being true. I don't see any reason sn-hy sn-c should have less confidence in this kind of perception, ic, in mathematical intuition, than...