Hearings, Reports and Prints of the House Committee on Foreign AffairsU.S. Government Printing Office, 1972 |
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Page 22
... understand it , half the payload of one submarine could completely exhaust that defense capability and still have enough missiles in that one - half payload to incinerate Moscow . Since that is the situation , why do we have to build ...
... understand it , half the payload of one submarine could completely exhaust that defense capability and still have enough missiles in that one - half payload to incinerate Moscow . Since that is the situation , why do we have to build ...
Page 26
... understand it , there was either a document or discussion with the Armed Services Committee that there were certain minimum requirements you believed should be observed . Some of these were not present in the final agreements that were ...
... understand it , there was either a document or discussion with the Armed Services Committee that there were certain minimum requirements you believed should be observed . Some of these were not present in the final agreements that were ...
Page 37
... understand that is the purpose of these new programs . PRESIDENT'S ESTIMATES OF SOVIET FORCES Mr. CULVER . In his press conference in late June , President Nixon said , had the Moscow agreements not been reached he was prepared to ask ...
... understand that is the purpose of these new programs . PRESIDENT'S ESTIMATES OF SOVIET FORCES Mr. CULVER . In his press conference in late June , President Nixon said , had the Moscow agreements not been reached he was prepared to ask ...
Page 59
... understand , the treaty itself is really a conditional treaty with an option for U.S. pullout in the event that at the end of 5 years we have not been able to pursue an ongoing treaty , understanding or agreement which would guarantee ...
... understand , the treaty itself is really a conditional treaty with an option for U.S. pullout in the event that at the end of 5 years we have not been able to pursue an ongoing treaty , understanding or agreement which would guarantee ...
Page 60
... understand . The United States left our options open . Secretary LAIRD . That is correct . THE OVERKILL ISSUE Mr. FASCELL . What difference does it make , as to the issue of qualita- tive and quantitative posture when both sides already ...
... understand . The United States left our options open . Secretary LAIRD . That is correct . THE OVERKILL ISSUE Mr. FASCELL . What difference does it make , as to the issue of qualita- tive and quantitative posture when both sides already ...
Table des matières
54 | |
114 | |
127 | |
141 | |
434 | |
445 | |
459 | |
31 | |
14 | |
31 | |
43 | |
50 | |
58 | |
7 | |
13 | |
26 | |
39 | |
iii | |
viii | |
36 | |
37 | |
43 | |
54 | |
62 | |
152 | |
29 | |
44 | |
52 | |
7 | |
29 | |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM radars ABM systems ABM Treaty Admiral MOORER agree Ambassador PORTER Ambassador SMITH American prisoners Article ballistic missile BARNET believe BINGHAM BLATCHFORD Chairman MORGAN Colonel BORMAN Colonel OVERLY Commission Committee of Liaison Communist concerned Congress Congressman defense deployed deployment families FASCELL FINDLEY forces FRELINGHUYSEN FRIEDKIN FULTON GALLAGHER Geneva Convention going Government Hanoi ICBM launchers interests Interim Agreement KAZEN Laos limitation ment Mexico military MIRV MONAGAN national technical means negotiations North Korea North Vietnamese nuclear Party Pathet Lao Peace Corps POW's President prisoners of war problem proposal question Red Cross release repatriation Republic of Korea Russians SALT agreements Secretary LAIRD Secretary ROGERS security deletion SLBM South Southeast Asia Soviet Union statement strategic offensive arms subcommittee submarines talk TELLER Thank tion troops United Viet Vietcong Vietnam volunteers weapons WEISS withdrawal ZABLOCKI
Fréquemment cités
Page 136 - Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 137 - The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 30 - Japan agree to establish durable relations of peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.
Page 482 - Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.
Page 138 - ... national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.
Page 429 - Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing Article, if such there be.
Page 6 - Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife...
Page 139 - Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 135 - To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode...
Page 133 - Declaring their Intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.