The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991Oxford University Press, 25 sept. 1997 - 368 pages For half of the twentieth century, the Cold War gripped the world. International relations everywhere--and domestic policy in scores of nations--pivoted around this central point, the American-Soviet rivalry. Even today, much of the world's diplomacy grapples with chaos created by the Cold War's sudden disappearance. Here indeed is a subject that defies easy understanding. Now comes a definitive account, a startlingly fresh, clear eyed, comprehensive history of our century's longest struggle. In The Cold War, Ronald E. Powaski offers a new perspective on the great rivalry, even as he provides a coherent, concise narrative. He wastes no time in challenging the reader to think of the Cold War in new ways, arguing that the roots of the conflict are centuries old, going back to Czarist Russia and to the very infancy of the American nation. He shows that both Russia and America were expansionist nations with messianic complexes, and the people of both nations believed they possessed a unique mission in history. Except for a brief interval in 1917, Americans perceived the Russian government (whether Czarist or Bolshevik) as despotic; Russians saw the United States as conspiring to prevent it from reaching its place in the sun. U.S. military intervention in Russia's civil war, with the aim of overthrowing Lenin's upstart regime, entrenched Moscow's fears. Soviet American relations, difficult before World War II--when both nations were relatively weak militarily and isolated from world affairs--escalated dramatically after both nations emerged as the world's major military powers. Powaski paints a portrait of the spiraling tensions with stark clarity, as each new development added to the rivalry: the Marshall Plan, the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the formation of NATO, the first Soviet nuclear test. In this atmosphere, Truman found it easy to believe that the Communist victory in China and the Korean War were products of Soviet expansionism. He and his successors extended their own web of mutual defense treaties, covert actions, and military interventions across the globe--from the Caribbean to the Middle East and, finally to Southeast Asia, where containment famously foundered in the bog of Vietnam. Powaski skillfully highlights the domestic politics, diplomatic maneuvers, and even psychological factors as he untangles the knot that bound the two superpowers together in conflict. From the nuclear arms race, to the impact of U.S. recognition of China on detente, to Brezhnev's inflexible persistence in competing with America everywhere, he casts new light on familiar topics. Always judicious in his assessments, Powaski gives due credit to Reagan and especially Bush in facilitating the Soviet collapse, but also notes that internal economic failure, not outside pressure, proved decisive in the Communist failure. Perhaps most important, he offers a clear eyed assessment of the lasting distortions the struggle wrought upon American institutions, raising questions about whether anyone really won the Cold War. With clarity, fairness, and insight, he offers the definitive account of our century's longest international rivalry. |
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... political integrity. And although Japan had promised to uphold the Open Door in the LansingIshii understanding of November 1917 (in exchange for a vague recognition by the United States of Japan's “special interest” in Manchuria and ...
... political integrity. And although Japan had promised to uphold the Open Door in the LansingIshii understanding of November 1917 (in exchange for a vague recognition by the United States of Japan's “special interest” in Manchuria and ...
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... political necessity. He desperately needed a large intervention force to prevent the Germans from transferring an additional forty divisions to the western front. Throughout April and May, Wilson had tried to get as much information as ...
... political necessity. He desperately needed a large intervention force to prevent the Germans from transferring an additional forty divisions to the western front. Throughout April and May, Wilson had tried to get as much information as ...
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... ” assurances that they did not contemplate “any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or hereafter.”35 Wilson.
... ” assurances that they did not contemplate “any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or hereafter.”35 Wilson.
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... political and economic conditions in Russia. Bullitt, however, was under the impression that he had been authorized to do considerably more than that, in fact, to find out if peace between the Bolsheviks and the Allies was possible ...
... political and economic conditions in Russia. Bullitt, however, was under the impression that he had been authorized to do considerably more than that, in fact, to find out if peace between the Bolsheviks and the Allies was possible ...
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... political spectrum, conservatives wanted to withdraw U.S. troops from Russia because they believed their presence encouraged radicalism at home by increasing public sympathy for the Bolsheviks. In March 1919, the same month in which the ...
... political spectrum, conservatives wanted to withdraw U.S. troops from Russia because they believed their presence encouraged radicalism at home by increasing public sympathy for the Bolsheviks. In March 1919, the same month in which the ...
Table des matières
6 | |
Carter and the Decline of Détente 19771981 | |
The Reagan Cold War 19811989 | |
George Bush and the End of the Cold War 19891991 | |
Conclusion | |
Notes | |
Suggested Readings | |
Index | |
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991 Ronald E. Powaski Aucun aperçu disponible - 1997 |
The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991 Ronald E. Powaski Aucun aperçu disponible - 1998 |
The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991 Ronald E. Powaski Aucun aperçu disponible - 1998 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
accept administration’s agreed agreement Allied American Angola announced army assistance attempt believed Berlin Bolsheviks bomb Brezhnev Britain British Brzezinski Bush Carter China Chinese Churchill Cold Cold War communist concessions conflict Congress cooperation crisis Cuba Cuban Cuban missile crisis December defense détente diplomacy diplomatic Eastern Europe economic Eisenhower administration election European feared Foreign Policy French German Gorbachev Grand Alliance hardliners human rights ICBMs Indochina intervention invasion Iran January Japan Japanese John Lewis Gaddis Johnson June Kennedy Kennedy’s Khrushchev Kissinger Korea Mao Zedong March Middle East missiles Moscow Nationalist nations NATO negotiations Nixon North Vietnamese November nuclear weapons October overthrow Pact peace political president presidential proposal refused regime result Roosevelt Russia SALT South Vietnam Soviet government Soviet leader Soviet Union Stalin strategic summit superpowers Taiwan talks Third World treaty Truman administration U.S. forces U.S. military U.S. troops United Vietnamese Vladivostok West West Germany Western Wilson withdrawal