66 Hatred, but all we want is his judgement that the ima gination can make persons of things. He is speaking of Gratitude and Resentment; which are excited, he says, "by inanimated as well animated objects. We are angry for a moment at the stone that hurts us. "A child beats it, a dog barks at it, a choleric man is apt to curse it". "A man grows fond of a snuff-box, a pen-knife, of a staff which he has long made use "of, and conceives something like real love and affec"tion for them". Afterwards this author mentions persons as the most proper objects of resentment and gratitude. When we are said to hate certain animals, as toads, spiders, &c. perhaps something of the same sort takes place. Imagination is very much concerned in the business : know not whether it may not give them a likeness to something shocking; to some instruments of pain; some powers of hurting; something like grotesque personal deformity: some characters; some tendency or disposition to do disagreeable things. Possibly the Stomach has some share in the feeling. Certainly any disquisition, which taught us to conquer hatred or disgust of this sort, would be useful. Might not, in common aversions, our senses correct our imagination? Suppose a man who disliked a spider, were to view it patiently on all sides, and to examine the fabric of its web, especially during its formation; were to touch the animal gently, nay to speak kind words to it, would not his disgust abate? A horse that boggles, seems to do something of this sort: so does a human being, when possessed of courage enough gradually to discover, that the frightful spectre which has alarmed him is nothing more than a harmless cow. (e) End of Art. 24.] When men speak of those things which do good by means of immediate evil, they are apt to forget, that there are things, which though immediately good, produce subsequent evils: sweets may be as much evils on the whole as bitters; luxury as a sword. It is weakness to neglect this; for if a thing produces both good and evil consequences, what does it signify which sort come first? Yet we are apt to speak of immediate good as good upon the whole; and of immediate evil as evil upon the whole. (f) End of Art. 25.] Odious sometimes signifies that which excites hatred; but sometimes it denotes bad qualities of a certain sort; of that sort indeed, which, as we are made, do excite hatred; but which might be classed and have a common name, though we had no such sentiment. Nay, might be blamed and avoided. (g) Art. 27.] Sterne says, in his Sentimental Journey, "When the heart flies out before the understanding, it saves the judgment a world of pains. Chap. Remise Deor. 66 (h) Art. 28.] The word Beauty includes not only certain conformations of person, but the colors and shapes of inanimate beings; of vegetables; plants, trees, flowers,; the appearances of nature which we call prospects the forms and colors of various animals: also features and attitudes, considered as expressive of virtues and graces of the mind. Whether it includes graceful motion, is scarcely worth contending. It is, I believe, generally understood to include gracefulness, which, in my idea, implies motion. Not but attitudes are called graceful; yet many attitudes imply motion: every motion is a succession of attitudes; and when a figure is imitated in an attitude which makes one of such succession, that figure seems to be in motion. This applies to figures of persons dancing, or of animals skipping, running, &c.-The horses of the Sun every one conceives to be in motion. So of Mercury, &c. 46 (i) Art. 37.] "Whatsoever is ay situation let me feel the movements which arise out of it, and "which belong to me as a man: if I govern them as a good one, I will trust the issues to thy justice; for "thou hast made us, and not we ourselves". Sterne's Sentimental Journey, chap. Conquest. 66 1 Sam. xv. 33. Deut. xiii., & Rev. vi. 8. Rom. xiii. 4. We may not swear. Matt. v. 34. We may swear. Deut. vi. 13. Psalm Ixiii. 12. We may not drink wine. Prov. xxiii. 31. Joel i. 5. We may drink wine. 1 Tim. v. 23. Matt. xi. 19. (k) End of Art. 37.] What St. Paul says of anger might be extended to all malevolent sentiments. Eph. iv. 26. He says, "Be ye angry, and sin not”. That is, " though ye be angry, sin not". (Butler Ser. 8.)-which implies that a man may be angry and "not sin".-In the same sense, it might be said ; Hate, and sin not '.- Envy, and sin not’. (1) End of Art. 38.] There is a very good French book which does the thing here proposed, entitled, "Essai sur les moyens de plaire". It is said to be written by Moncrief. Mr. Mainwaring has published a good Sermon on 1 Pet. iii. 8. in which some of the observations agree with those of this Essai. (m) Art. 45.] La passion voit tout eternel. Diderot; Pere de Famille, Act. 2. Sc. 6. NOTES ON PART II. (a) End of Art. 3.] MISANTHROPY is here described chiefly with a view to the more improved and higher classes of men: but it prevails much in ordinary life, tho the description of it there being more familiar, might be less decorous for a grave discourse. The most Misanthropy which I have seen is in London; but I have known one farmer's wife take such an aversion to another as not to visit her for years, though they lived at a convenient distance. The object of this aversion was a very worthy person; benevolent, candid, and very clear of qualities naturally and accidentally odious. Good sort of people in lower life are not in general ashamed to give out that they dislike all strangers; they rather boast of it as a part of their virtue. In the instance abovementioned the kind care which the person disliked took of her neighbour in sickness, at last effected a thorough victory over all prejudices. (b) Near beginning of Art. 10.] I have heard that General Guise used to say, No honest man ever eats butter. (c) Art. 10. See my Sermon for Addenbrooke's Hospital; bottom of p. 7. 7. Quarto. (d(Art. 16.] "This is in thee a Nature but affected; "From change of fortune". And afterwards, Timon of Athens, Act 4, Sc. 3. Thou'dst a Courtier be Wert thou not beggar. Marmontel, in his Tale called the Misanthrope, says, "c'est un caractere factice, un personnage qu'on prend par humeur, et qu'on garde par habitude.' (e) End of Art. 19.] The Misanthrope is sometimes made a character in Comedy; but I do not recollect an instance of an explanation between two misanthropes though I think it might have dramatic effect. NOTES ON PART III. (a) Beginning of Art. 5.]. See Bishop Joseph Butler's Sermons: Sermon 1st. Note.-And Plautus has this expression; Quoniam æmulari not licet, nunc invides. Miles glor. 3. 2. 26. Aristotle makes Envy and Emulation subjects of two separate chapters. Rhet. Lib. ii. Cap. 12, 13. Expressing them by φθονος and ζηλος. ano (b) Art. 8.] I once asked a very illiterate man at Cambridge why two particular women were always scolding and quarrelling; so as to disturb the neighbourhood. His answer was, "They envys one "ther; they sells the same things". I felt an inclination to extend the remark, or make it general; as all who are pursuing the same advantages by the same means, may be considered as selling the same things". This confirms the adage quoted by Aristotle, Ka nepameus nepaμεs. Rhet. Lib. ii. Cap. 12. (c) End of Article 9.] In the Greek Testament we have ovos and nλos, as in Aristotle; but not used with the same philosophical precision and discrimination. ovos seems the proper moral term for Envy, but as sometimes approaches so near it in meaning in in the New Testament, that there is a difficulty in distinguishing between them. Znos is originally only fervour, from Zew: it by degrees has come to mean envy and emulation; from the warmth of contention observable amongst rivals, er parties opposed to each other. Since fervour may have place in a good cause or a bad one nos is sometimes commended in scripture, as Rom *. ii.—2 Cor. vii. 11. and sometimes blamed, as Gal |