you are therefore a philosopher. This is too ridiculous. You must not, therefore, allege the incomprehensibility of the Trinity as your reason for rejecting it, unless you will be consistent, and deny also the being of a God and every thing else that you cannot comprehend; but if you continue to deny this doctrine, and yet believe a thou. sand other things that you are utterly incapable of comprehending, you must find some other argument against it. space, yet matter occupies some of it. He is eternal, self-existent, infinite. Do you comprehend these ideas, or many others that it would be easy to mention? You do not. Are they less mysterious or less contradictory than the doctrine of the Trinity? They are not. When you have rejected this obnoxious doctrine, God is still the great incomprehensible One. You have not thrown one ray of light upon his nature. Till that which is finite can comprehend infinity, the Divine nature must be clothed in mystery, and Zophar may, with as much propriety as ever, and to beings of a higher order, still propose his question, "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?" In denying the doctrine of the Trinity, you have got rid of one incomprehensibility; but what satisfaction can this afford you when so many remain? You are a rational Christ ian; so am I. But my reason cannot, nor do I know that yours can, furnish me with any light that can diminish the propriety, or even obviate the necessity, of our both adopting, in our speculations upon the divine nature, the language of Job, "Behold, I go forward, but he is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive him; on the left hand, where he doth work, but I cannot behold him; he hideth himself on the right hand, that I cannot see him." Or if you like better the language of a different kind of inspiration: "Quid te exempta juvat spinis de millibus una?" What approach do you make to ra-parently inconsistent. That man's tionality when you reject one knowledge must be very limited inincomprehensibility and retain a deed, who does not believe many thousand? I believe a hundred mys- things that he is quite unable to teries: I am, therefore, raw and reconcile with one another. Such credulous. The nurse's milk is not instances occur in common life, yet out of me. You are more cau- and in all sciences that I know of. tious. You maintain, that only I have already mentioned some ninety-nine are admissible; and apparently irreconcileable contra Well, you say, another and a better reason is at hand-the doctrine is self-contradictory. You understand it then; for, I repeat, that, if you do not understand it, it is absurd to say that it is either rational or irrational. What, you say, can be a more palpable contradiction than to say, that God is One, and yet, that he is Three? But, in the first place, no Christian says that God is Three. And, in the next place, if he did, unless you can determine exactly in what respect he is called One, and in what respect he is said to be Three, and show that it is precisely in the same respect, and in the same sense, then you have not the shadow of a reason for charging the doctrine with inconsistency. And, in the third place, even if you could justly charge the doctrine with a contradiction in terms, this is no satisfactory reason for not believing it. What, believe a contradiction! Yes, "Tucca, SOLET fieri; denique, Tucca, LICET," Wherever there is much that is incomprehensible, there will always be something ap dictions, in speaking of the incomprehensibility of the divine nature, which every man who admits the being of a God must believe. It would be easy to produce many more from every department of human knowledge. Even the mathematics, which peculiarly boasts of the certainty of its demonstrations, furnishes us with more than one instance of a contradiction in terms. It must be admitted, that nothing can be more directly contradictory than to talk of assigning the sum of an infinite series; yet every one knows that this can be done, and, moreover, that that sum may be smaller than any assignable number. And if you will take the trouble to read Barrow's Mathematical Lectures, (I cannot tell you chapter and verse, for it is many a long year since I had the pleasure of seeing them; but your time may be worse employed than in reading the whole of them,) you will find, I believe, the following words, or at least words to that effect, upon a certain Theorem of Euclid, "Ex hoc derivata sunt PARADOXA bene multa et MIRACULA non pauca." How Barrow disposes of these paradoxa et miracula I do not recollect; but I suppose that, in direct opposition to the rule for such cases, laid down by a celebrated writer, he cordially believed them all. But to notice some more generally intelligible instances. To say that the same thing is both finite and infinite is a contradiction in terms; yet we know that this may be said of the happiness of angels and the spirits of just men made perfect. It is a contradiction to say, that the same thing can be perfect, and yet imperfect; yet this may be said of the holiness of them that are in heaven. To say that the same thing is boundless, and yet limited, is contradictory; yet this may be said of the power and wisdom of God, which, though boundless, are yet limited to things that are or can be. And finally, supposing us to have as little knowledge of human nature as we have of the divine, would we not have accused one author of direct and irreconcileable contradiction, who sometimes talked of man as a mor tal, and at other times as an immortal being? I do not mention these things as proofs, or even illustrations of the doctrine of the Trinity; but I mention them to show, that a contradiction in terms is not always a contradiction in ideas; and that, as finite and infinite, perfect and imperfect, boundless and limited, mortal and immortal, are as directly opposed to each other as three and one can possibly be; he who believes that the former may be predicated of the same subject, has no right to accuse me of absurdity if I maintain, that there are circumstances in which, of the same subject, the latter may also be truly predicated. In the former instances we can' explain away the contradiction; we can show that it is only apparent, not real. In the latter, our knowledge is too limited to enable us to do so; but will any rational man maintain, that, therefore, the inconsistency must be real? That real contradiction is a certain proof of falsehood is readily granted; but that there may be an apparent contradiction where there is none in reality cannot surely be denied. The rule of common sense in this case is, that, where we are perfectly acquainted with a subject in all its bearings, we can ascertain with certainty where there is a real, and where there is only an apparent inconsistency; but where knowledge is limited, we will readily admit, upon the authority of direct evidence, assertions which, to us, appear to be inconsistent, our because we take it for granted, that the inconsistency is to be referred solely to our ignorance. Now if this be a rule which the student in every science whose knowledge is yet immature, feels himself compelled daily to act up on, and which, even the greatest masters in every science feel them selves compelled, in some instances, to adopt; is it not ridiculous to demand that in theology, that most sublime of all sciences, which treats of " things that are not seen," of things which lie the farthest remote from the inspection and know ledge of man, every thing shall be made so perfectly level to our understanding, as to render the application of this rule quite unne. cessary? This surely is plain enough-if I can walk right round two mountains, and survey every part of their boundaries, I can then say, that they are completely separated; but if there be parts of each that are inaccessible, I have no title to make the same assertion, since they may be connected at those parts which I cannot see. And when the question under discussion is, the nature and character of the great Supreme, the deist will not deny that we cannot take many steps in any direction with out meeting inaccessible ground. In the nature and character, the works and the ways of him who is enthroned in that light which mortal eye hath never seen, nor can see, there must exist innumerable relations and connexions, depen dencies, and distinctions, which mortal knowledge can never trace. And while his character and his ways must always possess that fulness of wisdom and perfection of beauty, that wondrousness in counsel and excellence in working, which are essential to his nature, they must often exhibit to our limited apprehension, an appearance of inconsistency, of the reality of which they can never be suspected. I conclude, then, that the antitrinitarian has no ground whatever to say, that the doctrine of the Trinity is contradictory; and that even if he could, he believes many truths that involve a contradiction in terms, because he can explain that contradiction away; and he believes many others of the same kind, with regard to which he can give no such explanation, on ac❤ count of the direct evidence by which they are supported. If, therefore, this doctrine be rejected, I am authorized to believe that its rejection springs from some other source than the apparent contradiction which is involved in the terms that are used to express it. Either you The reasoning hitherto pursued is either correct or incorrect. If it be not correct, then pray do me the favour to point out its inaccuracy, and it shall be either satisfactorily established, or frankly abandoned. This request I make, not in the spirit of a polemic conceited of his own power, but in the spirit of a sincere friendship, which would gladly divest you of an error that I conceive to be fatal; or if the idea please you better, in the spirit of a philosopher, who would gladly do homage to truth, whereever it is to be found. or I must be widely remote from all familiar intercourse with this bright offspring of heaven, the eldest daughter of intellect; and `if you feel less desire to extricate me from my error, than I do to extricate you from yours; if you would` experience less pleasure in bringing me, than I would experience in bringing you under the influence of Omnipotent truth, then so far have I reason to congratulate my. self on the superiority of my creed to yours. It produces the better feeling. Of this boast it is in your power easily to deprive me. Ac cept my invitation; canvass my arguments truly; where they are weak, overturn them; where they are false, expose them; where they are ridiculous, laugh at them; and should they in any instance be found to betray petulance, or any feeling inconsistent with that desire for your welfare which I profess, or unworthy of that cause which I support, overwhelm them with indignation and contempt; "spare no arrows.” But if you find, as I trust you will, that, with probably a few trifling exceptions which do not affect the general argument, my reasoning is well founded; then permit me to entreat that you yield to their influence; yield so far at least, as to make use of every means that is likely to conduct you to a knowledge of the truth, and pray with persevering earnestness to that God whose existence you acknowledge to render those means successful. And all this you not only may do, without sacrificing one iota of the deist's creed; but if you really believe in the being of God, all this you must do. For he who admits the being of God, must surely admit, that a correct knowledge of, and an intimate communion with him by whom all that is fair has been clothed with beauty, and from whom all that is desirable has derived its attractions, who has invested the mighty with power, and endued the wise with understanding, is by far the most important of all knowledge, and the most happy of all acquisitions. To a certain extent, I have every reason to think you will allow my arguments to be correct. You be lieve in the being of God. Now, you will allow that this is a truth which you did not originally discover yourself, and which you did not learn from men who had themselves discovered it without the aid of revelation. Proceed just one step farther. Admit that, as reason never did discover, so it never was capable of discovering, this truth, without the aid of revelation. This admission will lead you to embrace Christianity; or, if you still deny Christianity, you must allow, that the being of God is a doctrine, the belief of which, since revelation has not taught it, and reason was never capable of discovering it, is a groundless assump. tion-a vulgar prejudice. It I may now assume, that the pro position with which I set out-that, to deny Christianity, is to remove the only ground upon which the existence of God can be rationally believed-has been proved. would be easy to produce other arguments in support of the same truth; but, trusting to one argument well made out, rather than to a multitude lightly noticed, I shall proceed to a different branch of the subject. I shall admit that your belief in the being of God, from whatever source derived, is sincere; but you deny the divinity of Christ, and the doctrine of atonement. In this case also, the proposition of the Apostle is true and applicable. To deny the atonement is, in effect, to deny God, because it is to leave us destitute of any means by which we can ascertain his moral attributes. If you deny that God is holy, and just, and good, and true, it may be asked, upon what grounds you found your negations. If you as sert that he is holy, and just, and good, and true, it may be asked how you support your assertion : And I know not what answer can, in either case, be returned to the question. No answer can be derived from Providence. It af fords us by far too limited a view of the government of God, to enable us to form any decisive opinion with regard to the princi ples upon which that government is conducted. Even the light of revelation leaves much that is inscrutable without that light all is darkness that may be felt. To borrow an illustration from an author, from whom nobody needs to be ashamed of borrowing, he who has spent only one day in one of the most secluded villages of an empire, is by no means qualified to form any opinion with regard to the principles of him by whom that empire is ruled. No answer can be derived from Creation. If it cannot even assure us that there is a God, much less can it make us acquainted with his character. Allowing our knowledge of it to be as extensive and as minute as you will, it can afford us proofs only of wisdom and power. With regard to the moral attributes of the Creator, it can give us no information. He who examines the mathematical instruments made by Breguet of Paris, or Ramsden of London, can with certainty infer that both these gentlemen are admirable artists; but it would be ridiculous to draw a single inference with regard to the moral character of either, because no moral quality whatever was called into exercise in the formation of these instruments. The observation applies in all its force to the works of the great Maker of all things. These works declare his Wisdom and Power; but to discover what is his moral character, nay, whether he have any moral character at all, whether he be not merely the Fate of Greek and Roman mythology, we must apply to other sources of information. And other source of information, if the atonement be denied, there is none. To deny that doctrine, therefore, leaves us utterly unac quainted with the moral character of God, utterly unable to decide whether he be a Moloch, to whom we ought to make our children pass through the fire, or "Jehovah, a God merciful and gracious, long-suffering, slow to anger, and of great kindness.". But admit the doctrine of atonement, and the moral character of God stands at once revealed; inspiring awe by the exhibition of all that is venerable in holiness and truth; and love, by the exhibition of all that is attractive in the most tender compassion and kindness; revealed so clearly that he must be morally blind who does not see, and so impressively, that he must be morally dead who does not adore. While, therefore, the existence of God forms one article of my creed, the doctrine of atonement, which alone enables me to form any conception of what he is, must form another. Without this doctrine, the whole history of man, and of God's moral government, is a riddle and a mystery,-is involved in an obscurity which deism cannot illumine by one ray of light. What kind of a being is man? What is his nature, and what his prospect? Has he an immortal soul, or has he not? I cannot tell. The gospel makes this perfectly clear; but, setting that aside, I know not how it is to be proved. Every step of the reasoning employed to prove that our belief in the being of God is derived from the Holy Scriptures, may be applied with undiminished force, to show that we are indebted to the same source for our belief in the immortality of the soul. It can be proved, that before the coming of Christ, the knowledge upon this subject amounted to a mere conjecture that it might be so, that this ignorance cannot be attributed to any want of ability or diligence in the search, and, that immediately after the promulgation of the gospel, it was as well known, and as firmly believed as it is now. While, there |