striking points of resemblance between the errors of the Allies in 1854 and the errors of Americans in 1864, which should render us more charitable than we sometimes are when we discuss the history of the war in the Crimea. Between the operations against Sebastopol and the operations against Richmond there is much in common. From the beginning of the expedition to the Crimea to the fall of Sebastopol about eleven months elapsed: it was was eleven months, wellnigh to a day, from General Grant's first movement against Richmond to the entrance of the national forces into that much-sought city. The long siege of Sebastopol was the consequence of the neglect of the Allies to seize the Malakhoff, which might have been taken with little exertion immediately after their arrival before the town; and the long siege of Richmond was the consequence of the neglect of our forces to seize Petersburg, which was open to seizure for six weeks after the beginning of the last Virginian campaign. In each case the neglect arose from want of information; and in each case the want of information led to the loss of thousands of lives and the expenditure of millions of money. The Russian war was drawn out to great length because the Allies did not know the key of the position they were assailing; and the Secession war was prolonged full half a year because it was not seen that the vital point of the Rebel position lay miles from the Rebel capital. The Allies, after losing, or throwing away, as Mr. Kinglake shows, several opportunities to win the stake for which they played, were forced to adopt the "hammering" process, and to beat down or carry the strong works that were created by the genius of Todleben.

English critics see, or affect to see, something providential in the course that events took in the Crimea in consequence of the failure of the Allies to take possession of Sebastopol immediately after their brilliant victory of the Alma. Russia, they say, was reduced to the necessity of defending Sebastopol, and this exhausted both means and men, as that town lies at the southern extremity of the Czar's dominions, and could be reached only by long and toilsome marches, in the course of which thousands of men perished. This idea is not original with English critics. They are indebted for it to no less a personage than Napoleon III. When the siege of Sebastopol was at its height, the French Emperor compared it to a running sore, through which all the strength of the sufferer was passing away. The figure, though imperial, is more striking than elegant, and should rank with the coarsest as well as most famous of the facetia of the Emperor Vespasian. But the object of war is to succeed, to win victories as rapidly, as decisively, and as brilliantly as possible, so as to bring the moral power of the world to the support of the victors. Had the Allies taken Sebastopol in three or four days after the Alma, destroyed the Euxine

fleet and the fortifications of the town, and seized the stores there deposited, they would have accomplished far more than was attained by the capture of the Malakhoff almost a year later. It would have been impossible to disguise the fact that the great military monarchy which had governed Europe for a generation had proved unequal to the task of defending that stronghold which had been created as the base of operations against the East. The Allies would have been able to attack other parts of the Czar's dominions, and the Eastern question, which still perplexes nations with fear of change, could have rested for half a century. It is not impossible that the Polish question too might have been settled, and Poland have been recreated, to serve as the shield of Europe. Even Austria has been disposed, since 1814, to consent to the revival of the Polish nation; and she would not have hesitated to join a European Alliance to effect such a revival, had the Allies been entirely successful in the Crimea immediately upon their invasion of that peninsula. As matters turned, the Allies, instead of taking Sebastopol, were put on the defensive, and had to fight long and hard to maintain their hold on Crimean ground, that they might be able, when reinforced, to besiege the town. Their command of the sea enabled them to bring up reinforcements in great numbers, and to do so without loss, while the Russians were compelled to send their men by long and forced marches, so that many of them died without seeing the country they had been ordered to defend, and those who reached it did so in a state of extreme exhaustion. It was the naval power of the Allies that enabled them to effect their purpose, so far as that purpose was effected. They owed as much to their ships as we owed to ours in the contest we waged against the Rebel confederacy.

Mr. Kinglake devotes almost two hundred pages of his second volume (of the American edition) to an account of the battle of Balaklava, in the course of which occurred that wild incident, the charge of the Light Brigade. Less has been said of his account of Lord Cardigan's memorable charge than might have been expected, — probably because that brilliant cavalry commander is dead. Had he lived, he would doubtless have had criticisms to make on some of Mr. Kinglake's observations. The charge was the consequence of a misunderstanding, which leaves no indelible stain on the reputation of any man. Lord Raglan's "third order" seems plain enough to us, who know exactly what he intended it should mean because we have all the explanations that make it perfectly clear; but he must be a bold man who can say that, under the circumstances in which it was received, he would have given to it a different interpretation from that which it received from Lord Lucan. Then came the "fourth order,"

which led to the charge; and though Mr. Kinglake may be right in saying that there is no word in that order "which is either obscure or misleading,” it was a most unlucky circumstance that it should have been conveyed to Lord Lucan by Captain Nolan, whose manner was highly offensive to his superior officer, against whom he seemed to insinuate a charge of cowardice. Nolan assumed, we think, that Lord Lucan knew the state of things on the field as well as he himself did, who had just overlooked it; whereas Lord Lucan had no such knowledge; and he inferred that his superior officer objected to making an attack which he had been ordered to make. But the two men were thinking of entirely different positions,— Nolan, of the Causeway Heights; Lucan, of the North Valley. No explanation being made, the charge was ordered, and Nolan was killed before he could bring about an explanation. No fair-minded man can fail to sympathize with Lord Lucan, who was placed in the most distressing position that a soldier can occupy, and whose error of interpretation was such as nine officers out of ten might have fallen into without any impeachment of their capacity. He obeyed what he believed to be a most extraordinary order, and his conduct was strictly soldier-like. Lord Cardigan also obeyed orders, after making such representations as he thought circumstances demanded. Mr. Kinglake follows him down that "valley of death" into which rode the "noble six hundred," men deserving to rank with those who held the pass of Thermopyla against the entire power of Persia. Nothing can be more entrancing than his narrative, in which every incident of the charge is told that his conscientious and well-directed labors have enabled him to recover and to preserve. As a French officer said at the time, "It was not war," for war is a business, as much so as the buying and selling of cotton or flour, but it was a most daring and dashing act, which will live long in men's memories, and will never be recalled without causing the blood to course more rapidly. Mr. Kinglake comes to the conclusion, in summing up the results of the battle of Balaklava, "that there was no such decisive inclination of the balance as to give to one side or the other the advantage which men call a victory." This means that it was "a drawn battle"; but we incline to the opinion that the advantage of the Russians on the 25th of October was sufficient to lead to that attack on the Allies which they made eleven days later, and which brought about the combat of giants at Inkermann. In this, though they were repulsed, they dealt so severe a blow to the invading force, that the fall of Sebastopol was delayed till the close of the next summer. Had they not felt that the battle of Balaklava was, on the whole, favorable to them, they would not have ventured to repeat their attempt on so great a scale so soon after testing the power of the Allies in the field.

LIST OF SOME RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

1. The Science of Thought; a System of Logic. By Charles Carroll Everett. Boston: William V. Spencer. 1869. 12mo. pp. xii., 423.

2. A Compendious German Grammar. By William D. Whitney, Professor of Sanskrit and Instructor in Modern Languages in Yale College. New York: Leypoldt and Holt. 1869. 12mo. pp. vii., 248.

3. A German Reader in Prose and Verse, with Notes and Vocabulary. By William D. Whitney, Professor of Sanskrit and Instructor in Modern Languages in Yale College. New York: Leypoldt and Holt. 1869. 12mo. pp. 231 (text).

4. The Literature of the Age of Elizabeth. By Edwin P. Whipple. Boston: Fields, Osgood, & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 364.

5. George Eliot's Novels. Author's Household Edition. In Five Volumes. Adam Bede. The Mill on the Floss. Romola. Boston: Fields, Osgood, & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 315, 315, 344.

6. Reminiscences of James A. Hamilton; or, Men and Events, at Home and Abroad, during Three Quarters of a Century. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869. 8vo. pp. 647.

7. Elements of the Greek Language; taken from the Greek Grammar of James Hadley, Professor in Yale College. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 246.

8. Electricity in its Relations to Practical Medicine. By Moritz Meyer. Translated from the Third German Edition by William A. Hammond, M. D. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 8vo. pp. xxi., 497.

9. The Works of Horace. Edited, with Explanatory Notes, by Thomas Chase, Professor in Haverford College. Philadelphia: Eldredge and Brother. 1869. 12mo. pp. 429.

10. The Secret of Swedenborg: being an Elucidation of his Doctrine of the Divine Natural Humanity. By Henry James. Boston: Fields, Osgood, & Co. 1869. 8vo. pp. xv., 243.

11. Essay on Divorce and Divorce Legislation, with Special Reference to the United States. By Theodore D. Woolsey, D. D., LL. D., President of Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 308.

12. The American Annual Cyclopædia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1868. Vol. VIII. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869. 8vo. pp. 796.

13. Latin Lessons, adapted to the Manual Latin Grammar. Prepared by William F. Allen, A. M., Professor of Ancient Languages and History in the University of Wisconsin; and Joseph H. Allen. Boston: Edwin Ginn. 1869. 12mo. pp. x., 134.

14. A Latin Reader: consisting of Selections from Phædrus, Cæsar, Curtius, Sallust, Ovid, Virgil, Plautus, Terence, Cicero, Pliny, and Tacitus. With copious Notes and Vocabulary. Prepared by William F. Allen, A. M., Professor of Ancient Languages and History in the University of Wisconsin; and Joseph H. Allen. Boston: Edwin Ginn. 1869. 12mo. pp. x., 205.

INDEX

TO THE

HUNDRED AND NINTH VOLUME

OF THE

North American Review.