which was quite after the heart of King James the Second, and which had been vigorously trained in the household of Prince Rupert's mother; and every month of the years since the Restoration had laid up in him its store of venom against the spawn of Roundheads whom he came to teach their place. That was no reason why King William should not employ him in another government. The stern Dutchman liked him not at all the less for his idolatry of prerogative. The new king did not want on his hands the trouble that would be sure to be made if he should send Andros back again to Boston; but there was another colony which for other reasons needed to be held with a tight hand; and the fact that Sir Edmund had been the unflinching instrument of the last tyrant of the Stuart line secured him only the more favorable reception in Virginia when Virginia was to be brought into submission to the elected sovereign. And Andros was a man of sense enough always to know whom he had to deal with. In his new place he could not but act under a salutary conviction that there was watching him from across the water an eye which it was not easy to elude, and that altogether his best safety was in good behavior, - good behavior being now no longer what had been esteemed such in the last reign. The cold and politic king of the Revolution might have often to conceal his knowledge of the treachery of those immediately about him, but any eccentricities on the part of a governor of Virginia would be pretty sure to be brought to a swift reckoning. Andros was not so romantically devoted to the legitimate monarch but that he could consent to serve the usurper when the usurper sat firm in the saddle; and if he undertook that service, he knew too well the quality of the Orange blood to indulge himself in indiscretions. That Andros made a good enough governor of Virginia does not, in the circumstances, at all incline us to reverse the judgment which history has passed on his administration of New England.

10.. The Invasion of the Crimea: its Origin, and an Account of its Progress, down to the Death of Lord Raglan. By ALEXANDER WILLIAM KINGLAKE. New York: Harper and Brothers. Vol. II. 12mo. pp. 632.

THE Russian war is a contemporary event, for it is but thirteen years since it was brought to a close by one of the many important treaties that take their name from Paris; but it seems as remote as that contest which brought the career of Napoleon I. to a termination. Since 1856 the world has seen the Sepoy war, the Italian war,

the "Holy war" between Spain and Morocco, the Secession war, the war carried on by Prussia and Italy against Austria, the Abyssinian war, and the Paraguayan war, besides some less significant contests. The changes, too, that have taken place, in large part in consequence of the wars just mentioned, are of a gigantic character. That Bengal army, to the exploits of which England owes in great measure her wonderful Oriental dominion, has disappeared; the East India Company has ceased to exist as a political power, and Queen Victoria sits upon the throne of Akbar and Aurungzebe. The Austrian domination over Italy has ceased, and the kingdom of Italy has come into existence. The territorial possessions of the Pope have been reduced to a pitiful fragment. The Bourbons have been driven from the thrones of the Two Sicilies and of Spain, and Protestant preachers are at liberty to expound their opinions in Naples and in Madrid. American slavery, which seemed in 1856 to be so firmly seated, has been overthrown. The Germanic Diet has held its last sitting, and sleeps with the Holy Roman Empire. A new nation has risen in Europe, which challenges the European leadership of France. Great Britain has adopted democratic conditions of suffrage, and disestablished the Irish Church. These changes, so great and so unexpected, which have all occurred in less than twelve years, have dwarfed the Russian war to insignificance. The battles of the Alma and of Inkermann, of Balaklava and the Tchernaya, the bombardment of Sweaborg, and the storming of the Malakhoff, strike men as events equally remote and unimportant, because since their occurrence the world has heard of Delhi and Lucknow, Magenta and Solferino, Gettysburg and Chattanooga, Custozza and Sadowa.

This is so long a series of war-pictures that we underrate the importance of the earliest of them; but the Russian war was the opening act of the great drama to which the Italian war and the German war, the Sepoy war and the Secession war, all belong. It was the beginning of the breaking up of that conservative international system which had existed for almost forty years, and which was the chief result of the victory of the grand alliance formed against Napoleon. The first place in Christendom was held by Russia in consequence of the events of 1812-1815; England not appearing to care to dispute the leadership with her ally, though her part in the anti-Gallican confederacy gave her the primacy while war with Napoleon was going on, as she alone could command those enormous sums of money which rendered possible the fighting of such battles as Vittoria, Leipzig, and Waterloo. The Russian hegemony was established by Alexander I.; but the indecisive character of that czar, who never could be said to know his own mind,

and the shortness of his reign after the settlement of Europe in 18151818, prevented it from being very offensive so long as he lived. Alexander was "the soft triumvir" of the Holy Alliance, and, like James I., he was more inclined to talk about arbitrary power than to exercise it. But his early death led to a great change. Under his successor, Nicholas, the most was made of Russia's position; and had he been content with solid power, it is highly probable that his empire would have maintained its leading position to this day. That lead was lost by the inability of the czar to bear the test of long prosperity. After towering above his contemporaries for almost thirty years, the first rude blow of adversity prostrated him, and caused his death so suddenly that it is not strange men were inclined to believe that he left the world after "the high Roman fashion." For a long period be was virtually the arbiter of Europe; and no movement of importance could take place in it without his consent. He was the grand revolution-queller, and his army was a vast European police force. The Poles of "The Kingdom" were subdued by men who had conquered in Turkey and in Persia. Cracow was suppressed in violation of the terms of European treaties. The Turkish dynasty was upheld by Russian forces sent to the Bosphorus to protect it against Mahomet Ali. Hungary, after having achieved her independence of Austria, was prostrated by a larger Russian army than had fought at Borodino; and, had not Radetzky been victorious in Italy, Paskevitch would have marched into that country, and perhaps have achieved new successes on the old battle-fields of Trebbia and Novi.

But, though the talents of Nicholas were great, and his energy corresponded to his talents, he was not content with the substance of power. He required all men to acknowledge his supremacy, and never was more pleased with himself than when his conduct was most offensive to others. The consequence was, that he became the best hated man in Europe, and he was all the more detested because there appeared to be no hope of escape from his supremacy. He was the head of an old dynasty, and he ruled over a nation which had never lost ground from the time it had entered the European system. Nevertheless, the opportunity came. The course he pursued towards Turkey in 1853 gave to France and England good cause for war, and for breaking that power which was so offensive in itself, and so arrogantly wielded. It was impossible for England to consent to give up the East to him; and war was welcome to the new ruler of France, who had an opportunity to deal a damaging blow to the chief of the Continental powers which had overthrown the first Napoleon, and at the same time to gratify the national pride. The contest that followed, though

it did not essentially weaken the Russian empire, nevertheless deprived it of the leadership of Europe, and removed the Muscovite nightmare which had oppressed that continent for a generation. It did more. It made possible, and even easy, the changes in Europe that followed so fast upon the humiliation of Russia. The kingdom of Italy could never have been called into existence had the power of Nicholas remained unshaken; and the continuance of the system of Nicholas would have implied a resolute and successful opposition to that German policy which triumphed in 1866. The Russia that existed from 1814 to 1854 was as much opposed to the unification of Germany as ever was France in the days of the old monarchy. Such men as Cavour, Garibaldi, and Bismarck never could have accomplished what we have seen them bring about, had the strength of the Northern colossus remained unbroken. Even the Sepoy war could not have occurred, had not the Indian soldiers been impressed by the unfounded conviction, which they shared with men who had better means of knowing the truth,that the English army had made a poor figure in the contest with Russia.

It is singular that a contest so important in itself, and destined to have consequences so momentous, as the war between Russia and the Western Alliance, should have remained so long without a competent historian. The books which have been written upon it would fill many shelves; but they are either partial narratives, or semi-scientific in their character, or have been prepared for some special purpose. The general histories of the war do not rise above the rank of compilations, and the authors of them have not had access to the best authorities. Mr. Kinglake's work is the most striking exception to the truth of this remark; and even that is not a history of the war. It is the history of "The Invasion of the Crimea"; and, though the operations consequent upon that invasion were so striking as to concentrate attention, and to cause men often to speak of the "Crimean war," it is not to be forgotten that the contest began almost a year before the Allies saw Sebastopol, and that it was waged in Asia as well as in Europe, on the Danube as well as on the Alma, in the Baltic as well as in the Euxine. Then Mr. Kinglake writes only of that part of the war in the Crimea which closed at the death of Lord Raglan, June 28, 1854, ten weeks before the storming of the Malakhoff, and almost nine months before the contest was brought to a close. So far as his work extends, it satisfies every expectation, and makes us regret that he did not so plan it as to make it include a full account of the entire war. Mr. Kinglake's reputation as a writer leaves no occasion to speak of the style of his narrative, and we are convinced that he has written with as much honesty as spirit.

now no more

The volume before us, which contains the matter to be found in the third and fourth volumes of the English edition, is a history of thirty-five days, beginning with the evening after the battle of the Alma, on the 20th of September, 1854, and ending with the evening after the battle of Balaklava, on the 25th of October. A great critic- has objected to Orme's work on the foundation of the British empire in India, that it is minute even to tediousness; adding that in one of his volumes "he allots, on an average, a closely printed quarto page to the events of every forty-eight hours." What would he have said had he lived to read the work of an historian superior “in style and power of painting" to Orme, who allots on an average nearly a closely printed duodecimo page to the events of every forty-eight minutes? We do not object to this minuteness of narrative, for Mr. Kinglake is writing for a specific purpose, and we obtain from his vigorous pages a clear idea of the causes of the failure of the Allies to carry through their original plan, which was based on the belief that Sebastopol would fall before their efforts in a few days.

The current notion is, that the English were responsible for the long and costly siege of Sebastopol; that their timidity and sluggishness was a drag upon the vivacity and energy of the French; and that such men as St. Arnaud and Canrobert were restrained by Lord Raglan from the adoption of measures that would have given Sebastopol to the Allies as quickly as Wellington took Peronne. This estimate of the relative military merits of the two parties to the Western Alliance began to prevail at the very beginning of the war, and it has gained in strength almost to the present time. It had its origin in the almost universal conviction that the French are the first of nations in respect to the martial virtues; while the English, though of undoubted courage, and stubborn to a fault in action, are not otherwise good soldiers. French writers have afforded support to this assumption that English slowness was the cause of that delay which fixed the Allied armies around Sebastopol, when by active measures they might have entered it eleven months before the Russians evacuated it on the fall of the Malakhoff. It was not till Mr. Kinglake appeared in the field that the English side could obtain a hearing.

The first part of his work, which appeared six years ago, was devoted for the most part to the preliminaries of the war, and hardly touched upon military proceedings; but the second part relates almost entirely to the conduct of the war, and shows clearly where the trouble was with the Allies. The French generals showed the same lack of appreciation of the character of the war which was exhibited by some of our generals during the recent struggle. There are, indeed, some