high pleasure it was to create us frail, and whose characteristic love must necessarily incline him to treat our frailties leniently; whose nature can be disinclined to none but the stubborn, unreluctant sinner; nor to him but for a season, and with the gracious purpose of reclaiming him?

Can he be void of a death-bed consolation, who has been accustomed to regard and look up to his Creator as anxious (if the expression be consistent with his attributes) for the happiness of all his rational offspring, as loving them universally and impartially, and because he has created them; who has a thousand times announced his placability to sinners, exacting no other atonement for offences than a sinceré repentance, exemplified in purified morals and corresponding habits of life?

Say rather, that the Unitarian, under the influence of his habitual trust in such declarations, might in his extremity sing a song of triumph, when the devoutest professor of Orthodoxy-ceteris paribus in respect to the purity of their lives-might be weighed down with oppressive forebodings, the result of his lower estimate of the Divine character!"

The inconsistent charge has also been brought against Unitarians that they respect too lightly the threatenings of divine vengeance, fritter away their literal import, and repose too rashly, and even presumptuously, on the assurances of divine love, abounding as they confessedly are.

But, is that an argument against Unitarianism " supplying consolation upon a death-bed"? The assumption is a non sequitur, so palpable as to induce a smile. The converse might fairly be argued; leaving the question open as to the correctness of Unitarian apprehensions on the subject.

No, Sir! let us receive our Apostle's repeated axiom-with the humblest and the warmest gratitude receive and cherish it-in its genuine sense, that God's love to mankind is a feeling, which his power enables him to gratify; that, as the declaration of it is absolute, his love must be unlimited; and, whatever presuming mortals (inen who would appropriate the Divine mercy) may suggest

* Vide Postscript.

to the contrary, let us rest in the conviction that the God who is Love, views, in his boundless survey of the universe, the shrinking Calvinist, the confiding Unitarian, and the whole human race with undisturbed complacence, and with an equal regard to their eternal welfare.

Considering the stress laid in the Scriptures upon the article of faith, and the saving merit ascribed to it, of which these examples may suffice, "As thou hast believed, so be it done unto thee"

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Thy faith hath made thee whole❞— "Thy faith hath saved thee"

rian's faith in the Divine benignity, And, considering that the UnitaTM even were it overweening, appears so consonant to the spirit of the gospel, it would be difficult to conceive how it can ever be imputed to him for unrighteousness.

Ill betide-I could almost breathe

the imprecation-ill betide the sainted bigot, who would divest him of this faith on the verge of eternity! It may be more charitable to add-Enlighten, O God! the mind so clouded as to question its efficacy in our departing moments!

BREVIS.

P. S. All sects and denominations concur in speaking of the Almighty as the Father of the human race. Contemplating him in this endearing character, let us retire from it to one of ourselves, upon the supposition of his being even morally certain that some or one of any children he might have, would, maugre all his endeavours to make them virtuous, so act as to "perish everlastingly." Should we hesitate, if that man took a wife, or approached a woman, to pronounce him the worst and wickedest of all bad men? Would the man who volunteered himself the instrument of such perdition, deserve from us a more respectful mention? I leave the Calvinists to make the application.

severity, p. 409. When I read the passage I said, This is in course, and gives me no concern. But I am sorry to find that a learned and estimable man, the Bishop of St. David's, should have chosen to pronounce in the House of Lords that Unitarians are not Christians. Whether the Bishop means that they are unbelievers in disguise, or that, though they fancy themselves Christians, they are not really such, I neither know nor wish to be informed. But as I would willingly suppose that the Bishop does not profess to search the secrets of the heart, I shall consider his declaration as meaning, that though Unitarians believe what they profess to believe, still they are not entitled to the appellation of Christians. What then is the definition of the term Christian? I should propose the following; a Christian is one who admits the divine mission of Christ, and consequently acknowledges his religion as the rule of faith and practice. And I should add, that he who successfully endeavours to act up to the moral precepts of this religion, in the expectation of a life to come, is a real and a good Christian. This definition would not satisfy the Bishop of St. David's. Nor, I presume, would the Bishop's definition satisfy the Catholic. But the Bishop, no doubt, would say that the Unitarian rejects the essential doctrines of Christianity. But who is authorized to determine what are and what are not its essential doctrines? Until this question is settled, it may seem reasonable to conclude that those doctrines constitute the essence of Christianity which are inculcated in the New Testament with such perspicuity and force, that they have been admitted, in every age, though_with_various combinations of error, by all who have borne the Christian name. The doctrines for which the Bishop is so zealous are doubtless essential to the system which he considers as Christianity, but I should marvel if his Lordship, with the aid of all who think with him, could prove them to be essential to the great practical object of the Christian faith, that is to living soberly, righteously and godly in this present world, in the expectation of " that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ." Not awed by

the Bishop's skill in Greek, I repeat the words, “ and of our Saviour Jesus Christ;" which version is not inconsistent with the terms of the original, as the Greeks not unfrequently pass from one subject to another without repeating the article before the second. Of this some curious examples may be found in Thucydides. I know the canon by which it has has been attempted to prove the divinity of Christ from the passage now cited. But in the application of the canon it is assumed, that the expression," the great God," can be an attributive of the subject, Jesus Christ. But if this can be, how comes it to pass that we never meet with the simple expression our God Jesus Christ in the New Testament? an expression which was used when the divinity of our Lord was at length believed. Jesus Christ is sometimes called our Saviour, but his usual designation is that of "our Lord;" a designation which occurs about 100 times in the epistolary part of the New Testament. But in no one instance is he simply called our God. But, perhaps, some one may say, is not the passage in question rendered ambiguous by the omission of the article?" Ambiguous to whom? I will venture to say that it was ambiguous to no one who read the epistle in the age in which it was penned. But granting it to be ambiguous, which version has a just right to be preferred, that which makes Jesus Christ the same with the great Supreme, or that which distinguishes him from his Father and our Father, his God and our God; that which makes the passage speak a language consistent with the tenor of the sacred volume from beginning to end, or that which imports into it an inexplicable mystery which has no support whatever except from two or three passages of dubious construction? Yet for explaining these passages in such a manner as to render them conformable to innumerable clear and express declarations of scripture, Unitarians are reproached as unlearned, and pronounced not to be Christians!

I believe the Bishop of St. David's to be a Christian, and though in my judgment a mistaken, yet a conscientious Christian. But allow me to define the essentials of the Christian faith, and let me imbibe a little of his

It will be difficult I think to make out the consistency of these statements. They indicate a mind vacillating between philosophy and revelation, sensible at times of the insufficiency of the former, and disposed to rest with confidence in the latter; but at other times pursuing analogical reasonings, (or rather, perhaps, indulging benevolent conjectures,) till conclusions are formed at variance with the Scriptures as generally understood; and hence, not indeed inclined to reject Revelation (for it is expressly said, "I hold myself bound to give up any speculation which stands opposed to clear and positive scriptural doctrines"); but anxious to interpret the passages of scripture which appear to teach that men will be punished after the resurrection for the sins committed in the body," so that they may "be consistent with the hypothesis that the pains of this life may suffice for the whole of our future existence,"

Philadelphus, as we have seen, thinks that Dr. Priestley, and in consequence of his statements Dr. Hartley, had been led to hope for the reformation, without punishment or suffering, of those who have passed through life in vicious courses; and, endeavouring "to discover the train of reasoning which they pursued," he thinks that he has adduced at least plausible reasons in favour of the conclusion to which they had arrived; and his great solicitude is derived from the circumstance that there are "several passages of scripture which appear to teach that men will be punished after the resurrection for the sins committed in the body," and which, of course, appear to be inconsistent with his speculations as to the termination of pain with the present life. This is all in itself very perplexing, but it becomes doubly so when contrasted with the language of the writer, p. 284, in commenting on Dr. Hartley's assertion that reason approves of the pure and indefinite happiness of the good," and "acquiesces in the indefinite punishment of the wicked." As God is no respecter of persons, it would seem to follow," says Philadelphus, " not that there should be such an immense disparity in the future condition of such mixed characters, but that rewards and punishments will be dealt out with

perfect impartiality in exact proportion to the degree of virtue or of vice which belongs to each individual character." How can this passage be reconciled with the denial in toto of future punishment? And further, as if to form a climax of inconsistency, while " reasoning from analogy" for the purpose of shewing that future suffering may not be necessary to change the views and reform the habits of sinners, this benevolent, but too hasty, writer actually admits and reasons upon the existence of that very suffering.

Adverting to the hypothesis which supposes a continuance of consciousness and activity after death, he expressly says of the virtuous, "It is reasonable to suppose that, actuated by the same feelings which distinguish good men in this world, their efforts have been unceasingly directed to relieving the miserable, enlightening the ignorant, and reclaiming the vicious." In noticing the hypothesis which assumes a suspension of consciousness between death and resurrection, he does not, indeed, explicitly advance the same idea; but there is nothing in his argument which tends to establish a distinction between the two hypotheses as to this point. We have here then a distinct admission of vice and misery as existing in the future state. Philadelphus does not indeed say that the one will be the effect or the punishment of the other; but when he sets out (p. 284) with supposing "the invisible world and the invisible dispensations of Providence to be analogous to what ap pears; or that both together make up one uniform scheme, the two parts of which, the part we see, and that which is beyond our observation are analogous to each other;" he warrants the inference that, as in this world vice naturally tends to produce misery, so in the world to come the vicious will be exposed to suffering as the consequence of their evil character and conduct.

From what has appeared under the signature of Philadelphus, in "The Monthly Repository," I am induced to anticipate with confidence that his candour will prompt him, on a careful review of his papers, to acknowledge the justice of these remarks. If this be admitted, if it appear, after all, that we cannot reason fairly from

analogy without anticipating the existence of suffering in the future life as the effect of unrepented guilt, the bestowment of rewards, and the infliction of punishments, with perfect impartiality, in exact proportion to the degree of virtue or of vice which belongs to each individual character,-I do not see that the theory of the Divine Government which we are led by reason to form is opposed to that unfolded in the Scriptures: "Say ye to the righteous, that it shall be well with him; for they shall eat of the fruit of their doings. Woe to the wicked! it shall be ill with him: for the reward of his hands shail be given him." Isa. iii. 10, 11. God will judge the world in righteousness." Acts xvii. 31. God "will render to every man according to his deeds," &c. Rom. ii. 6, et seq. The dictates of sound philosophy and the plain declarations of Holy Writ concur to assure us that "it is an evil and a bitter thing to sin against God." Even on the most favourable supposition, admitting that the sufferings of the wicked will have a purifying tendency and effect, (and, I frankly confess, that I know not how, on any other theory, we can both

"assert Eternal Providence, And justify the ways of God to man,") the prospect disclosed to us should excite alarm in the sinner, and rouse the righteous to zealous exertion.

When the awful language of the New Testament denouncing bodily endurance on the impenitent is softened down as much as possible, granting that it is but a figurative mode of representing the realities of the spiritual world to our imperfect apprehension, there are still the tortures of the mind, the raging fire of evil passion, the overwhelming force of sinful habits, the goadings of an accusing conscience, the horrors of remorse, and the pangs of repentance to be endured. He who has felt in any degree the wretchedness which sin produces in this world, he who has witnessed with a feeling heart the misery which it brings on the sinner, will not be inclined (unless he denies a future state altogether) to entertain doubt as to its baneful operation in the world to come.

There will, no doubt, be great dif

ference, according to previous circumstances, in the future condition of those who leave this world unprepared for the pure happiness of heaven. He who knew not his Master's will," and therefore did it not, "will be beaten with few stripes," will need a comparatively gentle course of discipline. The communication of that knowledge which in this life was withheld, would be likely to exercise on his mind an immediate, powerful, and happy influence. But alas for him, "who knew his Master's will, and yet did things worthy of stripes," him to whom the majesty and the loveliness of the Divine character as exhibited in the works of God and in the gospel of Christ have been displayed, and who, notwithstanding, lived and died without cultivating the fear and love of God. Can we be surprised that such men should incur a dreadful condemnation, be beaten with many stripes, and having resisted in vain the grand motives presented to their minds, be subjected to "tribulation and anguish," to a discipline of tremendous severity, and be placed in a situation of eternal disadvantage? These are, indeed, prospects painful to the pious and benevolent mind; but it is of little use to close our eyes to them. We cannot by this means even avoid the uncomfortable reflections to which the existence of evil gives rise. Suppose. it could be proved that there will be no future suffering, suppose that the language of the New Testament were shewn to be consistent with this hypothesis, the object aimed at would not be attained. He who thinks that future suffering, although corrective, is inconsistent with the superintendance" of a truly benevolent Being," and hence persuades himself that it will not be inflicted, will still be dissatisfied. When he notices "the miseries which" in an infinite variety "flesh is heir to," (and the existence of which can neither be denied nor doubted,) he will be sometimes tempted to doubt whether such things could happen under the government of a truly benevolent Being, and will continue to experience uncomfortable reflections. For these doubts and painful emotions, whether suggested by the existence of evil at present or by the anticipation of future evil, there is