SERM. which are all we can conceive in fuch beings, II. that can produce any effect. Every one of these latter ideas however, takes in the primary fenfible qualities; whatever appears to us hot, cold, coloured, &c. appears at the fame time extended, divisible and figured. But we find also in our own minds, perceptions of another kind, which take in no ideas of any sensible qualities. By attending to the exercise of our own powers and the various modes of thinking, we have notions, and the knowledge of truths, which have no manner of relation to extenfion, magnitude, divifibility, figure, or motion. But the other and lower, even the fentient principle, opens to us a scene in nature different from the curious and beautiful fabric of the heavens, the earth, and all other inanimate effects. For they require nothing befides unactive and unintelligent matter for the fubject of them, tho' they lead us to the acknowledgment of wisdom and defign in the directing and difpofing caufe; but here feems to be in the effect itself a fuperior order of being, having properties and powers of a kind intirely different; and this feems to be in all the various forts of animals, in fome degree or other, fome of them being more, fome less perfectly fenfitive. It is true, we can't know what paffes in brutes, as we do what paffes in our own minds: Yet II. Yet when we confider their organs in the ex-SERM. terior form, and in the anatomy of them, very much resembling our own; and when we confider the effects which follow the prefenting, and the application of material objects to them, very like thofe which appear in us on the fame occafion, we cannot well avoid concluding, that they have the external senses of hearing, seeing, feeling, tasting and smelling, in common with us, and the like perception of fenfible qualities as we have. Some philofophers have represented them as mere machines; and the whole œconomy of their fenfes and operations, as if it were no more than a curious piece of clock-work, form'd with exquifite art. But this notion is defervedly exploded; for indeed the obvious appearances can never be accounted for by any mechanical hypothefis. But let us confider the fenfitive powers as we find them in ourselves; and though they are the lower part of our nature, far lefs excellent than fome other faculties of the human mind, yet they seem to be of quite another kind and original, and of a higher nature than the grofs corporeal part, or any of its organs; organs; indeed higher than any naturally incogitative and unactive being is capable of, at least, without the interpofition of a fuperior defigning Agent. If now we have found a being, nay, VOL. I. D a mul SERM.a multitude of beings in the world, effentially II. diftinguish'd from others by the peculiar pow ers of perception, exercis'd in a variety of modes, this muft overthrow all the Atheistical hypothefes. For their neceffary mechanical causes in an infinite ferious, and atoms by a fortuitous motion compounding and diverfifying themselves into various forms, are wholly infufficient to produce fuch effects. But this particular appearance leads us directly to acknowledge fomething refembling it, rather fuperior to it, that is understanding in the author. For can any one imagine, that a blind undefigning cause could have produc'd perception, diftinguish'd into fo many kinds, as of colours, founds, pain, pleafure, &c. all united in one undivided principle? This perceptive faculty is a low image of intelligence, which is very reasonably attributed to a free intending Agent, who may, himself poffefs'd of perfect power and wifdom, communicate various degrees of thofe perfections to his works, as he fees fit; but can never with any pretence of reafon, be accounted for by chance or neceffity, or by any unperceiving caufe; efpecially confidering it as an abiding principle, uniformly fubfervient to certain ends, fubfifting in a regular diverfity of outwards forms, and in a great variety of degrees. II. This will be ftill more evident, if we con- SER M. fider in conjunction with fenfe, that other principal appearance of the animal life, fpontaneous motion. We know that inanimate things at reft, neceffarily continue fo, till they are moved by a force fuperior to their own power of refiftance: But animal bodies, either the whole, or particular members of them, change their posture, begin to move or continue in motion, by an inward activity and voluntary self-determination. This, one would think, should be a very furprizing phænomenon to the Atheist, who denies the existence. of an original active Caufe. But how does het get rid of the difficulty? Why, he roundly denies any fuch thing as felf-motion; and alledges, that all which looks like it in animal action, is the mere effect of the inward agitation of the machine, raised by the impulse of external objects on the organs of sense. But to this account the fact does not at all agree; as every one may be easily fatisfied by his own obfervation. Tho' 'tis true that in our fenfations we are paffive, and they neceffarily arife, according to an establish'd law, by the impreffion which certain objects make upon us ; we cannot avoid the perception of pleasure and pain upon fome occafions, nor the hearing of founds and feeing of colours, when the D 2 organs SERM.organs are duly difpos'd, and these sensations II. are neceffarily attended with fome motions in the animal system; yet for the actions which are called voluntary, we know, that, as they are never properly caused, they are often not fo much as occafioned by the impulse of external objects. Is not every man conscious to himself that he moves his hands, his feet and other parts of his body, by the fole command of his will, frequently when there is no impulfe at all from without exciting him to it; and that the proper agent in fuch cases is the fame conscious felf, which is intimately prefent in all parts of the body, perceiving the impreffions which are made upon it by its organs of fenfe? We cannot indeed explain the nature and manner of this operation, nor would the exacteft knowledge we can attain of the animal œconomy enable us to underftand it. For tho' a learn'd anatomift may defcribe the mufcles, and fhew their convenient fituation, fitting them by their contractions to move the several members; yet how the act of the foul contracts thofe muscles, how it directs the courfe of the animal fpirits, or influences whatever are the nearest and most immediate inftruments of the animal motion; this he is as ignorant of, as the most unskilful ruftic. But this they equally know, and all mankind |
