mingle together; there is no farther propaga- SER M. tion of that fort, the anomalous breed termi- II. nates in the first production, and no new fpecies arises.

Again, as none of the fpecies have ever run into each other, fo it does not appear that any of them have been loft, for want of the neceffary means and opportunities of propagation. This evidently depends on the dftinction of the fexes, and a proneness in them to continue their kind. Strange! that in fo many descents there fhould never have happened, (if hazard ruled and not wife Providence,) all males of, at least one fpecies, or all females, or that individuals of one fex fhould not fo out-number the other, as to put an end to, at least very much diminish the race; (but we see the contrary in fact;) and that there fhould have been a never failing determination in the individuals to fulfil their natural law of propagation. The fum is this; these appearances I have mentioned in the animal world, amount to the three following obfervations of fact, which may be depended on as certain and constant; and let the Atheist, if he can, reconcile them to his beloved chance or blind neceffity. First, that there is belonging to every kind of animals, a diftinguishing nature, by the direction whereof all the matter

by

SERM. by which they are nourished, or an addition II. is made to their bulk, whether in the womb or out of it, is moulded into their particular and proper form. This nature we all acknowledge in the forms of living things. For when any extraordinary production happens, deficient in members, or with fupernumerary members, or a fituation of them different from what is ufual in the kind, we presently call it monftrous and unnatural. 2dly, The species are preferved by the diftinction of fexes in the individuals; and there has been of males and females belonging to the feveral kinds, in all the generations which have hitherto pafs'd, fuch a proportion, as, all circumstances confidered, is beft calculated to anfwer the purpose of perpetuating the species. 3dly, The propagation thus provided for, depends upon instincts planted in the individuals; and these have always appeared strong enough to answer their end.

If we proceed, in the next place, to confider the principal, but very obvious phænomena of the animal, and especially of the human conftitution, viz. perception, and activity, with all their modes, in the fame view with the frame of the visible world, and the origin and regular propagation of the fenfitive kinds; that is, if we confider them only as evidences of in

telligence

telligence and design in their production, they SERM. add a force to the argument which, one would II. think, fhould appear to an attentive mind irrefiftible. For furely it can never be imagin'd,

with
any appearance of reafon, that fenfation
and its different modes, feeing, hearing, &c.
fpontaneous motion, and the various instincts
of animals producing fuch a regular œconomy
in their lives, each individual caring for itself
and pursuing its own ends, by the proper use
of its powers and organs, and all of the feveral
tribes confpiring together to promote the com-
mon good of the whole, fo far as their several
conditions require; much less that the powers
of reafon and reflection, the focial and moral
affections wherewith men are endued, toge-
ther with the improvements of them in the
intire scheme of human life, and human fo-
cieties, comprehending fo much order, con-
trivance, and various enjoyment; it cannot, I
fay, be imagin'd, that all these are to be at-
tributed to undefigning neceffity or chance.

There is a variety with uniformity and beautiful order, in the fenfitive and intellectual, as well as in the material world, which must strike every confiderate perfon with a sense of grand design in its formation. As in the corporeal fyftem, vaftly numerous parts, all properly fituated and commodiously dispos'd, with an apparent

SERM.apparent mutual relation and ufefulness, is a II. clear demonftration of wife contrivance in the

whole; fo the no lefs, perhaps much greater diverfity of percipient and active powers, with the different degrees of them, which appears under vifible forms, at the fame time a regular unchanging fimilarity in the feveral fpecies, which could no more proceed from chance, than the variety could from undirected force; and if we add to all this the convenient difpofal of them, fo that every individual power has a full fcope for its exercife, and inftead of interfering with each other, there is an apparent mutual correfpondence throughout the whole of their ftate, and a fubordination of use, according to the measures of their perfection, the lower still ferving the higher, as inanimate nature minifters a conftant fupply to them all; this is at least an equally invincible proof of defign in the author of the fyftem. In short, the animal and rational inhabitants of this globe, even upon a fuperficial view of them feparately, of their natures, capacities and conditions, and the oeconomy which appears in the most obvious face of this living world, carry fuch irrefragable evidences of defign, that, referring to the comparifon us'd by fome of the ancients, it would be an equal, or even a greater abfurdity to refolve thefe appearances into blind neceffity,

neceffity, or chance, than to account for the SERM. compofure of the finest poem, by the neceffary II. or merely fortuitous jumble of letters. How ftrangely is the human understanding capable of being misled by prejudices and prepoffeffions, fo as not to difcern the clearest truths?

But if we confider more particularly these principal appearances of the animal life, efpecially the limited rational faculties of man, the argument will be yet more convincing to prove unoriginated intelligence and activity in the univerfe. I obferv'd before, that by attending to ourselves, and to the report of our senses, concerning external objects, we have the effentially different ideas of percipient and unpercipient beings, of caufe and effect, of active and paffive powers, or of voluntary agency and neceffity, as diftinguish'd from it. And now I add, that we cannot avoid obferving in ourfelves different kinds of perception, namely, fense and understanding. By the former we have only the ideas of what are called primary fenfible qualities, as extenfion, folidity, divifibility and figure, and other ideas, such as heat, coldness, colours, fharpnefs, fweetness, and the like, which our reafon tells us, are not in the objects themselves, but perceptions or phantasms rais'd in our minds by the various texture, figure, motion and fituation of parts, which