much, at least, is true. All proper oratory is a personal procedure. It implies a person in the concrete fullness of his personal relations addressing other persons in the concrete fullness of their personal relations. So far it is a moral procedure and comes under the supervision of ethics. Rhetoric is, by no means, however, a part of moral science. If it represent moral states, if it imply a moral aim, if, consequently, it must proceed in conformity to moral principles, still, it does not follow that it is a department of ethics. Every systematic procedure on the part of man partakes of this moral relationship. Rhetoric but takes elements or principles given by ethics and weaves them with others, on principles of its own, into a particular science or art. It is no more a department of ethics than of physiology.

§ 4. In so far as Discourse is a representation of feeling or addresses feeling in another mind, it bears an intimate relation to the SCIENCE OF THE EMOTIONS AND THE PASSIONS.

Rhetoric thus derives from this science the principles by which discourse is to be regulated both in the expression of feeling and in the excitement of feeling. It assumes these principles, however, as known, and does not properly regard the investigation of them as lying within its own province. It takes the analysis of the feelings, the classification, the description, the relations between them, as furnished by the appropriate science, and uses them for its own peculiar ends.

5. Discourse, as the product of a mind working freely, and directly aiming at an effect in another mind similarly constituted, involves and requires the exercise of Taste.

Rnetoric, accordingly, presupposes the science of

TASTE OF AESTHETICS. It assumes aesthetic principles and applies them to the production of discourse. The relation of Rhetoric to Aesthetics will be more particularly defined under Chapter III.

§ 6. As the art of communicating thought, rhetoric presupposes LOGIC, or the science which unfolds the laws of thought, and enumerates and classifies the various conceptions, judgments and conclusions of which the human mind is capable. It, however merely assumes those laws as known, and does not properly embrace a consideration of them within its own province.

§ 7. As the art of communicating thought by means of language, rhetoric also presupposes GRAMMAR, O the science of language. It takes the results of gram matical investigations and the laws of language as settled, and applies them to its own purpose.

The field of rhetoric is thus seen to be distinctly define and separated from both Logic and Grammar. That it ha ever been suffered to trench on these fields and assume intc itself purely logical or grammatical investigations and discussions, is to be attributed only to vague and indefinite views of the proper province of rhetoric. It was from the same vague apprehensions in regard to the proper province of rhetoric that the ancient rhetoricians very generally included in their systems the principles of Ethics and the doctrine of the feelings. Even Aristotle devotes a large part of his treatise on Rhetoric to a discussion of the nature of the different passions or affections.

The distinction between rhetoric on the one hand, and logic and grammar on the other, may, perhaps, be more perfectly apprehended from the following definitions:

Logic, in the more comprehensive view of the science, is the doctrine of ideas, conceptions, and judgments. In other words, logic enumerates the various possible states of the intellect, whether ideas, conceptions, or judgments, classifies them, determines their forms, and shows their relations and the occasions or modes of their appearing.

In

Grammar is the doctrine of words and sentences. other words, grammar unfolds the laws by which the various forms of thought appear in language; by which logical ideas and conceptions, in themselves and in their relations, emlody themselves in words and logical judgments in sen

tences.

Rhetoric is the doctrine of discourse. It takes, first, the individual ideas, conceptions and judgments of logic, and unites them into living wholes of thought by penetrating them with a rational aim; and then embodies these concrete wholes into continuous discourse made up of the words and sentences which grammar has furnished.

Logic and grammar thus supply the lifeless and fragmentary elements. Rhetoric takes them and constructs them into discourse; into a living concrete whole, animated with the proper life of feeling, and the proper moral aim which discourse in its original import ever implies.

§ 8. The art of rhetoric cannot in strictness be regarded as having accomplished its end until the mental states to be communicated are actually conveyed to the mind addressed. It, therefore, may properly comprehend Delivery.

The mode of communication, however, is not essential. The thought may be conveyed by the pen or by the voice. ELOCUTION, or the vocal expression of thought, is not accordingly a necessary part of rhetoric.

Elocution or vocal delivery has, indeed, generally been

esteemed a constituent part of the art of rhetoric. Diverse considerations, however, justify the propriety of separating

them.

First, Elocution is not essential to rhetoric in order to constitute it an art; because, as has been already remarked, there are other ways of communicating thought than by the voice.

Secondly, we have a complete product of art when the thought is embodied in a proper form of language. Short of this, of incorporating into language, the artist cannot stop. For no art is complete till its product is expressed, or embodied. Mere invention does not constitute the whole of artistic power, in any proper sense of that expression. But when the thought is invested in language, a work of art is completed. A farther exertion of artistic power is not necessary in order to give it expression. It requires no skill to dictate, no oratorical dexterity, certainly, to commit to writing. We have then the limits of a complete art before elocution.

Thirdly, the arts of rhetoric proper, and of elocution, are so distinct that great excellence in either may consist with great deficiency in the other. There have been many orators who could write good orations but were miserable speakers; and many excellent actors, who were utterly unable to construct an original discourse.

Fourthly, the modes of training in these different arts are so unlike, that convenience, both to the instructor and to the pupil, requires that they be separated.

§ 9. In so far as Discourse is the embodiment of thought in language, Rhetoric and the art of Poetry stand on common ground and are subject to common principles. They may be distinguished from each other by the following specific definitions; viz:

Rhetoric or the art of Oratory is the embodiment of thought in language with a view to an effect on another mind;

Poetry is the embodiment of aesthetic ideas in language simply for the sake of aesthetic expression.

Rhetoric and poetry have, thus, much in common. They both express thought. They are so far subject alike to the laws of logical science.

The medium of expression in both is the same-language. The principles of style, accordingly, apply, to a certain extent, alike to both.

They are both aesthetic arts; and come alike, conse quently, under the laws of Taste.

Many of the principles of rhetoric are, therefore, equally applicable to poetry. They admit illustrations, alike, from both of these arts.

But they differ both in content and in form. All thought, all at least, which can be serviceable to the moral effect that either directly or remotely belongs to all oratory, is appro priate to rhetoric, whether purely intellectual, or animated with emotion and fancy. Poetry can properly make use only of aesthetic ideas.

The language of oratory is not confined, as is that of poetry, to mere aesthetic expression. Poetry has a style as well as a content of its own.

Rhetoric, moreover, while proceeding in accordance with aesthetic laws, admits another end which is foreign to aesthetics; and aesthetic laws in their application to it, tuke direct cognizance of this foreign end, which is possible through the aesthetic element of propriety. See Chap. III. Poetry has no such aim foreign to aesthetic expression.

Rhetoric and poetry, therefore, are distinct arts; differing, essentially, in content, form and law of proceeding. The