the same mind in the same circumstances always wills in the same way. Respecting the origin of the notion of causation, which Mr. Hazard, with many other philosophers, attributes to our conscious voluntary efforts, producing muscular exertion, Mr. Mill brings forward the argument of Sir William Hamilton, that this cannot be the case, since between the volition, and the motion of the arm, or any other member, there intervene links of cause and effect of which the mind, in the act of will, can have no cognizance. In reply, Mr. Hazard denies that such a cognizance of the intervening process is requisite, inasmuch as the knowledge that the given effect will be produced as a consequence of volition is at first instinctive, and without this innate knowledge the putting forth of such volition would be inconceivable. Mr. Hazard also argues with much force against the general doctrine of Hume and Mill, that causation is identical with invariable sequence, efficiency being excluded. It is asserted that Mr. Mill's definitions seem only to indicate a mode of experimentally finding what are causes, and do not explain or define either our idea or the nature of cause. They do not discriminate between efficient causes and causes which, though necessary to the effect, have no agency in producing it; as life, for example, is the necessary condition of death. The passive agencies which resist a given change are not to be confounded with the active agency which changes them. The fact that men differ from one another in their distinction of the cause, from the mere conditions, of a phenomenon, does not prove that there is no cause, in the sense commonly assigned to the term. If twenty men attribute a phenomenon to twenty dif ferent agencies, it is no indication that it may be properly attributed to the whole twenty agencies combined." This diversity of judgment as to what is the real cause furnishes no scientific ground for combining all the conditions, and deeming them, collectively taken, the cause. We have room for only a brief extract:

"There must be some power producing the uniformity, the existence of which, in the flow of events, all admit. To meet this necessity of the observed facts, the last hypothesis of our category seems to have been devised. It appears to fully cover the ground intended, for it asserts that the cause inheres, not in the events themselves, but in the invariability or uniformity of their succession. But the very things to be

accounted for by the theory, are, first; the advent, addition, or succession of an event, and second, the observed uniformity in this succession. Under this hypothesis, if it be asked why one certain event succeeds another certain event, it must be replied, because it always does so; i. e. it does so on the particular occasion, because it does so on all other like occasions. And if in any case the cause of this uniformity be asked for, as, for instance, why the consequent B always succeeds the antecedent A, the answer must still be because it always does so; i. e. it always does so because it always does so, or, shorter, it does because it does. Nor will it help the matter to say it not only always has been, but we believe it always will be so. The generic names of the phenomena are now superseded by the phrase always does, both traceable to the same observed fact of uniformity, and both really making the phenomena in a collective form the causes of themselves individually.

"The idea of causative power is distinct from, and must precede, that of the uniformity of its action or its effect. The power which produces the effect may be wholly independent of any uniformity in its manifes tation. It is no less cause the first time it acts, when no uniformity can have obtained; and would be no less cause if it varied its action every time it acted. The two ideas are not only not identical, but are essentially distinct and different.

"From the conclusion which I reached, that the effect is simultaneous with the action of its cause, I have already suggested the corollary, that our idea of cause is independent of, and separable from, that of succession; and if I was correct in saying that the knowledge that we can (through motion of matter or otherwise) extend the effects of any action beyond, the moment of exertion is not essential to our idea of power or of cause, we may from this also infer that succession is not a necessary element in our idea of power or of cause; and this position, if tenable, takes away the whole foundation of the definitions of cause which rest upon the mere succession of consequents to antecedents invariable, inevitable, or otherwise."

Other points which are brought into this controversy on the nature of cause and the origin of our notion of cause, example, the simultaneousness of effect and cause, not here notice.

as, for we can

There is one department of the action of the will, which, if it be recognized in this treatise, has less than its due share of attention. There are permanent states of the will, immanent preferences, which are properly called principles of

action, inasmuch as they dictate a great variety of overt voluntary actions subordinate to them. In other words, the mind voluntarily sets before itself ends, and the determination of the will towards an end, when once made, may abide as a permanent state of the will, and as the spring of numberless volitions which are put forth as means for the attainment of the end thus previously chosen. Mr. Hazard has a chapter on the "Effort for Internal Change." In the course of it, he observes: "If the object of the effort, instead of external good and noble action, is the direct improvement of his own moral nature, then the persevering effort to be good and noble is, itself, being good and noble." Here the effort that is, the — action of the will-is characterized as "persevering." It is also said: "While in the external there must be something beyond the effort,-i. e. there must be that subsequent change which is the object of the effort, before the creation is consummated, — in the sphere of the moral nature the effort is itself the consummation." These sentences open a path of inquiry which this able writer has not very fully pursued. We may briefly indicate what we conceive to be the truth in the matter. That such a continuous purpose or determination of the will may exist, is a truth familiarly acknowledged. I resolve to go to London. This resolve is a determination of the will, after a consideration, we will suppose, of the reasons for and against the journey. This resolution, once formed, is not, or need not be, renewed. It remains as an abiding condition of the will; and in pursuance of it I arrange my affairs at home, engage my passage, and put forth numberless other volitions, all of which serve merely for the execution of this. original and continuous purpose. We believe that we are not wrong in describing the state of mind to which we advert as a voluntary state, a state of the will. Now the mind is capable of setting before itself ends, or cherishing purposes, of a vastly more comprehensive character. This explains the possibility of habits, as well as acts, of the will. The will is not merely a faculty of volitions; it is a faculty of preferences, comprehensive, abiding, and governing in their influence, from which volitions spring. These leading purposes or principles constitute character. To follow out the suggestions of this truth NO. 225.

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would lead us too far into the domain of theology. But it may be observed that philosophical theologians, like Augustine and Aquinas and Calvin, have considered themselves to assert in their doctrine of sin the very truth respecting the simplicity of character, which Jesus taught in the declaration, "No man can serve two masters." To live for an end is necessary for a rational, moral being; and this end is either good or evil.

The treatise of Mr. Hazard, in our judgment, assigns to knowledge an undue influence on voluntary action. We are not satisfied that what the author calls choice, the decision how to act, belongs to the understanding. This criticism touches one of the prominent features of the system advocated in the work. Suppose a case in which a man is engaged in a struggle with temptation. Reason and moral feeling prompt in one direction; appetite and selfish passion in another. And suppose that the will acts in conformity with the baser impulse. Can it be said that the man beforehand knows that this action is best? We are familiar with the distinction which writers make between the rational and the passionate judgment,-the conviction, on the one hand, that the virtuous action and the satisfaction attending it are best, and the vivid sense, on the other, of the attractiveness of forbidden pleasure. But the question is, does not the mind, as far as the judging-faculty is concerned, decide that the right action is best, and, all things considered, will suit it best? And does it not act in direct opposition to the decision of the understanding? In other words, does the man not know that he is acting foolishly, as well as culpably? He is, in fact, choosing an immediate gratification for one more remote and enduring, a gratification of a low species for a refined and elevated enjoyment. The motive to this unworthy act is not to be found within the sphere of the intellect or reason. If there is a more intense excitement of certain lower propensities, and if this vivid conception of the pleasure to be derived from indulging them occasions the wrong act of the will, still this condition of feeling is not to be confounded with an act of judgment. There is simply a choice a choice by the will- of an inferior good, which the mind knows to be inferior; and for this choice no sufficient reason is to be given. If there were, the act would

not be morally wrong. We can point out the occasions, or antecedent states of feeling, which are likely to lead to, or be followed by, such an act; but here our explication must end, unless we would call evil good.

The Greek philosophers, without exception, exaggerated the influence exercised by knowledge over character. One pervading error of their systems was this one-sided intellectualism, which even identified knowledge and virtue. This is the verdict of scholars generally, and has been stated by none more explicitly, even in reference to the Socratic system, than by Mr. Grote, the historian. An increase of knowledge may tend to an increase of virtue; but it is a part of the mystery of our free and responsible nature that we can, and often do, act in direct contravention of our clearest perceptions. Ignorance may mitigate, and in some cases obliterate, guilt. "They know not what they do," is an argument for forgiveness. But it is not true that knowledge invariably produces rectitude. Rather is it true that the will and affections may, and in unrighteous action do, reject the control of intelligence.

In perusing Mr. Hazard's treatise, we have carefully looked for his opinion in regard to the power of contrary choice. Has the mind the power to choose otherwise than it actually does choose, without any change of circumstances? That this power is essential to the freedom of the will has been a prevalent opinion of philosophers. It is true that philosophical theologians in great number,-Augustinians, Thomists, Calvinists, Jansenists, deny the existence of such a power within the sphere of strictly religious action, in the present moral condition of mankind; that is, they deny to "the fallen will" the power to reverse its own fundamental action. The will remains, such is the doctrine, and men sin spontaneously, and in this sense freely; but the will is not free to that which is good; on the contrary, it is a will in bondage. But the most orthodox of these theologians maintain an original power of contrary choice as an essential condition of man's first probation, and they hold to the present existence of such a power in respect to that vast category of human actions which do not fall within the distinctively religious sphere. Such a " power to the contrary" appears to be essential to moral liberty. "I