by CLEANTHES. That like effects arife from like causes: this principle he supposes the foundation of all religion. But there is another principle of the fame kind, no less certain, and derived from the fame fource of experience; that where feveral known circumftances are observed to be fimilar, the unknown will also be found fimilar. Thus, if we see the limbs of a human body, we conclude, that it is also attended with a human head, though hid from us. Thus, if we fee, through a chink in a wall, a fmall part of the fun, we conclude, that were the wall removed, we should fee the whole body. In fhort, this method of reasoning is fo obvious and familiar, that no fcruple can ever be made with regard to its folidity.

Now if we furvey the univerfe, fo far as it falls under our knowledge, it bears a great refemblance to an animal or organized body, and feems actuated with a like principle of life and motion. A continual circulation of matter in it produces no diforder; a continual wafte in every part is inceffantly repaired: the closeft fympathy is perceived throughout the entire fyftem; and each part or member, in performing its proper offices, operates both to its own prefervation and to that of the whole. The world then, I infer, is an animal, and the Deity is the SouL of the world, actuating it, and a&uated by it..

Were I obliged to defend any particular fyftem (which I never willingly fhould do), I esteem none more plaufible, than that which afcribes an eternal, inherent principle of order to the world; though attended with great and continual revolutions and alterations. This at once folves all difficulties; and if the folution, by being fo general, is not entirely complete and fatisfactory, it is, at leaft, a theory, that we must, fooner or later, have recourse to, whatever fyftem we embrace.

Our friend CLEANTHES afferts, that fince no queftion of fact can be proved otherwife than by experience, the exiftence of a Deity admits not of proof from any other medium. The world, fays he, resembles the works of human contrivance: therefore its caufe muft also resemble that of the other. Here we may remark, that the operation of one very small part of nature, to wit man, upon another very small part, to wit, that inanimate matter lying within his reach, is the rule, by which CLEANTHES judges of the origin of the whole; and he measures objects, fo widely difproportioned, by the fame individual standard. But to wave all objections drawn from this topic; I affirm that there are other parts of the universe (besides the machines of human invention) which bear ftill a greater refemblance to the fabric of the world, and which therefore afford a better conjecture concerning the univerfal origin of this fyftem. These parts are animals and vegetables. The world plainly refembles more an animal or a vegetable, than it does a watch or a knitting loom. Its cause, therefore, it is more probable, resembles the caufe of the former. The caufe of the former is generation or vegetation. The cause, therefore, of the world, we may infer to be fomething fimilar or analogous to generation or vegetation.

** But how is it conceivable, faid DEMEA, that the world can arife from any thing fimilar to vegetation or generation? Very cafily, res

plied PHILO. In like manner as a tree sheds its feed into the neighbouring fields, and produces other trees; fo the great vegetable, the world, or this planetary fyllem, produces within itself certain feeds, which, being fcattered into the furrounding chaos, vegetate into new worlds. A comet, for instance, is the feed of a world; and after it has been fully ripened, by pafling from fun to fun, and ftar to far, it is at last toft into the unformed elements, which every where furround this univerfe, and immediately fprouts up into a new fyftem.

I have all along afferted, and fill affert, that we have no data to establish any fy item of cofmogony. Our experience, so imperfect in itself, and fo limited both in extent and duration, can afford no probable conjecture concerning the whole of things. But if we must needs fix on fome hypothefis; by what rule, pray, ought we to determine our choice? Is there any other rule than the greater fimilarity of the objects compared? And does not a plant or an animal, which fprings from vegetation or generation, bear a ftronger resemblance to the world, than does any artificial machine, which arifes from reafon and defign?

In this little corner of the world alone, there are four principles, Reason, Infiinct, Generation, Vegetation, which are fimilar to each other, and are the causes of fimilar effects. What a number of other principles may we naturally fuppofe in the immenfe extent and variety of the univerfe, could we travel from planet to planet, and from fyitem to fyftem, in order to examine each part of this mighty fabric? Any one of these four principles above mentioned (and a hundred others which lie open to our conjecture) may afford us a theory, by which to judge of the order of the world; and it is a palpable and egregious partiality, to confine our view entirely to that principle, by which our own minds operate. Were this principle more intelligible on that account, fuch a partiality might be fomewhat excufable; but reafon, in its internal fabric and structure, is really as little known to us as inftinct or vegetation; and perhaps even that vague, undeterminate word, Nature, to which the vulgar refer every thing, is not at the bottom more inexplicable. The effects of thefe principles are all known to us from experience: but the principles themfelves, and their manner of operation are totally unknown nor is it lefs intelligible, or lefs conformable to experience to fay, that the world arofe by vegetation from a feed shed by another world, than to fay that it arofe from a divine reafon or contrivance, according to the fenfe in which CLEANTHES understands it. That vegetation and generation, as well as reafon, are experienced to be principles of order in nature, is undeniable. If I rest my fyftem of cofmogony on the former, preferably to the latter, 'tis at my choice. The matter feems entirely arbitrary. And when CLEANTHES afks me what is the caufe of my great vegetative or generative faculty, I am equally intitled to afk him the cause of his great reafoning principle. Thefe queftions we have agreed to forbear on both fides; and it is chiefly his intereft on the prefent occa. fion to ftick to this agreement. Judging by our limited and imper

fect

fect experience, generation has fome privileges above reafon for we fee every day the latter arife from the former, never the former from the latter.'

PHILO proceeds to inform us that he could, in an inftant, propofe various other fyftems of cofmogony, which would have fome faint appearance of truth; though it is a thoufand, a million to one, he fays, if any one of them were the true fyftem.-Motion, we are told, in many inftances, from gravity, from elafticity, from electricity, begins in matter, without any known voluntary agent, and to fuppofe always, in thefe cafes, an unknown voluntary agent, is mere hypothefis; and hypothefis attended with no advantage; the beginning of motion in matter itfelf being as conceivable a priori as its communication from mind and intelligence.

All religious fyftems, it is confeffed, fays he, are fubject to great and infuperable difficulties. Each difputant triumphs in his turn; while he carries on an offenfive war, and exposes the abfurdities, barbarities, and pernicious tenets of his antagonist. But all of them, on the whole, prepare a complete triumph for the Sceptic; who tells them, that no fyftem ought ever to be embraced with regard to fuch fubjects: for this plain reason, that no abfurdity ought ever to be affented to with regard to any fubject. A total fufpenfe of judgment is here our only reasonable refource. And if every attack, as is commonly obferved, and no defence, among theologians, is fuccessful; how complete must be his victory, who remains always, with all mankind, on the offenfive, and has himfelf no fixed flation or abiding city, which he is ever, on any occafion, obliged to defend ?'

PHILO, in a word, is of opinion, that as no fyftem of cofmogony ought ever to be received from a flight analogy, fo neither ought any to be rejected on account of a small incongruity; fince that is an inconvenience, from which we can justly pronounce no one to be exempted.

The object of that curious artifice and machinery, which nature has difplayed in all animals, PHILO tells us, is the prefervation alone of individuals and propagation of the fpecies. It seems enough for her purpose, he fays, if fuch a rank be barely upheld in the univerfe, without any care or concern for the happiness of the members that compose it. No refource for this purpose: no machinery, in order merely to give pleafure or eafe; no fund of pure joy and contentment: no indulgence without fome want or neceffity, accompanying it. leaft, the few phenomena of this nature, we are told, are overbalanced by oppofite phenomena of ftill greater importance.

Allowing, fays he, what never will be believed, at least, what can never poffibly be proved, that animal, or at leaft, human hap piness in this life exceeds its mifery; we have yet done nothing; for this is not, by any means, what we expect from infinite power, infinite wisdom, and infinite goodness. Why is there any mifery at

all

all in the world? Not by chance furely. From fome cause then. Ís it from the intention of the Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent, Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can fhake the folidity of this reafoning, fo fhort, fo clear, fo decifive; except we affert, that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our common meafures of truth and falfehood are not applicable to them; a topic, which I have all along infifted on, but which you have, from the beginning, rejected with fcorn and indignation.

• But I will be contented to retire ftill from this intrenchment ! for I deny, CLEANTHES, that you can ever force me in it: I will allow, that pain or mifery in man is compatible with infinite power and goodness in the Deity, even in your fenfe of these attributes: what are you advanced by all thefe conceffions? A mere poffible, compatibility is not fufficient. You must prove these pure, unmixt, uncontrollable attributes from the prefent mixt and confufed phenomena, and from thefe alone. A hopeful undertaking! Were the phenomena ever fo pure and unmixt, yet being finite, they would be infufficient for that purpofe. How much more, where they are alfo fo jarring and difcordant?*

There feem to be four circumftances, PHILO fays, on which depend all, or the greatest part of the ills, that moleft fenfible creatures, none of which appear to human reafon, in the leaft degree, neceflary or unavoidable; nor can we suppose them fuch, without the utmoft licence of imagination.

The first circumftance which introduces evil, we are told, is that contrivance of economy or the animal creation, by which pains as well as pleasures are employed to excite all creatures to action, and make them vigilant in the great work of selfprefervation. Now pleafure alone, in its various degrees, feems to human understanding fufficient to this purpofe.-The fecond circumftance is, the conducting of the world by general laws; and this feems no way neceffary to a very perfect being.The third circumftance is, the great frugality, with which all powers and faculties are diftributed to every particular being. Nature, 'tis faid, feems to have formed an exact calculation of the neceffities of her creatures; and like a rigid mafter, has afforded them little more powers or endowments, than what are ftrictly fufficient to fupply thofe neceffities. An indulgent parent would have bestowed a large stock, in order to guard against accidents, and secure the happinefs and welfare of the creature, in the most unfortunate concurrence of circumftances. Every courfe of life would not have been fo furrounded with precipices, that the leaft departure from the true path, by mistake or neceffity, muft involve us in mifery and ruin. Some referve, fome fund would have been provided to enfure happiness; nor would the powers and the neceffities have been adjusted with fo rigid an economy.

The fourth circumftance, whence arifes the evil and mifery of the universe, is the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs

and principles of the great machine of nature. One would imagine, PHILO fays, that this grand production had not received the laft hand of the maker; fo little finished is every part, and fo coarse are the ftrokes with which it is executed.

On the concurrence, then, continues he, of these four circumftances does all, or the greatest part of natural evil depend. Were all living creatures incapable of pain, or were the world administered by particular volitions, evil never could have found accefs into the univerfe; and were animals endowed with a large stock of powers and faculties, beyond what ftrict neceffity requires; or were the feveral springs and principles of the universe fo accurately framed, as to preferve always the just temperament and medium; there must have been very little ill in comparison of what we feel at prefent. What then fhall we pronounce on this occafion? Shall we fay, that these circumstances are not neceffary, and that they might eafily have been altered in the contrivance of the univerfe? This decifion feems too prefumptuous for creatures, fo blind and ignorant. Let us be more modeft in our conclufions. Let us allow, that, if the goodness of the Deity (I mean a goodness like the human) could be established on any tolerable reafons a priori, these phenomena, however untoward, would not be fufficient to fubvert that principle; but might eafily, in fome unknown manner, be reconcilable to it. But let us ftill affert, that as this goodness is not antecedently established, but must be inferred from the phenomena, there can be no grounds for fuch an inference, while there are fo many ills in the univerfe, and while thefe ills might fo easily have been remedied, as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on fuch a subject. I am fceptic enough to allow, that the bad appearances, notwithstanding all my reafonings, may be compatible with fuch attributes as you fuppofe: but furely they can never prove these attributes. Such a conclufion cannot refult from fcepticism; but must arife from the phenomena, and from our confidence in the reafonings, which we deduce from these phenomena.'

In regard to the influence of religious principles on the conduct of mankind, PHILO fays, it is certain from experience, that the smalleft grain of natural honefty and benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the moft pompous views, fuggefted by theological theories and fyftems. And when we bave to do with a man who makes a great profeffion of religion and devotion; this, we are told, has no other effect upon feveral, who pafs for prudent, than to put them on their guard, left they be cheated and deceived by him. He further fays, that the fteady attention alone to fo important an interest as that of eternal falvation, is apt to extinguish the benevolent af→ fections, and beget a narrow, contracted selfishness; and that when fuch a temper is encouraged, it eafily eludes all the general precepts of charity and benevolence. In regard to the worship of the Deity, hear what he says:

To know God, fays SENECA, is to worship him. All other worhip is indeed abfurd, fuperftitious, and even impious. It degrades REV. Nov. 1779.

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