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to study the type of crossings we termed "booby traps"; improvement of crossing signals and a study of the financing problems for eliminating some crossings and for the provision of better protection at others. On January 26, 1968, we issued a report on a fatal head-on collision, of two New York Central railroad freight trains, which occurred in New York City. We identified numerous inadequacies in the operating practices and rules and personnel training of the railroad; urged the need for the industry to reassess its safety practices, and recommended to the Department that, lacking evidence of improvement, they give consideration to the safety problems posed by this accident in considering the need for legislation.

On March 7, 1968, we issued a third report on a grade crossing accident between a commuter train and a fuel tank truck at Everett, Mass. Eleven passengers and two trainmen died in this accident because of their inability to evacuate a car which had become engulfed in flames following the collision.

In this case, we recommended to the Department that it give immediate attention to seeking legislation to authorize the Department to prescribe standards requiring emergency means of evacuation of such cars and to require the provision of emergency lighting.

Meanwhile, the National Transportation Safety Board also conducted a general review of railroad accident data covering the last several years for train accidents, which has shown a progressively worsening trend in rates, occurrences, deaths, and damage.

Especially disturbing was the fact that many train accidents in recent years have involved hazardous or poisonous materials, resulting in fires, or the escape of poisonous or hazardous materials followed by evacuation of populated areas. The latter collateral factors, coupled with a rising accident rate, increase the probability of catastrophic occurrences. We indicated our concern to the Department in my letter of April 3, 1968.

In my letter, we noted that total train accidents, excluding train service and nontrain accidents, increased from 4,149 in 1961 to 6,793 in 1966, up 63.7 percent, and according to preliminary figures increased to 7,089 in 1967, up 71 percent over 1961.

Train accidents per million train-miles increased from 7.09 in 1961 to 11.29 in 1966, up 59.2 percent.

Deaths in train accidents increased from 158 to 214, or by 35.4 percent.

Reported loss and damage to lading in train accidents (which excludes rough handling) increased from $9.3 million to $18.6 million during the 1961-66 period, or up 100 percent; such loss and damage was up from $15,800 to $30,900 per million train-miles, or up 95.5 percent.

Track and equipment damage reported in train accidents increased from $50.4 million to $99.0 million, up almost 100 percent; such track and equipment damage was up from $86,200 to $164,500 per million train-miles, or up 90 percent.

Derailments, the single most important cause of train accidents, increased from 2,671 in 1961 to 4,447 in 1966, up 66.5 percent, and the rate of derailments per million train-miles increased from 4.57 in 1961 to 7.39 in 1966, up 61.7 percent.

Derailments, as the largest single cause of the 6,793 train accidents in 1966, accounted for 4,447 or about 65 percent of all train accidents in 1966, and over 80 percent of the damage to track and equipment. Collisions, the next most frequent cause, accounted for 1,552 or 23 percent of the 1966 train accidents.

The Interstate Commerce Commission's "Accident Bulletin", now under the jurisdiction of the Federal Railroad Administration, reflects in detail, the primary causes of derailments, comparing 1961 with 1966. Defects in or improper maintenance of way and structures accounted for 21.6 percent of all derailments in 1961 and this increased to 31.2 percent in 1966.

Further, both in numbers and in proportion of total derailments, those caused by defects in or improper maintenance of way and structures have become an increasingly significant factor in derailments, increasing by 140 percent and by 44.5 percent, respectively.

Defects in or failure of equipment, on the other hand, though still the largest group of causes of derailments, had declined as a proportion of derailment causes from 47.5 percent in 1961 to 34.9 percent in 1966. Derailments charged to negligence of employees accounted for 12.3 percent of all derailments in 1961 and 12.4 percent in 1966, almost the same proportion, although the number of derailments caused by employee negligence increased by 68.1 percent.

Statistics as to derailments resulting from defects in or improper maintenance of way and structures, which resulted in train accidents, clearly show how progressively deteriorating track conditions are causing derailments.

The safety record of railroads is an operating result depending upon management efforts, and train accidents are the class of accidents most completely amenable to management decisions. The trend of results in train accidents which was analyzed by the Safety Board has been available for anyone to see in the "Accident Bulletins" of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The losses involved have been very costly to the railroads and others, but the problem has not been brought adequately to public attention.

These results indicate that railroad safety is not under effective management control. Because of this lack of control, we do not know what the future holds. The apparent risks to bystanders from hazardous materials carried by rail will be increasing. Speeds and train lengths are also increasing, and this means longer stopping distances for trains. High-speed passenger trains are in the near future.

The Safety Board has found certain specific safety problems on railroads even in the short time the Board has been studying and reporting railroad accidents. Some of these problems indicate the type of regulatory action or research and development effort needed to improve rail safety.

In the area of railroad operation and training, one accident we received showed two operators and a dispatcher incompletely trained and even unaware of some of their duties and relationship to authority. The rules examination process of the railroad was a kind of class discussion which did not effectively insure that those who attended knew the rules.

This problem could be handled by requiring personnel to periodically pass examinations on the rules.

In this same accident, the railroad rule book carried two different versions of the same critical rule. A regulation could simply require orderly removal of old rules and clarity in representation.

I might say on the side that I think it is rather sad to even think of a necessity for a regulation to correct the operating practice of a railroad in order to bring them up to date. These inconsistencies do exist and one way of eliminating them is by a regulation requiring them to be kept up to date.

The control tower in which the operator who made the key error had been working was also crowded by several train crews having coffee and making distracting noise at the time the error was made. A regulation for control tower discipline which might have prevented this error is already in effect for air traffic control operations.

In the same accident, after it was realized that two trains were headed toward each other in the same track, it was impossible to halt either train, even though both trains carried operating radios. Apparently., the radios were not turned on because their use was merely optional. A regulation could simply require that radios, when carried aboard, be left on.

These are examples of regulations which would carry little or no direct cost to the railroad. Now, some examples of problems with equipment and track.

In two cases, one not yet reported, the relatively slow braking of railroad trains appears to have been a factor. Many people do not realize that train brakes are very slow in application. A time of 8 seconds may be required to transmit an emergency brake impulse from the locomotive to the rear of a 150-car train. After that time, as much as 10 seconds is required for each car to attain the full braking deceleration available. Together, a total time of 18 seconds may pass before all brakes are fully applied on all 150 cars. At 60 miles per hour, the train will move 1,584 feet before the brakes are fully applied.

In one case under review, the train literally came apart during the emergency stop. It is not unusual for trains to be derailed, to sustain internal collisions after first breaking apart, or to go off a curve under emergency braking. These problems have been present in railroad practice for more than 70 years.

Engineering improvement of brakes would be required preliminary to issuance of regulations requiring higher standards of braking, and the regulation would have to be applied over a period of years.

In still another case, passengers failed to escape from a burning rail car because there were no emergency exits, and the inward-opening doors jammed under the press of the crowd. The need for this regulation indicates the lack of transfer of technical knowledge from other fields.

Regulations for aircraft were promulgated years ago by the Federal Aviation Administration, and similar requirements could be applied to all new railroad construction.

Inward opening doors have been prohibited in public buildings for half a century.

Emergency lighting, another factor in this same accident, could be required to be installed in existing trains. The Board does not know the cost of such regulation, but such lights are already required in restaurants, churches, and other places of public gathering.

In another case now under Board review, a broken rail, originating at a bolt hole in a rail joint triggered a sequence of hazardous material fire and explosion in a small community, requiring the evacuation of the town and causing damage exceeding $500,000.

The interesting point here is that rails have been breaking at bolt hole stress concentration points for many decades.

The cost to the railroads of replacing the rails and of the accidents from such failures must be very high by now. It seems clear that rail joint design should not employ bolt holes, but no low-cost substitute, as I know, has yet been developed, or if it has been developed it is not in general use.

This example illustrates not only the need for engineering development by industry, but the need for forceful Government action to energize such development. Design to prevent repeated failures is a very ordinary kind of engineering development problem.

We have indicated to the Secretary our awareness that his current regulatory authority did not encompass many areas related to the causes of railroad accidents. Our concern about the state of railroad operations vis-a-vis safety, for example, was indicated in the recommendations accompanying our report on the railroad collision in New York City, where we stated that there is clear need for a reappraisal, a self-assessment and corrective action by the railroad industry.

We further indicated our belief that the primary responsibility for improved railroad safety should rest upon railroad management and labor. That is still our belief. However, we said that if it appears that they cannot or will not accept the challenge promptly to arrest the worsening railroad accident picture, consideration should be given to supporting or proposing Federal legislation which would provide additional safety regulatory authority for the Department of Transportation in the railroad safety field.

The Department is now seeking such action-as is set forth in H.R. 16980. On the basis of his review of the railroad safety program, the Secretary has concluded that broad authority to provide safety standards is required. Under this bill, the piecemeal efforts of years would be replaced by one comprehensive statute. The Secretary would be authorized to set minimum standards in areas where there is, at present, no Federal regulation.

For example, standards for the design and construction of rail facilities and equipment would be possible. In our review of the Everett case, discussed above, we recommended such action.

Minimum standards for inspections of all facilities and equipment, not just for locomotives, also could be established. Minimum standards for the operations of rail carriers, including training and company operating rules could be authorized; as clearly noted in our report of the New York Central accident.

The Secretary would have the authority to effect uniform regulation for all those areas needing action, as demonstrated in the cases reviewed by the Board, and in the areas which have been the major causes of the accelerated accident rate in the railroad industry.

The Secretary in transmitting this proposal to the Congress, indicated the intent to prescribe safety standards based upon "continuing research programs and upon the changing transportation needs*** We agree there must be sufficient natural development of advanced

safety technology to feed advanced regulations. There is a need for innovation and technological development in rail safety which would not necessarily be assured by regulatory authority alone.

The provision of this bill having direct effect on our Board is section 11, concerning accident investigations. It would preserve the existing relationship between the Department and the Board as spelled out in the Department of Transportation Act, and to which I referred in my opening remarks.

The Secretary would have the authority to investigate accidents, the Board would determine cause and report the conditions and circumstances. The Board would be permitted to delegate to the Department the determination of cause and reporting of minor accidentsthereby enabling the Board to devote its energies to major accidents of a catastrophic nature. The Board would also have and retain its parallel authority to investigate railroad accidents, under section 5(d) (4) of the Department of Transportation Act.

Section 11 would also retain the existing law concerning the use of reports of railroad accidents in private litigation (45 U.S.C. 40) and recognize the existing practice of permitting Department and Board investigators to present testimony concerning facts developed during investigations and which cannot be obtained from other sources.

The proposed language, as it refers to accident reports of the Board, would parallel the existing law and practice in aviation (49 U.S.C. 1441(e)) and motor carrier (49 U.S.C. 320(f)). The public would have access to the facts and at the same time to do so with minimum burden to the small staff of investigators who are engaged in this activity.

I do not feel that the primary concern at this point is the safety of passengers on today's trains. The railroad fatality rate on a passengerwide basis is as low as is found in any form of transportation. We need to be concerned about the railroad employees and bystanders who do not directly benefit from rail traffic, but are in conflict with it.

I will not repeat again the full statistics for employee casualties which you have already heard. I would point out, however, that the rates of bystanders fatalities to user fatalities is far higher in railroad operation than highway safety or air travel.

In 1967, there were 12 passenger fatalities, 167 fatalities among employees, and 2,279 fatalities at grade crossings and at other places where people get into contact with the railroad. This includes all categories of accidents reported to the Federal Railroad Administration, irrespective of legal status of those killed, and includes so-called trespassers.

In highway usage in 1967, there were 43,600 fatalities among persons riding in vehicles and 9,400 among pedestrians. In domestic commercial air transport there were 226 passenger fatalities and only 14 fatalities among persons on the ground.

The disparity in the railroad safety problem is important in the philosophy of this law. Both management and labor need more safety, but the bystanders to rail operation need it even more.

In my judgment, the railroad accident picture is serious and urgent. The Secretary, after a detailed review of the problem, has concluded that broader legislation is necessary and that a uniform and compre

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