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toms, which the negligent, and unfore
seeing innocence of the first ages began,
had brought in successors of another
stamp, the people finding their proper-
ties not secure under the government, as
it then was, (whereas government has
no other end but the preservation of
property) could never be safe nor at
rest, nor think themselves in civil socie-
ty, till the legislative was placed in col-
lective bodies of men, call them senate,
parliament, or what you please.
which means every single person became
subject, equally with other the meanest
men, to those laws, which he himself,
as part of the legislative, had establish
ed; nor could any one, by his own au-
thority, avoid the force of the law, when
once made; nor by any pretence of su-
periority plead exemption, thereby to
license his own, or the miscarriages of
any of his dependents. No man in civil
society can be exempted from the laws of
it for if any man may do what he
thinks fit, and there be no appeal on
earth, for redress or security against any
harm he shall do; I ask, whether he be
not perfectly still in a state of nature,
and so can be no part or member of that
civil society; unless any one will say,
the state of nature and civil society are
one and the same thing, which I have
never yet found any one so great a pa-
tron of anarchy as to affirm.

"At the first, when some certain kind
of regiment was once appointed, it may
be that nothing was then farther thought
upon for the manner of governing, but
ali permitted unto their wisdom and dis-
cretion, which were to rule, till by ex-
perience they found this for all parts
very inconvenient, so as the thing which
they had devised for a remedy did in-
deed but increase the sore, which it
would have cured. They saw, that to
live by one man's will, became the cause
of all men's misery! This constrained
them to come unto laws, wherein all men
might see their duty beforehand, and
know the penalties of transgressing them.
"Civil law being the act of the whole
body politic, doth therefore over-rule
each several part of the same body."
Hooker's Eccl. Pol, l. 1. sect. 10.
[To be continued.]

THE TRIENNIAL ACT
IMPARTIALLY STATED;

SHEWING,

the Liberties of the People by the fre quent calling of Parliaments chosen by them; and is now become a fundamental part of our Constitution not to be violated on slight pretences. II. That the many plausible Arguments insinuated for Repealing this Act, are fallacious and inconclusive, and the Consequences thereof may be fatal to the Public.

[First printed 1716.]

The British nation have long justly valued themselves on that happy constitution our government is composed of, whereby the rights and liberties of the subject are equally preserved and regarded with the prerogative of the prince, and such wise and good laws made, as might at all times secure any one part of our constitution from being endangered by the other.

The authority and force of our laws (being enacted by the whole legislature) is a check to such designs as ambitious persons, or a corrupt ministry might entertain to subvert or alter that constitution, which, though often attempted, has not as yet (God be thanked) succceded, nor can, in all probability, succeed at any time, unless we should fall under the same circumstances with the Swedes and Danes our neighbours, among whom the liberty of the suh. ject has been delivered up, and shamefully betrayed by those who were the people's representatives, and intrusted by them as the guardians thercof!

Our government being composed of three distinct states, the King, the Lords, and the Commons, nothing is a law binding the people, but what proceeds from their joint authority; and the members returned on every election to parliament, are the representatives of the Commons of England; the bulk of the people, who by chusing such persons as they judge most fit to represent them, are supposed to give their as

1. That the Law was made for securing sent to all such laws as by the wis

dom of the parliament are thought necessary and convenient for the public good.

In every session, particular laws are made or repealed suitable to the occasions that present, either for the remedying or preventing some evil, or procuring some benefit or advantage to the nation; nevertheless, it has always been granted, that no bill any ways encroaching upon the liberties of the subject, annulling or repealing laws in their favour, or taking off the force of them, may, or ought to be brought in, without very cogent reasons of the absolute necessity thereof at that time.

This I thought proper to premise as an introduction to the following pages, wherein I propose to show:

1st. That the Triennial Act was made for securing the liberties of the people, by the frequent calling of parliaments chosen to represent them, and is now become a fundamental part of the constitution, not to be violated upon slight pretences.

2d. That the many plausible arguments insinuated for repealing this act, are fallacious and inconclusive, and the consequence thereof may be fatal to the public.

To the first part:

I believe it will not be denied me, that the bolding of parliaments is one of the fundamental parts of our constitution, and the choice of them by the freeholders of Great Britain, is a part wherein the share of the people in the government chiefly consists, and on the right use of which the liberty of the subjects do, in a great measure, depend: the depriving them of this, would be striking at the root, excluding the people from that right the laws of the land had wisely and prudently given them.

By the ancient customs and laws of the land, parliaments were to be held annually for the redress of grievances; and the statute of the 4th Ed. III. c. 14, runs thus: Item,

"It is accorded, that a parliament shall be holden every year once, and more often if need be;" and afterwards, upon some ambiguity in the reference of the words, if need be, it was more plainly expressed in the statute of the 36th, Ed. III. c. 10, in these words. Item:-"For the maintenance of the said articles and statutes, and the redress of divers mischiefs and grievances which daily happen, a parliament shall be holden every year."

Nevertheless, many of our princes did, by virtue of their prerogative, or under colour of it, dispense with the sitting of parliaments for several years together; and to go no further back than the reigns of King Charles 1. and King Charles II. the session of parliament was intermitted in each of their reigns for several years, by which many grievances arose, and great impositions were borne by the subjects in the former reign, the sad consequences of which are too well known to be here insisted on, and not material to the subject in hand. In the latter, a set of courtiers so guided the prince and all public measures, they were afterwards afraid to trust a free parliament with the examination of their conduct, which engaged them. to French counsels and French money for their support, rather than the state of the nation should be impartially enquired into, and remedies ap plied by the wisdom of a parliament; which, however necessary for the public, would perhaps have been inconve nient for themselves!

as were

When by the evil counsels of the late unhappy Prince King James II. he pursued such measures inconsistent with our constitution, and the rights and liberties of the subjects, and by the concurrence of many other causes, the late Revolu tion took place in these kingdoms. The nation wisely judged it neces、 sary at such a time, upon such a revolution of government, occasioned by the infringement of the liber

ties of the people by the prince, to ascertain those rights and privileges the people were intitled to, which was accordingly done by the Petition and Bill of Rights, wherein is the following clause: That for the redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening, and preserving the laws, parliaments ought to be held frequently.

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The uncertainty of the sitting of parliaments, and the long intermission of them at some times, and the long continuance of the same parliament at others, (as particularly the parliament of King Charles II. which was continued from the time of calling them on the 8th of May 1661, to the 30th of November 1677, and became pensioners to the court and to France !) whereby the members were, by places, gratuities, and other means, wholly devoted to the Ministry, had been a great occasion of the many grievances and hardships the subjects had suffered, and the interest of the nation been neglected, it was thought advisable, that a law should be made whereby parliaments should sit at convenient times for the dispatch of public business, and the continuance of them so limitted, as should they become too much courtiers, and devoted to the prince without regard to their country, it should not be in the power of the prince to continue them any longer than that time, and the country to come to another election, which it was supposed they would. make of such persons whose actions were mostly intended for the public service.

Accordingly with these views, and for this purpose, was the Triennial Bill calculated, and very much la boured for by the principal men of the different parties at that time, and at last obtained from the crown; (not without great difficulty) the reason of it is plainly exprest in a short preamble, in these words," Whereas by the anticut laws and statutes of

this kingdom, frequent parliaments ought to be held, and whereas fre quent and new parliaments tend very much to the happy union and good agreement of the king and peo ple, &c." And this act has since, in all the different turns of party, and change of Ministry, been always esteemed sacred and inviolable, and not the least offer to repeal or suspend it, made before by either party. Though the Triennial Act has not been made above this twenty one or twenty two years. It is not therefore to be regarded as a temporary act made for a certain time, but as a fundamental part of our constitution, and a change among others, it received from the Revolution.

The settlement of the crown in the protestant line, the union of the kingdoms of England and Scotland, were neither of them effected in the days of our forefathers, and yet are now deemed fundamental parts of our constitution; and I presume, if we look into the Triennial Act, and reflect on the occasion and reason of enacting it, we shall be of opinion, that it was designed to be an unal terable fundamental; and am the more persuaded herein, since in several attempts of an extraordinary nature, as taking off the test and pe▪ nal laws, generat naturalizations, &c. This was never struck at, though had any Parliament whom we have stigmatized with the most odious characters, perpetuated themselves by virtue of its being in their power so to do, what might they not have effected?

The last house of Commons (how undeservedly I shall not here enter into) have been by some men treated with all the marks of infamy and reproach imaginable, and represented as the betrayers of their country and the scandal of the nation; every evil design has been imputed to them, and we are told unaccountable things were to have been done, had those gentlemen had the time, the power,

and the means; to which I shall only say, though they were a majority considerable enough, they made no attempt of this nature, which perhaps they might have as easily carried as it may be hereafter; but they (amidst all the load of guilt they are charged with) had. more regard to the liberties of the subject; though it may be remembered, this was an imputation of the highest nature on them, that they designed it, made, perhaps, before the project was judged an immediate expedient for us. The people, by the laws of the land, have a legal right to chuse their representatives at every election, by whom they agree to those laws which are found requisite for the public; and by the Triennial Act, that power of chusing their representatives devolves upon them once in three years at least, whereby they are at liberty to elect different persons, if they find those chosen before have not had the public interest at heart, as much as was expected from them; or pursued such measures as were disagreeable to the inclinations and intentions of their electors: Now to deprive their electors of this their right, from the laws in being, by virtue of the power vested in them by those electors, is, certainly, a very unexpected return for that confidence and trust reposed in them.

By what is said, I hope it in some measure appears, that the Triennial Act was a law, made for securing the liberties of the people by the frequent calling of parliaments chosen by them, and is now a FUNDAMENTAL PART OF THE CONSTITUTION, not to be violated on slight pretences. Under the second head I shall en deavour to show, that the many plausible arguments insinuated for repealing this act, are fallacious and inconclusive, and the consequence thereof may be fatal to the public,

The advocates for repealing the Triennial Act, insist on the unavoidable necessity of affairs at this time at

home and abroad, which requires the continuation of the present parliament, and this, enforced under several pretences, which may be reduced to these four heads.

1. That otherwise this house of Commous will not have sufficient time to go through the mismanagement and mal-administration of the last years of the Queen, so loudly complained of and bring the persons concerned to justice.

2. That we shall not be able to make such treaties as are necessary, with foreign princes, unless we can, by continuance of this parliament, engage them to rely on the present turn of politics and designs.

3. That the elections at the usual time, might be dangerous from the: present infatuation of the common people, and the false suggestions and insinuations of the adversaries to the present establishment.

4. That the Triennial Act has not had the good effects expected from it, but has been an occasion of keeping up feuds and party divisions," gentlemen spending their estates, and corrupting the country in general.

To the first.If there have been such mismanagements, and such a mal-administration, as some people would persuade us, there must be evidences thereof, and it is in the power of a parliament and ministry, who want not inclination, to make it fully appear, there is yet time sufficient to come, according to our legal constitution, to effect any thing of that nature; but granting that the particular actions of a number of men, or a series of perplext affairs may not, nor cannot be entire ly gone through, examined, and punished by this present parliament, is the nation then so barren of men of worth and character, zealous for the good and honour of their country, that, should this house of Commons ever have an end, there would not be found men of principle and integrity to do us justice on those.

who have been really concerned in any mal-administration, or betraying the public.

or

A house of Commons is, or ought to be, a body of men met together to consult and effect what is for the good of the kingdom; to enquire into and redress grievances; to prevent prosecute any mal-administra, tion; and being a body politic, their power is the same, and their end the same, though the same particular men do not compose it; therefore if there has been any real evil that ought to be enquired into and punished, there is no question to be made (especially if it be of great concern to the public) but that a future house of Commons would take effectual measures for enquiring into and punishing or redressing it, if those before them should omit, or not be able to go through with it for want of time and leisure. But groundless clamours and complaints may be raised by designing men of a party, to fix an odium on their competitors in the good will of the people, or favour of the prince; and if they are able to influence the undiscern ing men in their interest, and to make them believe any aspersion that is given out to multiply fears and apprehensions, and press for real securities against imaginary evils, it will be then the interest of such men to subject the enquiry of their own insinuations only to themselves; and it is not so difficult to pass upon the people plausible and specious pretences for truth, at least we are told the Tories have that art; and it would be lessening the merit of the Whigs to believe them inferior in this respect. Should this be the case, then perhaps a set of honest gentle men, unprejudiced, and designing only the good of their country, might see through and neglect all such artifices, and pursue the interest of the nation, without regard to the prejudices or party quarrels of particular men; but as this I am per

suaded will not be avowed, it is not easy to conceive that so great an infringement of our constitution can be made necessary on this head.

We come to the second argument, that otherwise we cannot effect such treaties with foreign princes as are necessary. On this it may be ob served, that all treaties or alliances between states, are made with regard to the interest of one or other of these states, or with regard to their mutual interest; this is the tye which binds the alliance, and causes the execution of the articles of treaties, It is very certain, this kingdom, has on many occasions made alliances and treaties with foreign princes, leagues offensive and defensive, treaties of peace and commerce; and it is as evident they have not all been for the interest of the kingdom. A ministry may advise a prince to make such treaties as may be preju dicial to the nation, as we are told the late treaties of peace and commerce were but it is the parliament must give them their force, and we may find by a late experience, what may be judged at one time for the interest of the kingdom, may at another be thought prejudicial to it.

It has been sometimes thought the increase of our trade and naviga tion was our best security, and our concern was not to interweave our politics with the perplext and jarring interests of the continent, any further than for the preservation or enlargement of that: That we wanted no acquisition of dominions, but a free and open trade would be to us the greatest strength and riches. Now different circumstances and changes have made it necessary for us to be more concerned in the interests of other princes; and, as it is to be supposed there is an interest of our own in all treaties with them, that interest will at all times engage par liaments to make good the faith of such treaties; but should it be our misfortune, which it has sometimes

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