our coast towns were protected by submarine mines and torpedoes, while the ransom to be extracted from those not so protected was not worth the expenditure of ammunition and risk of capture involved in a bombardment.

Our heaviest losses were of course in our sea-borne trade. Apart from captures and destruction by the enemy, immense numbers of vessels with their cargoes were lost through being manned and in many cases commanded by foreigners, the foreign seaman in the mercantile marine amounting to over one-third of the whole of its personnel. In hundreds of instances the foreign crews took possession of the vessels and carried them into hostile or neutral ports. In other cases, where a vessel manned by foreigners was lying in a home port, the crew declared the risk of death or capture too great, and refused to go to sea except on the prepayment of wages so high that the owners could not afford to give them. In spite of the high prices realized, when a cargo, especially a cargo of wheat, was safely brought into port and unloaded, the net profits were small owing to the enormous rise of insurance rates. To escape these many owners transferred their vessels to neutral flags, and in a yet larger number of cases British merchants shipped their goods in neutral bottoms, a practice which was almost universally adopted by foreign merchants who had hitherto been in the habit of shipping in British vessels. In fact, it was one of the conditions of the Armed Neutrality that the merchants of the Powers adhering to it should be forbidden to make use of British shipping. The United States, though not a member of the League of Neutrals, and Germany have through these causes acquired a considerable proportion of our carrying trade, and, to judge from historical precedents such as the case of Holland at the end of the seventeenth century and that of the Northern States in the American War of Secession, it is exceedingly doubtful whether it will ever be recovered. By far the greater proportion of the sailing ships in the merchant service were laid up on

the outbreak of war, except those engaged in coasting and other trade between the different parts of the British Islands. There were two reasons for this, which were the risk of capture, and the want of crews to man them through the strike or desertion of foreign seamen. The sailing ships were inevitably discarded in favor of the faster steamers, and though a few put to sea, only a very small percentage of these escaped capture or destruction. The system of convoys was resorted to whenever the Admiralty could spare vessels for the purpose, but the convoys consisted exclusively of steamers, as the inclusion of sailing ships would have impeded rapid progress and so increased the risk of capture. Auxiliary cruisers were largely used for escort purposes, while the regular cruisers which were not employed with the fleets of battleships were more generally engaged in cruising on the trade routes and seeking out the enemy's commercedestroyers.

Another factor which helped to hamper British trade was the existence of the Armed Neutrality. The League of Neutrals adopted, as one of the conditions of inclusion, the imposition of prohibitive duties on all goods coming from the British Islands and their dependicies. This resulted in our trade being practically excluded from Continental Europe, as it had been under the Berlin and Milan decrees in the time of Napoleon. In the existing circumstances British merchants could not afford to pay these ruinous duties, and the only course open to England was to retaliate by excluding the products of the League of Neutrals from her ports and expelling from the British Islands all natives of the countries which had formed it, except those who had become naturalized British subjects. This was done; but, while the expulsion of aliens somewhat reduced the number of mouths to be filled, this advantage was far more than counterbalanced by the diminution of the supply of food entailed in the exclusion of European products. In one respect, however, the exclusion of British trade from Continental Europe was

beneficial to the Empire, for it resulted in the commercial relations of the Mother Country with the Colonies becoming closer than they had been before, and a real Imperial Federation was brought nearer by this, as well as by the other circumstances of the war. At the same time the friendly, though neutral, attitude of the United States was of great assistance to us, as our supply of wheat was drawn almost entirely from that country and from Canada. The length of the voyage from Australia, or even from India, entailed too great risks for dependence to be placed on obtaining so important an article of consumption in large quantities from those parts of the Empire.

con

The threat of invasion at the beginning of the war produced a panic on the Stock Exchange, the prices of foreign stocks especially going down with a rush; and this was followed by a tendency toward a run on the banks. The concentration, however, of our Channel and Reserve Fleets at Spithead restored some degree of fidence, and the run on the banks ceased altogether with the enemies' retreat to Brest. Still, many small provincial banks stopped payment, and some even of the more important London houses were perilously near doing so when the panic came to an end, for in the abnormal circumstances the Bank of England was able to afford very little help to other houses. Trade throughout the country was dislocated through the prevailing uncertainty, the interruption of foreign communications, and the great rise in insurance rates. Many important mercantile and shipping houses became bankrupt, while others practically stopped carrying on active business, at least for the time. The Insurance Offices themselves, in spite of the rise in their premiums, had such heavy losses to make good that their average profits amounted to little or nothing. This, of course, applies especially to Marine Insurance Offices, but Fire, Life, and other offices also suffered heavily. All these misfortunes told upon the social conditions of the country. Deaths from want, of which there are always a cer

tain number in normal times, increased to an appalling extent; epidemics of diseases produced by hunger, and by inferior food, broke out in many parts, especially in the crowded dwellings of the poor in towns; the hospitals were overcrowded, and frequently their resources were found unequal to the additional strain placed upon them in spite of all the efforts of the staffs; schools were thinly attended on account of illness and other causes; and the workhouses and jails were full. At the beginning of the war the demand for newspapers was almost unlimited, and their circulation, especially that of the halfpenny journals, increased by leaps and bounds, but when the excitement and novelty died out the demand declined and, as the rise in the prices of food and other necessaries continued, and money became scarcer and scarcer, the circulation fell far below its normal numbers. The trades which suffered first, and suffered most severely, were, naturally, those dealing in articles of luxury and not of necessity, and the book trade, which had long been in a bad way, was one of the first to feel the evil effects of the war, and many publishing and bookselling firms which had hitherto been regarded as sound were declared bankrupt.

Very soon after the beginning of the war, with the quartern loaf at a shilling and still rising, the result of the scarcity of food was seen in abnormal distress, especially in the large towns, and in London more than all. As before mentioned, the interruption of the submarine cables made it impossible- to communicate with the United States, our Colonies, or other countries from which the food-supply could be replenished, except by means of fast cruisers or merchant vessels, with the result that by the end of the first month the price of the loaf had risen to two shillings and sixpence. The precautions, such as the adoption of circuitous routes, necessary to guard against provision. ships falling in with the enemies' commerce-destroyers, made the passage from New York or Halifax to a British port take considerably longer than in time of peace, in spite of the high rate

of speed maintained whenever possible, and this was still more the case when the port of departure was more distant, as the Cape, Calcutta, or Sydney. The loaf never rose above two shillings and sixpence, but fluctuated between two shillings and that sum during the remainder of the war.

On the

The people on the whole bore their hardships patiently, and among all classes the laboring as well as the educated classes-the determination to bring the war to a successful issue never faltered, for it was clearly understood that England could not afford to be beaten, and that at all costs victory must be ultimately secured. Large numbers of the mechanics out of employment were enrolled in the navy as engine-room artificers, while many of the less skilled laborers found at any rate occupation by joining the military forces of the country, whether regular or auxiliary. Nevertheless there were serious riots in some of the larger towns, especially in those, such as London and the seaports, where there was considerable foreign population. These riots took place principally during the earlier weeks of the war, before the declaration of the Armed Neutrality and the expulsion of aliens. first of May there was a mass meeting of unemployed in Trafalgar Square, in which a large number of foreigners from the Soho and Leicester Square districts took part. Some of these made Anarchist speeches, and as the English part of the mob consisted largely of members of the criminal. classes, their sentiments were not treated with the contumely they generally meet with from an English crowd. A strong police force was unable to prevent the mob marching down Whitehall and doing on the way great damage to the Government Offices. Their object was supposed to be an attack on the Houses of Parliament; but in Parliament Square they were met by two squadrons of Household Cavalry, who were eventually compelled to charge. The loss of life was considerable, and, some of the mob being armed with revolvers or other firearms, half a dozen troopers were killed and

more wounded. The riot was ultimately suppressed, and a large number of arrests made. Similar scenes took place in Liverpool and Glasgow, in both of which the Irish element promoted the disturbances, and others of the large towns, but in none did the riots assume such a formidable aspect as that of the first of May in London, and in all cases they were promptly and firmly dealt with by the authorities. After the first outbreaks had been suppressed, the discontented part of the population generally sank into sullen acquiescence, varied by meetings to protest against the continuation of the war, and to abuse the Government. There were in the early weeks of the war fears of a formidable rising in Ireland, and of an attempt to land French troops in that island; but through the energetic measures adopted by the Irish Executive, ably seconded by the military dispositions of the Commander-in-Chief, nothing more serious happened than a few isolated outbreaks in the south and southwest. Moonlighting raids, however, became frequent again, and the Constabulary, which had been gradually diminished during the past few years, was largely augumented.

An attempt has been made since the restoration of peace to keep the price of wheat up, and though it is to some extent promoted by our present critical relations with Germany it is not probable that it will succeed. Apart from the outcry for the restoration of the cheap loaf and the danger to public order if it is disregarded, there has been an immense influx of Canadian, American, and other foreign wheat into the country since the end of the war. This influx of foreign wheat exceeds all previous experience in a similar space of time, and the farmers will have to give way in order to avoid

ruin.

In two ways the war has been productive of good results. In the first place, the common danger and the absolute necessity of united action in order to save the country have tended to considerably diminish Party feeling, while it has been made evident that

Englishmen are still possessed of the old. fighting spirit and the dogged determination to suffer any losses and hardships that victory may ultimately be secured. In the second place, as before mentioned, we have been brought into closer relations with the United States, as well as with the Colonies, and the way has been paved for a real Imperial Federation which will make the British Empire an organized political entity, while an Anglo-American Alliance, perhaps leading in the future to a Pan-Anglo-Saxon Federation, has come within the range of practical politics. But if the war has been advantageous to us in these respects, we fear that these advantages are more than counterbalanced by the commercial losses we have sustained. Though it is too early yet to form anything like an accurate estimate of the future results of these losses, we have sufficient data in the previous experience of nations to make us extremely apprehensive. In addition to the loss of many ships through their foreign crews carrying them into hostile or neutral ports, and to the capture or destruction of hundreds more by the enemy's commerce-destroyers, the loss in our carrying trade resulting from transfers to neutral flags is variously estimated at from 25 to 40 per cent. of the whole. By far the greater proportion of this has passed into the hands of Germany, and, judging from the experience of Holland after the Peace of Nimeguen in 1678, and from that of the United States after the War of Secession, we cannot hope to regain it, at any rate for a long time to come. There is, in fact, a very strong and ominous analogy between the present position of Great Britain and that of Holland two centuries ago, and although in some respects we are more favorably situated than the United Provinces were for we have no land frontier to defend in Europe, our mineral and manufacturing resources are still a great source of wealth, and our Colonial Empire, which is infinitely greater than Holland's even then was, can supply us both with food and raw materials for

manufacture, as well as with practically unlimited men for our naval and military forces-still, on the other hand, we are far more dependent than Holland ever was on Sea-Power for our food, and we are consequently far more liable to be starved into surrender, if we once really lose the command of the sea. That we did not lose it in the late war is due rather to the decrees of Providence than to our own foresight and preparations, and even the partial and temporary loss of it produced disastrous results both in out internal economy and in our foreign commerce, from the effects of which we shall not recover for many years, if ever.

As our present position resembles that of Holland two hundred years ago, so Germany to-day stands in some degree in the position in which England stood then. It has been evident for some years past that this Power has been preparing to dispute our commercial, colonial, and maritime supremacy, and there is a great danger that, now that we are just at the end of an exhausting war, in which many of our finest ships have been destroyed, and the number of our trained fighting seamen killed or permanently incapacitated for active service is put at about one-third of the whole, while we have not had time to train others to take their places, she may take the opportunity of pressing claims which we could not but resist, with the result of another war, in which we should probably be hampered by hostilities between the English and Dutch and South Africa. Germany's attitude toward England during the war, though neutral, has been consistently inimical, and by retaining her neutrality she has reaped the benefit of a large proportion of our carrying trade, and a by no means insignificant share of our general commerce passing into the hands of her merchants. In going to war with us now she would run no risk in having other European enemies on "her back," for France and Russia, the only Powers which would be at all likely to attack her, are even more exhausted than we are, and quite unable,

even supposing they were willing, to do so, while Japan would in all probability maintain her attitude of neutrality as in the late war. It is possible that the United States might come to our assistance, but we cannot at all depend upon her doing so. Our best hope lies in this, that in the course of history no Power has ever attained military and maritime supremacy at the same time, a fact which is specially illustrated by the careers of Louis XIV. and Napoleon. Assuming that it is beyond the capacity of any Power to achieve these two objects at once, we may conclude that Germany, being at the present moment undoubtedly the first military Power in Europe, would, if she now tried to gain possession of maritime supremacy also, be preparing

her own downfall. Yet it does not follow from this that we should retain our position, and it behoves us to make every effort to restore our navy while we have time, at the same time doing everything possible to promote Imperial Federation. The mercantile marine, also, should be, as far as possible, re-established, and every inducement should be offered for the employment of British, and the exclusion of foreign seamen, and for the rest we must place our dependence on that Power Who has brought us safely through many dangers and difficulties, and,

"Beneath Whose awful Hand we hold
Dominion over palm and pine.'

-National Review.

I

THERE is no word in the English language more foully misused than the word Art, possibly because there is no nation which, as a whole, has less understanding of what art is than the English nation. do not mean to assert that England has been behind other civilized countries in its artistic productions, for that is not true. English artists have produced admirable buildings, sculptures, paintings, musical compositions, and other artistic productions, but these have never appealed to the great mass of Englishmen; they have always been created for and appreciated by the few. In Florence, when Cimabue finished his first great Madonna, the whole town went en fête; no English town can be conceived of as behaving in a similar manner. There is with us no popular artistic judgment worth a moment's consideration. The verdict of the majority on any artistic question, if it could be obtained, would throw no light whatever on that question, but might cast a somewhat

lurid illumination on the majority's artistic sense.

It may be assumed that if any one understands the mind of the purchasing public it is they whose bread is earned by selling things to it and endeavoring to find out what it wants to buy. Advertisers are continually proclaiming the merits of art furniture, art colors, and art goods in general. Presumably they do so because they find the phrase attracts. That alone is proof positive that the purchasing publie knows nothing about art, for all colors alike are capable of artistic employment, and no color is more an art color than any other. I have often wondered what these advertisers, and the people they appeal to, consider art to be. Do they imagine one lot of things to be mere objects of utility, not art things at all? and do they conceive that there is a separate category of things appertaining to art? A more erroneous classification cannot be made.