in, broke upon me from the fountains of the Kant's system is not to make the mind out great deep, and fell from the windows of heav. of the senses, as Hume had done, but the en. The fontal truths of natural religion and senses out of the mind. the books of revelation alike contributed to the Hume had started from without, so he

As Locke and food; and it was long ere my 'ark touched on started from within, making the one fixed an Ararat and rested.'”

truth, the only ground of reality, to consist, About this time he fell in with the works not in that which the senses furnish, but in of the German and other mystics — Tauler, that which the understanding supplies to Böhmen, George Fox, and William Law, make sensible knowlerige possible. His and in them he found the

same kind of help prime, question was, How is experience which Luther had found in Tauler:

possible? And this possibility he found in

the a priori forms of the sensory time and “ The writings of these mystics acted in no space, and in the a priori forms or categoslight degree to prevent my mind from being ries of the understanding, which by their imprisoned within the outline of any single activity bind together into one the multidogmatic system. They helped to keep alive farious and otherwise unintelligized intithe heart within the head; gave me an indis mations of sense. It is sense that supplies tinct yet stirring and working presentiment the understanding with the raw material; that all the products of the mere reflective this the understauding passes through its faculty partook of death, and were as the rattling machinery, and, by virtue of its inherent twigs and sprays in winter into which a sap concept-firms, reduces it to order, makes it was yet to be propelled from some root to which conceivable and intelligible. But the unI had not as yet penetrated, if they were to afford my soul food or shelter. If they were a

derstanding is limited in its operation to moving cloud of smoke to me by day, yet were phenomena of experience, and whenever it they a pillar of fire throughout the night, during steps beyond this and applies its categories my wanderings through the wilderness of to super-sensible things, it lands itself in doubt, and enabled me to skirt, without cross- contradictions. It cannot arrive at any ing, the sandy deserts of utter unbelief.” other truth than that which is valid within

man's experience. Ultimate truths, valid It was in the company of these men that for all intelligents, if such there be, are behe first got clear of the trammels of the yond its reach. mere understanding, and learned that there Had Kant's philosophy stopped here it is higher truth than the faculty can compass would not have done much more for Coleand circumscribe. The learned seemed to ridge than Locke's and Hartley's had done. him for several generations to have walked It was because Kant asserted the existence entirely by the light of this mere under- in man of another faculty, distinct from and standing, and to have confined their inves- higher than understanding, namely, Reason, tigations strictly within certain conven- that Coleridge found him so helpful. The tional limits, beyond which lay all that is term Reason Kant employed in another most interesting and vital to man. To en- than our ordinary sense, as the faculty of thusiasts

. illiterate and simple men of heart, ultimate truths or necessary principles. He they left it to penetrate towards the inmost distinguished, however, between Reason in centre, the indwelling and living ground its speculative and in its practical use. of all things.” And then he came to this Speculative Reason he held to be exclusiveconviction which he never afterwards aban- ly a regulative faculty, having only a formal doned, that if the intellect will not acknowl- and logical use. This use is to connect our edge a bigher and deeper ground than it judgments together into conclusions, accordcontains within itself, it, making itself the ing to the three forms of reasoning, — the centre of its system, it seeks to square all categorical, the hypothetical, and the disthings by its own laws, it must, if it follows junctive. These three methods are the out fearlessly its own reasoning, land in ideas of Speculative Reason by which it Pantheism or some form of blank unbelief. strives to produce unity and perfectness While bis mind was seething with these among the judgments of the understanding. thoughts it was that he first studied the As long as the ideas of Speculative Reason works of Kant, and these, he says, took pos- are thus used to control and bring into session of him as with a giant's hand. Hence- unity the conceptions of the discursive unforth his metaphysical creed was moulded derstanding, they are used rightly, and mainly by the Kantian principles. This is within their own legitimate sphere. But not the place to attempt to enter on the whenever Speculative Reason tries to eleslightest exposition of these. But, to speak vate these regulative ideas into objects of popolarly, it may be said that the gist of theoretical knowledge, whenever it ascribes

objective truth to these ideas, it leads to was that which so attracted Coleridge. contradiction and falsehood. In other But in the use which Coleridge made of words, Speculative Reason Kant held to be this power, and the range he assigned it, true in its formal or logical, but false in its he went much beyond his master.

He material application. As the understand speaks of Reason as an immediate beholding, with its categories, has for its object ing of super-sensible things, as the eye and only legitimate sphere the world of which sees truths transcending sense. He sense, so Speculative Reason, with its ideas, identifies Reason in the human mind, as has for its exclusive sphere of operation the Kant perhaps would have done, with Uniconceptions of the understanding, and be- versal Reason; calls it impersonal; indeed, yond this these ideas have no truth nor regards it as a ray of the Divinity in man. validity. It was not, however, by these In one place he makes it one with the Light views, either of understanding or of Specu- which lighteth every man, and in another lative Reason, that Kant came to the help he says that Reason is the presence of the of the highest interests of humanity, but by Holy Spirit to the finite understanding, his assertion of the existence in man of the at once the light and the inwarl eye.' Practical Reason which is the inlet or “ It cannot be rightly called a faculty,” he source of our belief in moral and super- says, “much less a personal property of any sensuous truth. Some have maintained human mind." We cannot be said to posthis to be an afterthought added to Kant's sess Reason, but rather to partake of it; for system. But, be this as it may, Kant held there is but one Reason, which is shared by that the moral law revealed itself to man as all intelligent beings, and is in itself the a reality through his Practical reason -a Universal or Supreme Reason. “He in law not to be gathered from experience, but whom Reason dwells can as little approprito be received as the fundamental principle ate it as his own possession, as he can claim of action for man, evidencing itself by its ownership in the breathing air, or make an own light. This moral law requires for its enclosure in the cope of heaven.” Again, action the truth of three ideas, that of the he says of Reason, that "it has been said to soul, of immortality, and of God. These be more like to sense than to understandideas are the postulates of the practical rea- ing; but in this it differs from sense: the son, and are true and certain, because, if bodily senses have objects differing from they are denied, morality and free-will, themselves; Reason, the organ of spiritual man's highest certainties, become impossi- apprehension, has objects consubstantial ble. They are, however, to man truths of with itself, being itself its own object, – moral certainty — of practical faith – that is, self-contemplative.” And again, though Kant did not use that word, rather “Reason substantiated and vital, not only, than objects of theoretical contemplation. yet manifold, overseeing all, and going

This distinction between the understand through all understanding, without being ing and the Reason Coleridge adopted from either the sense, the understanding, or the Kant, and made the ground-work of all bis imagination, contains all three within itself, teaching. But the distinction between even as the mind contains its owu thoughts, Speculative and Practical Reason, which and is present in and through them all; or was with Kant radical, Coleridge did not as the expression pervades the different dwell on, nor bring into prominence. He features of an intelligent countenance." knew and so far recognized Kant's distinc- In much of the above, Coleridge has not tion, that he spoke of Speculative Reason only gone beyond Kant's cautious handling as the faculty of concluding universal and of Practical Reason, but has given to the necessary truths, from particular and con- German's philosophical language a religious, tingent appearances, and of Practical Rea- and even a Biblical colouring of his own. son, as the power of proposing an ultimate Nay, in regarding. Reason as the power of end, that is, of determining the will by intuitive insight into moral and spiritual ideas. He does not, however, seem to have truths, he has approached nearer to some held by it firmly. Rather he threw himself of the German philosophers who came afon Kant's view of Practical Reason, and ter Kant. Though Coleridge made so much carried it out with a fulness which Kant of this distinction between Reason and unprobably would have disallowed. Kant's derstanding, and of Reason as the organ of strong assertion that there was at least one spiritual truth, and though throughout his region of his being in which man came into later works he is continually and at length contact with super-sensible truth, with insisting on it, he cannot be said to have the reality of things, this, set forth not made it secure against all the technical obvaguely, but with the most solid reasoning, ljections. It would be impossible here to follow him into all the ramifications of this with man's deepest aspirations in all time. abstruse sulject, and to show minutely the It was a thorough and profound protest relation in which he placed Reason to un- against the philosophy judging according derstanding. We may, however, notice to sense, with which England, and, pace one scoff against the wbole system. It has Reid be it said, Scotland too, had so long been represented as a device to enable a been deluged. "It opened up once more a man to believe that what is false to his free passage for man's thoughts to that understanding may be true to his Reason. higher world of truth which philosophy had This

, though it may be a smart sneer, is so long barred against them; opened up nothing more. What Coleridge did main to the human spirit a path which it might tain was that the material of moral and travel, undisturbed by technical objections spiritual truth which comes to man through of the understanding, toward that spiritual his Reason, must, before it can be reduced region which is its natural home. Man's to definite conceptions and expressed in deepest heart, his inmost being, from depths propositions, first pass through the forms of beyond all conscious thought, cry out for the understanding. In so passing, the truths such access. And it is the business of a of Reason and the moral will suffer some true philosophy, not, as has been often loss, because the conceptions of the under- done, to bar the way and to break down the standing are not adequate to give full ex. bridges that span the gulfs, but cautiously, pre-sion to them; so that it was to him no yet resolutely, to make ready a way by argument against a truth whose source lies which the weary hearts of men may pass in Reason, if, in passing through the under- over in safety. slonour be to the spiritual standing, or being reduced to logical lan- engineers who have laboured to build up guage, it issued in propositions which seem such a bighway for humanity! illogical

, or even contradictory. And what When Coleridge had made his own the more is this than to say that man's logical distinction between reason and understandunderstanding is not the measure of all ing, he found in it not only a key to many truth ? a doctrine surely which did not of the moral and religious questions which had originate with Coleridge. But whatever perplexed himself, and were working confudifficulties there may be in this philosophy sion among his contemporaries, but he seemof the reason, it is an attempt to vindicate ed to find in it a truth, which, however and sanction those truths which lie deepest

, unsystematically, had been held and built and are most vital to buman nature. Ques- on by all the masters of ancient wisdom, tions are continually rising within us, wheth- whether in philosophy or theology. Espeer born of our own thoughts or imported cially he seemed to see this truth pervading from intellectual systems, asking anxiously the writings of the Cambridge Platonists, whether any thought of man can reach to of Leighton, and of all the best divines of spiritual realities. The mind is continually the seventeenth century. getting entangled in a self-woven mesh of A good example of the way in which Colesophistry. It is the highest end of all philos- ridge applied his inetaphysical principles ophy to clear away these diffculties which to philosophic questions will be found in philosophy has itself engendered, and to let the Essays on Method, in the third volthe mind look out on the truth as uncloud- ume of The Friend. He there attempts edly as it did before these sophistications to reconcile Plato's view of the idea as arose; to give back to the race the simpli- lying at the ground of all investigation city of its childhood, with the wisdom of with Bacon's philosophy of induction, and its mature age. Of most metaphysicians, to prove that, though they worked from first and last, the main work has been to opposite ends of the problem, they are not build up between the spirit of man and the really opposed. In all inductive investigaFather of spirits solid walls and high, which tions, Coleridge contends, the mind must no human strength can pierce through, no contribute something, the mental initiative, eye can overlook. To break down and the prudens quæstio, the idea; and this, clear away these walls, which others with when tested or proved by rigorous scientific such pains had reared, this was the ultimate processes, is found to be a law of nature. aim and end towards which Coleridge What in the mind of the discoverer is a laboured. Herein lies the great service prophetic idea, is found in nature to be a which he did to his age and country. He law, and the one answers, and is akin to, was almost the first philosopher for a bun- the other. What Coleridge has there said dred and fifty years, who upheld a meta- of the mental initiative which lies at the physics which was in harmony at once with foundation of induction, Dr. Whewell has the best wisdom of the olden time, and taken up and argued out at length in his works on Induction. Mr. Mill has as stout- | substance of that essay. Hard words and ly redargued it from his own point of view, repulsive these may seem to some, who and their polemic still waits a solution. But feel it painful to analyze the faith they we must pass from these pure metaphysical live by. And no doubt the simple, child. problems to notice some of the ways in like. apprehension of the things of faith which Coleridge applied his principles to is better and more blessed than all phimoral and religious questions.

losophizing about them. They who have In the Li'erary Remains there is a re- good health and light breathing, whose sysmarkable essay on Faith, which contains a tem is so sound that they know not they suggestive application of these principles. have a system, have little turn for disquisiFaith he defines to be fealty or fidelity to tions on health and respiration. But, just as that part of our being which cannot be- sickness and disease have compelled men to come an object of the senses ; to that in us study the bodily framework, so doubt and which is highest, and is alone uncondition- mental entanglement have forced men to ally imperative. What is this ? Every man go into these abstruse qu'stions, in order to is conscious of something within him which meet the philosophy of denial with a countells him he ought, which commands him, to ter philosophy of faith. The philosophy is do to others as he would they should do to not faith, but it may help to clear away sohim. Of this he is as assured as he is that phistications that stand in the way of it

. he sees and hears ; only with this difference, For entering into speculations of this kind that the senses act independently of the Coleridge had been branded as a transcenwill. The conscience is essentially connect- dentalist, a word with many of hideous imed with the will. We can, if we will, refuse port. But abstruse and wide of practice as to listen to it. The listening or the not these speculations may seem, it was for listening to conscience is the first moral act practical behoof mainly that Coleridge unby which a man takes upon him or refuses al- dertook them. “What are my metaphylegiance to a power higher than himself, yet sics ?” he exclaims; “ merely the referring speaking within himself. Now, what is this of the mind to its own consciousness for in each man, higher than himself, yet speak- truths which are indispensable to its own ing withiu him ? It is Reason, super-sensuous, happiness.” Of this any one may be con. impersonal, the representative in man of vinced who shall read with care his Friend the will of God, and demanding the allegi- or his Lay Sermons. One great source of ance of the individual will. °Faith, then, the difficulty, or, as some inight call it, the is feality to this rightful superior ; "allegi- confusedness of these works, is the rush and ance of the moral nature to Universal Rea- throng of human interests with which they son, or will of God; in opposition to all usur- are filled. If he discusses the ideas of the pation of appetite, of sensible objects, of the Reason, or any other like abstract subject, finite understanding" of affection to others, it is because he feels its vital bearing on or even the purest love of the creature. And some truth of politics, morality, or religion, conscience is the inward witness to the pres- the clear understanding of which concerns ence in us of the divine ray of reason, the the common weal. And here is one of his irradiative power, the representative of the strongest mental peculiarities, which has Infinite." An approving conscience is the made many censure him as unintelligible. sense of harmony of the personal will of His eye Aashed with a lightning glance man with that impersonal light which is in from the most abstract truth to the minutest him, representative of the will of God. A practical detail, and back again from this to condemning conscience is the sense of dis- the abstract principle. This makes that, cord or contrariety between these two. when once his mental powers begin to Faith, then, consists in the union and in- work, their movements are on a vastness of terpenetration of the Reason and the indi- scale, and with a many-sidedness of view, vidual will. Since our will and moral nature which, if they render him hard to follow, enter into it, faith must be a continuous and make him also stimulative and suggestive total energy of the whole man. Since rea- of thought beyond all other modern writers. son enters into it, faith must be a light — a When Coleridge first began to speculate, seeing, a beholding of truth. Hence faith the sovereignty of Locke and his followers is a spiritual act of the whole being; it is in English Metaphysics was not more " the source and germ of the fidelity of man supreme than that of Paley in Moral Phito God, by the entire subjugation of the hu- losophy. Both were Englishmen of the man wiil to Reason, as the representative in round, robust English stamp, baters of him of the divine will." Such is a condensa- subtilties, abhorrent of idealism, resolute to tion, nearly in Coleridge's own words, of the warn off any ghost of scholasticism from the domain of common-sense philosophy. founds morality, which looks to the inward And yet both had to lay down dogmatic motive, with law, which regards only the decisions on subjects into which, despite the outward act. Indeed, the need of a judgburliest common sense, things infinite and ment of actions according to the inward spiritual will intrude. How resolute was motive, forms one of the strongest arguColeridge's polemic against Locke and all ments for a future state. For in this world his school we have seen. Not less vigorous our outward actions, apart from their mowas his protest against Paley as a moralist, tives, must needs determine our temporal and thai at a time when tew voices were welfare. But the moral nature longs for, raised against the common-sense Dean. and Scripture reveals, a more perfect judg

For completely rounded moral systems ment to come, wherein not the outward act Coleridge indeed professed little respect, but the inward principle, the thoughts and ranking them for utility with systenis of intents of the heart, shall be made the casuistry or auricular confession. But of ground of judgment. Again, this criterion vital principles of morality, penetrating to is illusory, because evil actions are often the quick, few men's writings are niore turned to good by that Providence which fruittul. A standing butt for Coleridge's brings good out of evil. If, tien, conseshafts was Paley's well-known definition of quences were the sole or chief criterion, virtue as “ the doing of good to mankind, then these evil actions ought to be, because in obedience to the will of God, and for the of their results, reckoned good. Nero persake of everlasting happiness.” Or, as secuted the Christians and so spread ChrisPaley has elsewhere more broadly laid tianity: is he to be credited with this good down the same principle, "we are obliged result? Again, to form a notion of the to do nothing, but what we ourselves are to nature of an action multiplied indefinitely gain or lose something by, for notbing else into the future, we must first know the can be a violent motive.” Against this nature of the original action itself. And if substitution, as he called it, of a scheme of we already know this, what need of testing selfish prudence for moral virtue, Coleridge it by its remote consequences? If against was never weary of raising his voice. Mo- these arguments it were urged that general rality, as he contended, arises out of the consequences are the criterion, not of the Reason and conscience of man; prudence agent but of the action, Coleridge would out of the understanding, and the natural reply, that all actions have their whole wants and desires of the individual; and worth and main value from the moral printhough prudence is the worthy servant of ciple which actuates the agent. So that, if inorality, the master and the servant can- it could be shown that two men, one acting pot rightly be confounded. The chapter from enlightened self-love, the other from in The Friend, in which he argues against pure Christiani principle, would observe the Utilitarian system of ethics, and proves towards all their ne'ghbours tbroughout life that general consequences cannot be the exactly the same course of cutward concriterion of the right and wrong of particu- duct, yet these two, weighed in a true moral lar actions, is one of the best-reasoned and balance, would be wide as the poles asunder. most valuable which that work contains. By these and suchlike arguments Coleridge The following are some of the arguments oppos''s the Paleyan and every other form with whieh he contends against “the inade- of Utilitarian ethics. Instead of confoundquacy of the principle of general conse- ing morality with prudence, he everywhere quences as a criterion of right and wrong, bases morality on religion. “ The widest and its utter useles-ness as a moral guide." maxims of prudence,” he asserts, " are arms Such a criterion is vague and illusory, for without hearts, when disjoined from those it depends on each man's notion of happi- feelings which have their fountain in a ness, and no two men have exactly the living principle.” That principle lies in same notion. And even if men were agreed the common ground where morality and as to what constitutes the end, namely, religion meet, and from which neither happiness, the power of calculating conse- can be sundered without destruction to quences, and the foresight needed to secure both. The moral law, every man feels, has the means to the end, are just that in which a universality and an imperativeness far men most differ. But morality ought to be transcending the widest maxims of expegrounded on that part of their nature, rience ; and this because it has its origin in namely, their moral convictions, in which Reason, as described above, in that in each men are most alike, not on the calculating man which is representative of the Divine understanding, in which they stand most Will, and connects him there with. Out of widely apart. Again, such a criterion con- Reason, not from experience, all pure prin

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