with the obligation to submit to laws laid down by other people who happen to be law in a majority. Unless, indeed, this "law which one has laid down for one's self" simply inculcates obedience to the majority. But, if that be liberty, then liberty is no less possessed by the man who makes it a law to himself to obey any master; and liberty is as fully possessed by the slave who makes up his mind to be a slave, as by the freest of free men.

With respect to the other aim of government, the maintenance of equality, Rousseau makes an instructive statement in answering the objection that the attempt is chimerical,

It is precisely because the nature of things (force des choses) continually tends to the destruction of equality, that the power of legislation ought always to tend to maintain it.*

Absolute equality of power and wealth is not required, but neither opulence nor beggary is to be permitted; and it is to depend upon the legislators' view of the circumstances whether the community shall devote itself to agriculture or to manufactures and commerce (liv. ii. chap. xi.). Thus the State is to control distribution no less than production. Moreover, the sov

"A sec

* In spite of all his sentimentalism, Rousseau occasionally sees straight into the realities of things. A prendre le terme dans la rigueur de l'acception, il n'a jamais existé de véritable démocratie, et il n'en existera jamais. Il est contre l'ordre naturel que le grand nombre gouverne, et que le petit soil gouverné. S'il y avait un peuple de dieux, il se gouvernerait démocratique ment. Un gouvernement si parfait ne convient pas à des hommes (liv. iii. chap. iv.). ond Daniel come to judgment !" For it would not be far from the truth to say that the only form of government which has ever permanently existed is oligarchy. A very strong despot, or a furious multitude, may, for a brief space, work their single or collective will; but the power of an absolute monarch is, as a rule, as much in the hands of a ring of ministers, mistresses and priests, as that of Demos is, in reality, wielded by a ring of orators and wire-pullers. As Hobbes has pithily put the case, a democracy, in effect, is no more than an aristocracy of orators, interrupted some. times with the temporary monarchy of one orator" (De Corpore Politico, chap. ii. 5). The

alternative of dominion does not lie between a sovereign individual and a sovereign multitude, but between an aristarchy and a demarchy, that is to say between an aristocratic and a democratic oligarchy. The chief business of the aristarchy is to persuade the king, emperor, or czar, that he wants to go the way they wish him to go; that of the demarchy is to do the like with the mob.

NEW SERIES.-VOL. LI., No. 6.

ereign people is to settle the articles of a State religion, not exactly as religious dogmas, but as "" sentiments of sociability without which a man can neither be a good citizen nor a faithful subject":-

Without being able to oblige any one to believe them, he may banish from the State whoever does not believe them; he may banish them, not for impiety, but for unsociability— as persons incapable of sincerely loving the laws or justice, and of sacrificing themselves having acknowledged these same dogmas, to duty if needful. If any one, after conducts himself as if he did not believe them, let him be punished with death: he has committed the greatest of crimes, he has lied before the law (liv. iv. chap. viii.).

The articles of the State creed are the existence of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent, foreseeing and provident Deity; the life to come, the happiness of the just, the punishment of the wicked, the sanctity of the social contract and of the laws. These aro the positive doctrines of the Rousseauite crced. Of negative dogmas there is only one, and the reader may be surprised to learn that it enjoins the repression of intolerance. Having banished unbelievers in the State creed and put to death lapsed believers, Rousseau thanks God that he is not as those publicans, the devotees of les cultes que nous avons exclus'intolerant. Does he not proclaim that all religions which tolerate others should themselves be tolerated? Yet the qualificatory provision, so far as their dogmas are in no way contrary to the duties of the citizen," would seem to effect a considerable reduction in the State toleration of the tolerators; since, as we have just seen, it is obligatory on the citizen to profess the State creed.

Whether Rousseau used the works of

Morelly and of Mably, as he did those of Hobbes and Locke, and whether his reputation for political originality is not of that cheap and easy sort which is won by sedulously ignoring those who have been unmannerly enough to anticipate us, need not be discussed. At any rate, important works of both these authors, in which the principles to be found in the essay on the

Social Contract' are made the foundation of complete schemes of regimental socialism, with community of goods, were published earlier than that essay. Robespierre and £t. Just went as far as Rousseau in the direction of enforcing equality, but they left it to Babœuf to try to go as

far as Mably. In their methods of endeavoring (by the help of the guillotine) to "force men to be free," they supplied the works naturally brought forth by the Rousseauite faith. And still more were they obedient to the master in insisting on a State religion, and in certifying the existence of God by a governmental decree. The regimental Socialists of our own time appear to believe that, in their hands, political regimentation has taken a new departure, and substantially differs from that of the older apostles of their creed. Certainly they diverge from the views of Owen or of Fourier; but I can find nothing of importance in the serious writings of t e modern school, nor even in their romances, which may not be discovered in the works of Morelly and of Mably, whose advocacy of the doctrines that several ownership is the root of all the evils of society; that the golden age would return if only the State directed production and regulated consumption; and that the love of approbation affords a stimulus to industry, sufficient to replace all those furnished by the love of power, of wealth and of sensual gratification, in our present imperfect state, is as powerful as that of any later writers.

We may now turn to the other line of development of political philosophy based upon a priori arguments, which is represented by individualism in various shades of intensity. I have already said that the founder and father of political individual. ism, as it is held by its more moderate adherents at the present day, is John Locke ; and that his primary assumptions--the state of nature and the contractual basis of society-are the same as those of his predecessor Hobbes, and of his successors Rousseau and Mably. But I have also remarked that the condition of men in the state of nature, imagined by Locke, is different from that assumed by either Hobbes or Rousseau. For these last philosophers, primitive man was a savage; lawless and ferocious according to the older, good and stupid, according to the younger, theorist. Locke's fancy picture of primitive men, on the other hand, represents thein under the guise of highly intelligent and respectable persons, living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them" (Civil Government, §19).

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wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of naturet and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one among another without subordination or subjection.

Again (87), since the law of nature "willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind," every man has a 66 right to punish the transgressors of that law;" that

This view of the law of nature comes from the jurists. Hobbes defines it in the same way, but he says that, in the state of nature, the Law of Nature is silent. In speaking of

Locke as the founder and father of Individual

ism, I do not forget that Hooker (to whom

Locke often refers) and still earlier writers have expressed individualistic opinions. Novertheless, I believe that modern individualism is essentially Locke's work.

Yet Locke, of course, knows well enough

that children are not born equal and that adults are extremely unequal. All that he really means is that men have an equal right to natural freedom,' " and that is a mere a priori dictum (§ 54-87). The sceptics as to the reality of the state of nature are treated with some contempt (§ 14). "It is often asked as a weighty objection, Where are or ever were there any such men in a state of nature? To which it may suffice as an answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of indepen. dent governments, all through the world, are in

a state of nature, it is plain that the world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that state. I have named all governors of independent communities, whether they are or are not in league with others, for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community and make one body politic; other promises and compacts men may make with one another, and yet still be in the state of nature. The promises and bargains for truck, etc., between the two men in the desert island mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega, in his History of Peru, or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them though they are perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one another: for truth

and keeping of faith belongs to men as men, and not as members of society."

เ

is to say, those who invade the rights of others. Moreover, truth and the keeping of faith are commands of the Law of Nature, and belong to men as men," and not as members of society (§ 14). Locke uses the term Law of Nature, therefore, in the sense in which it was often (perhaps generally) employed by the jurists, to denote a system of equity based on purely rational considerations. There is no connection between this law of nature and "natural rights" properly so called. The state of nature imagined by Locke is, in fact, the individualistic golden age of philosophical anarchy, in which all men voluntarily rendering suum cuique, there is no need of any agency for the enforcement of justice. While Hobbes supposes that, in the state of nature, the Law of Nature was silent, Locke seems to imagine that it spoke loudly enough, but that men grew deaf to it. It was only in cousequence of the failure of some of them to maintain the original standard of ethical elevation that those inconveniences arose which drove the rest to combine into commonwealths; to choose rulers; and to endow them, as delegates of all, with the sum of the right to punish transgressors inher

ent in each.

In taking this important step, however,

our forefathers exhibited that caution and prudence which might be expected from persons who dwelt upon the ethical heights which they had reached in the state of nature. Instead of making a complete surrender of all the rights and powers, which they possessed in that state, to the Sovereign, and thus creating State omnipotence by the social contract, as Hobbes wrongfully declared them to have done, they gave up only just so much of them as was absolutely necessary for the purposes of an executive with strictly limited powers. With the Stuarts recognized by France, and hosts of Jacobite pamphleteers on the look-out for every coign of vantage, it would never do to admit the Hobbesian doctrine of complete surrender. So Locke is careful to assert that when men entered into commonwealths they must have stipulated (and, therefore, on approved a priori principles, did stipulate) that the power of the Sovereign was strictly limited to the performance of acts needful "to secure every one's property.'

§ 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and

executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society to be so far society shall require; yet it being only with an disposed of by the legislative, as the good of intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse), the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy.

*

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To listen to Locke, one would imagine that a general meeting of men living in the state of nature having been called to consider the defects' of their condition, and somebody being voted to the tree (in the presumable absence of chairs), this earliest example of a constituent assembly resolved to form a governmental company, with strictly limited liability, for the purpose of defending liberty and property; and that they elected a director or body of directors, to be known as the Sovereign, for the purpose of carrying on that business and no other whatsoever. Thus we are a long way from the absolute Sovereign of Hobbes. Here is the point, in fact, at which Locke diverged from the older philosopher; and at which Rousseau and Mably, after profiting as much as they could by Locke's Essay, left him and laid the theoretical foundations of regimental socialism.

The physiocrats of the eighteenth century, struggling against the effects of that "fureur de gouverner, 99 which one of their leaders, the elder Mirabeau, called the worst malady of modern states, and which had nearly succeeded in strangling every branch of French industry and starving the French people, necessarily welcomed and adopted Locke's individualistic formula.

Their favorite maxim of "Lais

*The following passages complete the expression of Locke's meaning: "Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently of all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the such laws and in the defence of the commonforce of the community in the execution of wealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good" (S3). "Government has no other end than the preservation of prop. erty" (§ 94). "The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property'' (§ 124).

sez faire" was a corollary of the application of that formula in the sphere of economy; and it was a great thing for them to be able to add to the arguments based on practical expediency, which could be properly appreciated only by those who took pains to learn something about the facts of the case, the authority of a deduction from one of those a priori truths, the just appreciation of which is supposed to come by nature to all men. The axiom of absolute ethics in question has been stated in many ways.

It is laid down that every man has a right to do as he pleases, so long as he does no harm to others; or that be is free to do anything he pleases, so long as he does not interfere with the same freedom in others. Daire, in the introduction to his Physiocrates (p. 16), goes so far as to call the rule thus enunciated a "law of nature."

La loi naturelle qui permet à chacun de faire tout ce qui lui est avantageux sous la seule condition de ne pas nuire à autrui.*

The physiocrats accepted the dogma of human equality, and they further agreed with Locke in considering that the restriction of the functions of the Government to the protection of liberty and property was in no wise inconsistent with furtherance of education by the State. On the contrary, they considered education to be an essential condition of the only equality which is consistent with liberty. Moreover, they laid great stress on the proposition that justice is inseparably connected with property and liberty. Nothing can be stronger than the words of Quesnay on this point :—

Là où les lois et la puissance tutelaire n'assurent point la propriété et la liberté, il n'y a

* The oldest recorded form of the rule, and that which has the most positive character, is contained in the command of the Jewish law, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Leviticus xix. 18), (neighbor including stranger that dwelleth with you," v. 34), which stands in the same relation to the individualistic maxim as Fraternity to Equity. The strength of Judaism as a social organization has resided in its unflinching advocacy of freedom, within the law; equality, before the law; and fraternity, outside the law. I am not sure that, from the purely philosoph. ical point of view, the form in which that great Jew, Spinoza, has stated the rule is not the best: "Desire nothing for yourself which you do not desire for others" (nihil sibi appetere quod reliquis hominibus non cupiant). (Elhices IV., xviii.)

ni gouvernement ni société profitables; il n'y a que domination et anarchie sous les apparences d'un gouvernement; les lois positives et la domination y protègent et assurent les usurpations des forts, et anéantissent la propriété et la liberté desfaibles.*

ethics of the individualist leave as little That is to say, the absolute political ethics of the individualist leave as little and the right to deal freely with it are esdoubt in his mind that private property sential to the protection of the weak against the strong, as the absolute political ethics of the regimental socialist assure him that private property and freedom of contract involve the tyranny of the strong over the weak.

man.

Through the widespread influence of the Wealth of Nations, individualism became a potent factor in practical politics. Wherever the principles of free-trade prevailed and were followed by industrial prosperity, individualism acquired a solid fulcrum from which to move the political world. Liberalism tended to the adoption of Locke's definition of the limits of state action, and to consider persistence in letting alone as a definition of the whole duty of the statesBut in the hands of even the most liberal governments, these limits proved pretty elastic; and, however objectionable State interference might be, it was found hard to set bounds to it, if indirect as well as direct interference were permissible. So long ago as the end of the eighteenth century, the distinguished scholar and statesman Wilhelm von Humboldtt attempted to meet this difficulty. He wrote a special treatise, which remained unpublished till sixty years later, for the purpose of showing that the legitimate functions of the State are negative; and that governments have no right to take any positive steps for the promotion of the welfare of the governed. Von Humboldt does not encumber himself with Locke's limited contract," but starts an a priori axiom of his own, namely:

* Droit naturel, chap. v.

Von Humboldt's essay was written in 1791; but views so little likely to be relished by the German governments of that day needed cautious enunciation, and only fragments appeared (under the auspices of Schiller) until 1852, when the treatise formed part of the posthumous edition of Von Humboldt's works. A translation, under the title of The Sphere and Duties of Government, was published in 1854, by Dr. Chapman (then, as now, the editor of the Westminster Review), and became very well known in this country.

That reason cannot desire for any man any other condition than that in which each individual not only enjoys the most absolute freedom of developing himself by his own energies in his perfect individuality, but in which external nature even is left unfashioned by any human agency, but only receives the impress given to it by each individual by himself and his own free will, according to the measure of his wants and instincts, and restricted only by the limits of his powers and rights (p. 18).

From this very considerable assumption (which I must say does not appear to me to possess the quality of intuitive certainty) the conclusion is deduced that

the State is to abstain from all solicitude for the positive welfare of the citizens and not to proceed a step farther than is necessary for their mutual security and protection against foreign enemies; for with no other object should it impose restrictions on freedom.

This conclusion differs but little from that of Locke, verbally. Nevertheless, in its practical application, Von Humboldt excludes not only all and every matter of religion, of morals, and of education, but the relations of the sexes, and all private actions not injurious to other citizens, from the interference of the State. However, he permits governmental regulation of the power of testamentary devolution; and (though somewhat unwillingly) interference with acts which are not immediately hurtful to one's neighbors, yet the obvious tendencies of which are to damage them or to restrict their liberties.

By far the best and fullest exposition known to me of the individualism which, in principle, goes no further than Locke's formula, is Dunoyer's Liberté du Travail, of which the first volume was published in 1825, and the whole work in 1845. One great merit of the author is the resolute casting aside all the a priori figments of his predecessors; and another lies in his careful and elaborate discussion of the historical growth of Individualism, which goes a long way toward the establishment of the conclusion, that advance in civilization and restriction of the sphere of Government interference have gone hand in hand. J. S. Mill has referred to Dunoyer's work; but later expositors of Individualism ignore him completely, although they have produced nothing comparable to the weighty case for the restriction of the sphere of government, presented with a force which is not weakened by fanati

cism, in the seventh chapter of the ninth book of Dunoyer's work.

*

The year 1845 is further marked in the annals of Individualism by the appearance of Stirner's The Individual and his Property, in which the author, going back to first principles, after a ruthless criticism of both limited Individualism and regimental Socialism, declares himself for unlimited Individualism; that is to say, Anarchy. right" is nothing but natural might. Stirner justly points out that "natural Man, in the state of nature, could know of no reason why he should not freely use his powers to satisfy his desires. When men entered into society they were impelled by self-interest. Each thought he could procure some good for himself by that proceeding; and his natural right to make the most out of the situation remained intact. The theory of an express contract, with either complete or incomplete surrender of natural rights, is an empty figment, nor was there any understanding, except perhaps that each would grasp as much as he could reasonably expect to keep. According to this development of Individualism, therefore, the state of nature is not really put an end to by the formation of a polity; the struggle for existence is as severe as ever, though its conditions are somewhat different. It is a state of war; but instead of the methods of the savage who sticks at no treachery, and revels in wanton destruction, we have those of modern warfare, with its Red Cross ambulances, flags of truce strictly respected, and extermination conducted with all the delicate courtesies of chivalry. The rules of this refined militancy are called laws, and prudence dictates respect for them because, as it is to the advantage of the majority that they should be observed, the many have agreed to fall upon any one who breaks them; and the many are stronger than the one. Thus the sole sanction of law being the will of the majority, which is a mere name for a draft upon physical force, certain to be honored in case of necessity; and "absolute political ethics" teaching us that force can confer no rights; it is plain that statecompulsion involves the citizen in slavery,

*Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum, by Max Stirner. I follow the account of the contents of the book given by Meyer, Der Emancipationskampf des vierten Standes (ed. 2, 1882, pp. 36-44).