What, then, are the British claims to the Shiré Valley and to Nyassaland, which Major Serpa Pinto, with 3000 mercenary Zulus, has been raiding? The Rev. Horace Waller, in a recent pamphlet on Nyassaland, has briefly put the case when he wrote: The moment has arrived when. in the face of all this map-making and this scramble for Africa, Great Britain must have a word with her neighbors, and place before them in black and white-not the intentions of a rosy-colored future-but the tale of a hard, determined campaign against the barbarism of Africa, dating back thirty years already. David Livingstone drew attention to the country round Lake Nyassa in 1856, and in 1858 the British Governor placed an expedition at Livingstone's disposal, the main object being to extend the knowledge already attained of the geography and mineral and agricultural resources of East and Central Africa," These efforts were followed up by the Universities Mission to Central Africa under Bishop Mackenzie, and it is superfluous to speak of the work done. there, and of the valuable and heroic lives laid down. Those "little mounds" in Africa mean much to many a home in Eng land. The Established Church has spent £43,000 on her work in the Shiré Highlands, and of the sixty-one members of the Universities Mission, we learn that there are nine clergymen, two ladies, and eight laymen. No title-deeds to a barbarous country can ever be stronger than these.

once. It may be remarked that all sections of missionaries have worked hand in hand in the great work of civilization. Together with the Universities Mission, the Scotch Free Church and United Presbyterians have been associated, and Dr. Stewart, the head of the great Missionary College at Lovedale, in the Cape Colony, sends trained Kaffirs from the south as native catechists. The devotion of these Kaffirs is beyond praise. They speak the language of the Angoni, who originally came from the south of the Zambesi."" In a country like South Africa, where the problem of native education and civilization has to be worked out, this idea of Dr. Stewart is of extreme value. It opens up a wide field and a most ample vision. The Lovedale Institute tells its own tale, and is, perhaps, one of the most encouraging signs of European occupation in South Africa. There the great problem of Kaffir education, in its broadest and widest sense, is boldly and successfully grappled with.

Further, it must be remarked that this missionary movement in the Lake district has the sympathy and co-operation of the Dutch Reformed Church, which has great power and influence with the Dutch colohists of the south. This Church has still to make its own history in the field of missionary enterprise, and it would be one of the most cheering signs of South African progress if, side by side with the Universities and Free Church Missions, Stellenbosch Seminary, the South African College, or the Cape Town University, were to establish a working centre. still more cheering sign would be the voluntary aid of members of the Dutch Reformed Church in the Free State at the Transvaal. But perhaps this is too much to hope for just yet.

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To a great extent the question in the Shiré Valley has been a missionary question, and our continental neighbors, in the opinions they form on the nature of our colonial empire, are rather apt to leave out of sight the very real and genuine motives which prompt our missionary enterprises. Incidentally, the mission station may open the avenues to trade, but in the first instance it is a chivalrous and heroic resolve on the part of great men and great minds to battle with the powers of darkness. Let the Portuguese be content to sit, as they

have done, at the receipt of custom. Their position on the east coast is of enhanced value since English and American capital has flowed thither. Who had ever heard of Delagoa Bay until the submarine cable, in the first place, brought its dreary and fever-stricken solitudes into touch with the outer world? That a railway has been constructed from the Bay itself to the Lebombo mountains, and to the Transvaal frontier, is the direct result of the exploitation of the gold fields of the Transvaal by means of British capital. What, may we ask, has been the share contributed by Portugal to this undertaking from the beginning Relatively, none at all. The activity introduced into the Bay is the activity of English engineers, and the money that of an American capitalist.

At one time it was stated that Portugal would appeal to the Congo Conference (1885), and advance the theory that the Shire Valley was part of the Congo Free State. This appeal is diametrically opposed to their own position there, and in answer it might be said that the less Portugal says about the Congo Conference the better for her case. She was the sole obstructing power at that Conference, if we except, perhaps, France; and, by the unanimous verdict of all, pushed aside from her position at the mouth of the Congo with the scantiest possible ceremony. The argument that was used against her flimsy occupation of the Congo mouths would apply equally well to her ports at the mouth of the Zambesi or at Mazambique; and, for the matter of that, to her position at Delagoa Bay. With regard to the whole of this Portuguese difficulty, there can be but one verdict from all parties and politicians in England. The issue before Lord Salisbury was really a very plain one, and his action was just, plain, and peremptory. No doubt some disappointment was felt in Portugal. Awakened out of their long sleep in Africa, the Portuguese merchants and manufacturers, keeping the prosperous vision of Brazil before them, dreamed of a TransAfrican empire between Angola and Mozambique. They had been working up to this idea since 1884, and in 1886 had obtained from France and Germany a diplomatic recognition, couched in vague language, of exclusive Portuguese Trans-continental claims. They had also commenced a royal Trans-African railway, from the

capital of the province of Angola toward the interior, and subsidized a steamship company to connect their two provinces by the route past the Cape of Good Hope. In the future they had a pleasing picture of millions of buyers and consumers in this Trans-African empire, which would bring untold wealth to the Portuguese manufacturers of woollens and cottons. But Portugal has been asleep too long, far too long for the achievement of these national projects. The race is to the strong.

Further south, the Swazieland question demands a speedy settlement. Sir Francis De Winton has arrived in England with evidence on the whole matter. There is no reason in the world why that country should be incorporated with the Transvaal Republic. Are not the burghers satisfied yet with their good fortune! With a country as large as France, and an evergrowing revenue arising from the extraordinary prosperity of their gold fields, the most rabid patriot should be satisfied. Unfortunately, this Swazieland difficulty has become mixed up with Cape politics. How it is mixed up we have had a hint given us some time ago by Sir Gordon Sprigg, the Premier of the Cape Colony. It has long been the aim and object of the mother colony, in its rivalry with Natal, to conciliate the Republics of the Free State and the Transvaal, and obtain the consent and perhaps the help, of the latter more especially, to a railway extension to Johannesburg, and to the immense regions farther north. Paul Kruger is notably averse to railway extension, for many reasons, and is in a very strong position, standing for the time and by the force of circumstances as arbitrator.

We would gather from what Sir Gordon Sprigg remarked recently in a public speech, that pressure might be brought to bear upon England by his Government at Cape Town to hand over the Swazies to the Boers, upon the condition of the latter assisting his pet schemes of railway extension. Such an exchange of civilities is based upon a small and selfish policy, and it was bad taste to hint at it. For what, indeed, is the position of the Home Government in such a compromising bartering? England has her own case to decide upon, and might well do without the suggestions of a Cape politician. In a word, the genuine interests of South Africa are

too big to be jockeyed at Cape Town. The Swazies, whatever they may be, cannot be bandied about at the discretion and advice of a Cape Premier. For what, after all, is the position of a Cape Premier. Any one who follows South African politics knows that the uncrowned king of the Cape Colony is a Dutch gentleman who does not care to hold office himself, but likes to be in the irresponsible and comfortable position of a controller and guide of the policy of others. On the other hand, England has every obligation to stand up for the Swazies and take them under her protection; and, if they must be incorporated with any British colony, let it be eventually with Natal, which is a rising and prosperous community close by, and soon destined in the usual course of things to achieve responsible government. The Swazies have stood by the side of the British, and in the storming of Secocoeni's kopjie, or hill fortress, did their work thoroughly. The object of the Secocoeui campaign was to aid the first bankrupt Transvaal Republic, and set the community on its legs. The Swazies had no love for the Boers, but they helped us to punish Secocoeni because we asked them. Afterward, in the Transvaal war, they were ready to help us against the Boers. What then would the Swazie tribes say now to the wholesale abandonment of themselves by us to the tender mercies of the Boers? After our policy in Zululand they may not be surprised certainly; but can England afford to lose any more prestige in South Africa? Mr. Rider Haggard has asked, in the New Review (January, 1890)," Can no rulers be found who, like Gunnar, the hero of Norse song, will not yield a single inch; but who will go forward, heedless of Boers, Germans, or Portuguese."

Sir Hercules Robinson, in an article contributed to the February number of the Fortnightly Review, on the Swazieland question, observes : "The South African Republic, in return for our assent to their expansion on the east, should withdraw all claims to the north, and give us all the moral support (the italics are ours) they can in furtherance of our schemes for opening up the interior by the British South African Company." Is it come to this? Must England lean on the moral support of the Transvaal Government? Well, it is time for her to disappear altogether from South Africa if such is to be

we

However, Sir Hercules Robinson's expression has a marked similarity to Sir Gordon Sprigg's sentiments; and fancy we can detect the influence of master on pupil. Has Sir Bartle Frere's "valiant henchman" offered his services to Sir Hercules Robinson, and has he then been serving two masters? But has he not forgotten the example of his first Gamaliel ? Would Sir Bartle Frere have ever cousented to the retrocession of the Swazies, our former allies, thus giving to the Boers the control they like over the destinies of the natives, and to Boers and Portuguese commercial and strategic advantages to be exercised at the expense of England? And the reason put forward by Sir Hercules is so pitiful and paltry, viz. that by so doing and betraying our former allies we may have the moral support, forsooth, of the Transvaal Republic in helping us to carry out our schemes. We confess we cannot follow him here. Sir Hercules Robinson further remarks that he would allow the Boers to annex as much as they desire of the native territories between the Lebombo Mountains and the Pongolo River, and would put no obstacle in the way of Boer government reaching the sea through northern Amatongaland. "The condition which I should insist on for this further concession would be that the Transvaal should enter into a Customs Union with the British colonies and with the Orange Free State." Looking back upon the history of the attempts at a Customs Conference made recently in South Africa, and their failure (for the Transvaal would have nothing to do with the last one), the condition which Sir Hercules Robinson insists on seems hardly likely to be carried out.

How has the Transvaal Government met British offers and British concessions in the past? The answer is written plainly enough in the pages of South African history. The Boers have flouted and defied

British authority in every direction; and the trouble and expense of the Bechuanaland expedition was mainly caused by the official neglect of the Pretoria Government to restrain their lawless subjects. Filibustering is a favorite pastime of the unruly burghers, and the setting up of sham Republics as those of Goshen, Stellaland, and the new Republic formed part of that dreary farce which was allowed to go on in South Africa unchecked. Those adventurers in Swazieland, who have bought up concessions from the drunken and profligate chief Umbandine, have no locus standi worth our serious consideration. At the highest computation they do not exceed 500, and the whole population of Swazieland is, according to a statement made to Sir Hercules Robinson at Cape Town," about 150,000, of whom 25,000 are fighting men. Of these 500 it is said that 400 are English. But whether English or Dutch the fact of their invasion of Swazieland, for there is no other name for it, does not give them a voice in the disposal of the whole country. Their purchases of land were made at random and in ignorance, the same ground being sold over and over again by the chief, and the chief himself, a poor drunken savage, had really no right to sell the birthright of his people.

As a sequel to his policy in allowing the absorption of Swazieland by the Transvaal, Sir Hercules adds-" With such a condition, which would secure the trade of the whole of South Africa being allowed to flow through its natural and most economical channels untrammelled by artificial restriction, I should see more good than harm in the Transvaal having a seaport." We ask, where would the seaport be? At some unknown place in Amatongaland or at Delagoa Bay? Surely Sir Hercules cannot be anticipating the seizure of Delagoa Bay by the Boers! At present it appears that the Boers and Portuguese are on remarkably good terms, and agree in one thing-their hostility to British interests in a country, by the way, whose prosperity has been built up entirely by British hands. Obviously, it would be a senseless proceeding to throw Boers and Portuguese together for their mutual advantage, at the present or any subsequent time, by a policy of retrocession on the eastern seaboard. And the diplomatic pressure which will be necessary in order NEW SERIES.-VOL. LI., No. 6.

to procure the unrestricted flow of commerce through Delagoa Bay or any future. port of Amatongaland will have to be, we imagine, of an extremely strong order.

The end of Sir Hercules Robinson's policy is "the ultimate establishment of a Federal Dominion of South Africa under the British Flag ;" and a very desirable consummation, too! But does the exHigh Commissioner counsel us wisely as to the steps to be taken toward such an end? In the Review he predicts for the Transvaal an Anglicized and Liberalized Republic. It would be difficult to find a place for this Republic in a dominion under the British Flag. "Hold fast !"'

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At the present moment, is a very good maxim in South Africa, and on no account whatever ought England to give up Swazieland to the Boers. From no point of view is it desirable, not even for the purpose of gaining the moral support" of the Boers for our schemes of South African progress. Sir Hercules Robinson has assisted at so many ceremonies of British surrender and abdication that we may be pardoned if we ask for a guide in South African matters who has less disagreeable traditions and memories.

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Sir Hercules Robinson has stated very clearly, in that well-known after-dinner speech at Cape Town, that he regards England simply as the transient trustee of certain possessions in South Africa; and when he pronounces her doom thus emphatically, and hints at Colonial Republicanism, he destroys any moral power she may claim at the present. How can the Boers respect the grandmotherly advice of an old country whose deeds and position in South Africa are shortly to become a tradition, and not a very agreeable tradition, either? Will England have the power, or even the opportunity, to recommend the sinking of all local differences, and the advantages of colonial reciprocity, and the unrestricted flow of trade and commerce everywhere? Those who were in Africa at the time of the Boer war, and after it, remember that cry, "Africa for the Africander, from the Zambesi to Cape

Town!"'

There is one fact very noticeable in South African politics, and this is the gradual shifting eastward and northward of the area of wealth and the sphere of activity. A brief glance at the map will prove this. Kimberley was the ultima Thule at one

time; now it is the Gold Fields of the Transvaal. Time may furnish us with fresh surprises northward, perhaps in Mashonaland. The Customs Revenue of the Cape Colony for the year 1889-90, as given in the Cape Times, amounts approximately to £1,227,169; the diamond export reaches a total of £4,215,809; the gold export is £1,431,726. In a detailed account of the Customs Revenue, we find that Cape Town earns £411,729. Port Elizabeth, in spite of bad accommodation and dangerous anchorage, £541,729. East London, with all her drawbacks, gets £193,800. Cape Town, as the seat of Government, labors under distinct physical disadvantages. In the battle of the railway routes she is constantly fighting against extra mileage, and in the end she must be beaten.

In the history of all nations, a convenient geographical position for the distribution of goods has been one of the first elements of success. The distance from Cape Town to Johannesburg via Kimberley is 938 miles, from Port Elizabeth viâ Kimberley 776 miles, but from Durban viâ Newcastle it is only 400 miles. The railway journey across the "Great Karroo," from Cape Town to Kimberley, is particularly trying in hot weather, and no sane passenger would go by this route if he could remain on board a comfortable steamer, and, after landing at Port Durban, go straight by rail to Johannesburg. The port and harbor of Natal have been wonderfully improved by the continual and energetic efforts of Natalians, chief among whom is Mr. Escombe. Natal herself has forged ahead considerably of late, and her revenue has mounted up by leaps and bounds. Her railway policy has been prompt and straightforward, and, as a natural consequence, she has attracted a considerable part of the Gold Fields traffic. Her increased wealth and rapidly improving position must make her play a far more important part in South African politics than hitherto. Naturally she may claim, in the future, an extension of territorial power, both on the south and north. Pondoland, as far as the mouth of the St. John's river, the whole of Zululand, Tongaland, and Swazieland should all ultimately be administered from Durban or Pietermaritzburg. Everything points to the advisability of coupling the High Commissionership of South Africa with the

office of the Governor of Natal. Swazieland can be approached by way of Amatongaland, and it is a great pity that the "New Republic," filched away by Boer filibusters, which lies between Natal and Amatongaland, was ever allowed to pass into the hands of the Transvaal Government. But, generally speaking, England must show the same determination to carry out a wise and far seeing policy on the east as she has on the west of the Transvaal. Considering the nature of the main functions which are attached to the office of Her Majesty's High Commissioner in South Africa, viz. the oversight of the natives, it is more reasonable that his headquarters should be somewhere near the native territories. On the west coast of Cape Colony, the native question can hardly be said to exist, and since the Angra Pequena affair, Germany has taken upon herself the oversight of the Damaras. Natal is near the very heart and centre of the vast native population of South-East Africa, and the territories of Khama and Lobengula are 500 miles nearer Durban than Cape Town.

The terms of Sir H. Robinson's commission were "to represent Her Majesty's Crown and authority in matters occurring in South Africa beyond the limits of our Colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and of Natal respectively, and beyond the limits of any other place or territory in South Africa, in and over which he may, from time to time, have appointed a Governor." Also, he was empowered to have an oversight of affairs in Basutoland and Bechuanaland, and to transact business with the Free State and Transvaal; and "to do all such things in relation to native tribes in South Africa with which it is expedient that we should have relations. The same commission is issued, we suppose, to Sir Henry Loch.

With the growing responsibilities on the north and east coasts, it is imperative that a High Commissioner should be constantly in touch with the frontier, to see and judge for himself. Sir H. Robinson has himself observed that it was impossible to get two witnesses to tell the same tale about Swazieland; so the moral is that a Governor should go and see for himself. In the old days, when the Cape Colony was the only colony to monopolize attention, and the only wars were those on the Kei River, and along the present borders of Kaffraria,