dent kingdom under Russian protection, strong enough to absorb Servia, Croatia, and perhaps all the Slav countries in the Austrian Empire, and thereby help Russia to plant her standard on the dome of the Aya Sofia.

In Vienna, Berlin, and London there was considerable anxiety as to the further development of things. At that moment Russia and France were opposed to England on the question of the Danubian Principalities, and it became known that the French Emperor, in spite of the sympathies of his country, looked coldly on the Polish insurrection. The conclusion Bismarck arrived at was that the Russian Chancellor, the Emperor of the French, and the Governor of Poland thoroughly understood each other, and that they all agreed that a new Poland, in friendly alliance with Russia, would serve as a basis for an attack on Vienna and on the Ottoman Empire. The Emperor of the French could then settle the Italian question, and perhaps obtain for France the annexation of Belgium and of the left bank of the Rhine.

In England the government, who had some inkling of the objects of France, enencouraged popular sympathy with the Polish insurrection; and the Cabinet of Vienna, notwithstanding its fear for Galicia, viewed it with satisfaction because it crossed the plans of Prince Gortschakoff. Bismarck was equally determined to use the rebellion for the purpose of breaking down the Russo-French alliance, and he set about doing so with characteristic courage, originality and genius.

On various grounds connected with external German politics the relations between Prussia and Austria were becoming daily more strained. England, for some perfectly unintelligible reason, took the side of Austria, and was continually urging the Cabinet of Berlin to adopt a more friendly attitude toward the Government of Vienna. This advice was always met by Bismarck with a request that the ministers of Francis Joseph should be told to be more civil to Prussia.

More important for Prussia than the advice of England was the change of French policy in the autumn of 1862. The Cabinet of Turin held fast to the idea that Rome inust be the capital of Italy. But they announced that the city must be won by peaceable means, and therefore,

while proclaiming the doctrine of Roma Capitale, did not hesitate to disperse the freebooters of Garibaldi at Aspromonte. Soon after this Napoleon the Third, who always hoped he would be able to force both the Pope and Italy to accept his solution of the Italian question, determined to show his displeasure to the Court of Turin by making a change in his diplomatic service. He therefore sent to Rome and Turin as his representatives men of what were called Ultramontane views. Thouvenel, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs, was dismissed, and his place given to Drouyn de Lhuys, the old friend of Austria and the Pope. It became therefore vital for Prussia to keep on good terms with the government of the Czar.

It would be difficult to decide which would most inconvenience the Prussian monarchy-a victory of the Revolutionary party, such as Mieroslawski, Mazzini, and Garibaldi desired, or the establishment of a Polish state under the protectorate of Russia and France, which was the plan of Wielopolski and Prince Gortschakoff. The Radical party had already proclaimed their desire to incorporate into the future Polish Republic, West Prussia, Posen, and Pomerania up to the Oder. The other party, indeed, were moderate in language, but if they got the upper hand it was plain that Wielopolski would be driven forward by the force of circumstances and his own inclinations. Moreover, Prince Gortschakoff was the last man to stop him in his career. The moment, therefore, the news of the Polish insurrection reached Berlin it was determined to deal directly with the Emperor Alexander, and for this purpose General von Alvensleben was sent to St. Petersburg to ask in the name of the King of Prussia for an explanation of the situation and to consult as to the best means of putting down the rebellion. Considering the general position of European politics at the moment this mission of Alvensleben was a very bold step. Everybody sympathized with the Poles. Liberals, Clericals, Republicans, Conservatives worked together in their interest. They were backed by the public opinion of Europe, and had stanch friends in all the most important Governments. This circumstance, however, secured a welcome for the Prussian general at St. Petersburg. A convention was signed by which the

two Powers agreed to render each other mutual assistance. Gortschakoff was hostile to the arrangement, and although it was agreed to keep the transaction secret, he made it known the very next day to the Duc de Montebello, the French Ambassador, and that diplomatist showed his respect for the Russian Chancellor by at once telling Herr von Redern, the Prussian minister, from whom he heard the news. Bismarck had no objection that all the world should know what had taken place, and on the 11th of February he had an interview with Sir Andrew Buchanan, and told him about it. Sir Andrew asked if the troops on each side would cross the frontier. Bismarck replied in the affirmative, and remarked that Prussia would not tolerate an independent Poland. "But what," said Sir Andrew, "if the Russians should be driven out?" "In that case, " said Bismarck, 66 we shall occupy the kingdom ourselves." "Europe will never tolerate that,' ,"remarked Sir Andrew, and repeated this phrase several times. "What do you mean by Europe?" said Bismarck. "The different great nations," replied the British Ambassador. "Are you then all agreed?" said Bismarck. This question was somewhat difficult to answer, and Sir Andrew stammered something about France not allowing Polish oppression. Well, as for us," said Bismarck, "the suppression of the revolution is a question of life and death." He held the same language to the French minister, who, however, replied he knew nothing as to the designs of his Government.

Napoleon the Third was an enemy of the Red party. He would have been delighted to support Wielopolski, and therefore the Prussian Convention was most unpleasant to him. At the same time the whole Clerical party in France as well as the Republicans were equally enthusiastic about Poland. It became, therefore, a matter of importance to pretend at least to do something for Poland, and the French Government hit on the thought of turning their attention not to Russia but to Prussia. Drouyn de Lhuys was just the man for such a policy.

The Prussian Ambassador was first informed that it would have been well if Prussia would remain neutral in the Polish question. A few days later it was announced that the convention had made the

Polish question a European one, and at last it was intimated that nothing would satisfy France but the resignation of Bismarck. The Cabinet of Vienna was asked to join in a Note to that effect, and it was hoped it would assent, considering the hostility to Prussia. In London thero was a general sympathy for the Poles, and Lord John Russell; had, unfortunately, made use of some expressions against the Russo-Prussian Convention. It was hoped, therefore, England would also join. Lord John, however, recognized the danger of the insurrection for Prussia, and refused to be a party to any remonstrance. Austria followed suit, and the whole French plan fell to the ground.

The Prussian statesman had during all this time to face the intrigues of Gortschakoff and a most violent attack in his own Chamber. The Berlin Parliament condemned the action of the Government and declared for neutrality. Bismarck, however, remained unmoved. He stood firm by his own views, and there can be no doubt that this policy was the basis of his success in the Danish war, in the war with Austria, and in the war of 1870.

When Bismarck became Prime Minister of Prussia everything was in confusion. After the year 1848 a powerful reaction had set in throughout the country, in consequence of the revolutionary vehemence of the demagogues and the want of practical sense which the Liberal party had exhibited at Frankfort. The great middle class began to tremble for its safety, and desired above all things the preservation of order. This state of feeling produced a movement in Prussia similar to that which placed the second Bonaparte on the French throne and Bach at the head of Austrian affairs. Thus it came to pass that the ministry of Manteuffel acquired for some years considerable popularity, notwithstanding the Convention of Olinütz. The Prince of Prussia, however, had never forgotten this event, and he was further alienated from the Conservative party in consequence of the manuer in which Kleist-Retzow, a highly honorable but uncompromising Pomeranian nobleman, adininistered the provinces on the Rhine.

When the Prince of Prussia succeeded to the government of his brother, King Frederick William the Fourth, he intro

safe in port, some of their greatest admirers and even fulsome flatterers had been their bitterest opponents and enemies in the hour of difficulty and danger.

The circumstances that led to the war with Austria in 1866 are well known. They grew primarily out of the dualism which resulted from the schism in the national life of Germany caused by the Reforination; but the immediate occasion was the disputes arising out of the joint occupations of Schleswig Holstein. What is less perfectly understood, even in Germany, is the part Bismarck took in negotiating the treaty of Nicolsburg, which terminated the war. The truth in this matter, as far as I am aware, has not yet been told. Soon after the battle of Königgrätz the King of Prussia called together his chief councillors to consider on what basis peace should be negotiated with the Austrian Empire. A proposal was made that Prussia should demand certain annexations of territory, not necessary now to mention, but to which it was positively certain that Austria would not consent without another appeal to the god of battles. Bismarck opposed on five grounds: that it would lead at once to war with France, for which they were not prepared; that there was cholera in the army; that the troops of the Southern German States were not yet defeated, and that with a little assistance from without they might be formidable; that the war would have to be carried into Hungary; and lastly, that the end must be the total destruction of the Austrian Empire, which would greatly aid the Panslavistic movement.

The original proposal was vehemently supported by Roon, who gave a complete answer to the military objections raised by the Chancellor, and who showed that there was no danger to fear from a struggle with France, seeing that the munitions of war were wanting in the arsenals, and that the whole administration of the French army was in a state of complete confusion owing to the Mexican expedition. The Minister of War was supported by Moltke, who urged that another blow should be swiftly struck at Austria, and then that the larger part of the army should be wheeled round for a march on Paris if the Emperor declared war. Bismarck, beaten on the military points, took refuge in his fifth argument, and plainly said he would

not agree to a policy which might mean the total destruction of Austria.

The debate became animated, and the King grew warm. He leaned to the view of his military advisers, and in the course of conversation he said, no doubt unwittingly, something which hurt the feelings of his chief minister. Bismarck retired to his quarters anxious, and waited the determination of his King. While he was standing at a window somebody entered the room. It was the Crown Prince. He and Bismarck had not been for some time on the best of terms, but they made up their differences and discussed the situation. The minister convinced the son of. his sovereign of the danger to Prussia there would be in the future, if not in the present, if the policy which the King seemed disposed to favor were adopted. The Crown Prince, when the council again assembled, gave his opinion against the particular annexation proposed, and Bismarck was triumphant. That very night he summoned Giskra, who was then burgomaster of Brunn, and sent him to Vienna with offers of peace, which, if accepted on the spot, would have been more advantageous than the peace eventually concluded, and would have saved Austria the payment of a war indemnity.

There can be no shadow of doubt that Bismarck in opposing the wishes of his imperial master on this occasion rendered one of his most solid services to the German nation and to the dynasty to which he is so devotedly attached. The object of the war was attained when Austria agreed to withdraw from Germany and when the Germanic settlement of 1815 was broken up. To prosecute the war further would have intensified the feeling of animosity to Prussia in the South German States, and particularly in Bavaria, to such an extent that it would have been out of the question to expect reconciliation between the peoples of the North and South for another generation. It is not likely that there would have been immediate war with France. But it would have come sooner or later, and when it did Southern Germany would have been once more in arms against the North, supported by whatever was left of Austrian power. This catastrophe was averted by the firmness of Bismarck, for when the hour of trial came four years after Königgrätz, the sturdy sons of the Bavarian mountains,

under the command of the Crown Prince of Prussia, stormed the fortified position of Weissenburg, and were among the first Germans to shed their blood in that war which was to end for Germany in the reunion forever of her lost western march, and the re-establishment of Kaiser und Reich in the palace of the very sovereign who harried the Palatinate and tore away Alsace.

The battle of Königgrätz was fought on the 3rd of July, 1866. When the result was known, most men who could read the signs of the times felt, like Göthe after Valmy, that a new era was approaching. There was consternation at the Tuileries. The Emperor of the French had not calculated on so rapid and complete a success for the Prussian army. His knowledge of Germany led him to expect that the solid regiments of King William would ultimately be victorious. But he imagined that the struggle would be long, that both combatants would be exhausted, and that he would be able to offer himself as arbitrator at some critical moment, and secure thereby for a long time to come the undisputed supremacy of France. He was now deeply disconcerted, and without carefully considering the situation sent an ultimatum to Berlin which was delivered early in August, 1866. He demanded for France all the German territories on the left bank of the Rhine, together with the important fortress of Mainz.

Bismarck did not hesitate an instant, but at once refused to meet the wishes of the French Government and determined to accept the alternative of war. A few days afterward, however, when the ministers in Paris realized the danger of a struggle with Prussia, it was intimated to the Court of Berlin that the ultimatum was sent during an illness of the Emperor, and Bismarck was requested to think no more about it. From that moment, however, the relations between France and Prussia were never cordial, and it was clear that sooner or later hostilities would break out between the countries. France began almost at once to make preparations for them, and in December, 1867, Marshal Niel, the Minister of War, openly said that his scheme of army organization must be carried through in order to prepare for a possible collision with Prussia. În July, 1868, M. Thiers, at that time far the greatest authority of the Opposition, NEW SERIES.-VOL. LI., No. 5.

spoke with even unusual vehemence in favor of increased armament in view of an approaching conflict with that power.

The animosity of France against Prussia was stimulated by the action of the Government and the harangues of the Opposition. When Napoleon the Third went to Salzburg to visit the Emperor of Austria after the tragedy at Queretaro, he continually insisted on the circumstance that the French nation were so bitterly jealous of Prussia since the battle of Königgrätz that the slightest incident might provoke war. The Emperor of France asked to see Prince Hohenlohe who was then Prime Minister of Bavaria. Prince Hohenlohe went to the station at Munich to pay his respects. The Emperor got out of his carriage, and, walking up and down the platform, warned the Bavarian minister of the absolute necessity of keeping aloof as much as possible from Prussia, so as not in any way to provoke the susceptibilities of the French. The Emperor did not evidently know the full purport of the treaty of alliance which had been concluded between Prussia and Bavaria in 1866. There were for a couple of years continual rumors of a FrancoGerman war, and at last the explosion came in 1870.

In the spring of that year the crown of Spain was offered to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern Sigmaringen, and accepted by him. The French Government and nation became frantic with anger. The candidature of this prince, however, had been mentioned the year before. A distinguished member of the Cortes, Salazar y Mazarredo, had published a pamphlet which attracted considerable notice in favor of choosing Prince Leopold as King of Spain. One of the reasons he urged in support of his proposal was that of all candidates this Hohenzollern would be least objectionable to France, and less disagreeable a good deal to the House of Bonaparte than the Duc de Montpensier. Prince Leopold, he further pointed out, was only distantly related to the King of Prussia. He belonged to the Catholic branch of the Hohenzollerns which had for centuries been separated from the Protestant line.

It was the same Salazar y Mazarredo who in 1870 conducted negotiations personally with the Prince. So little had the King of Prussia to say to this candidaturé