Part II. Product of external Objects, or material Beings; nay, it will ferve as well to fhew that they do not fall under the productive Power even of God himself, nor have any caufal dependance upon his Will. And fince eternal Truths are the relations of these Neceffary, Eternal and Immutable Ideas, it may hence be further infer'd, that they also are no more capable of being made or produced by God, or of having any fuch dependance upon his Will, than the other. Which Remark here naturally offers it felf against the Cartefian Notion of the Pofitivity of Truth. But to come back again to the Point in hand, that we have no power to produce our Ideas, we may be fufficiently fatisfied by experimental Reflection. Since, if we had a power to bring them into Being, we must (à fortiori) retain the fame Power over them when they are in Being, and fo must be able to change and alter them: But we find we cannot alter them, or make them any otherwise than they are. Whence we may again conclude, that we neither do nor can produce them. But after all, to what purpose fhould we produce them, fince there can be no Production of them, but what presupposes them? Which leads me to obferve,

7. 2dly. That tho' the Soul fhould be allow'd a Power of producing her Ideas, yet 'tis reasonable to think it fhould be a dormant and unactive Power, fince fhe would never use it for the Production of them. This Mr. Malebranche handfomely

handfomely illuftrates by the Similitude of a Painter: For, fays he, even as a Painter, how skillful foever in his Art, cannot represent an Animal which he never faw, and of which he never had any Idea: So a Man cannot form an Idea of an Object, if he does not know it before; that is to fay, if he has not already an Idea of it, which does not depend upon his Will. But if he has already an Idea of it, then he knows that Object, and fo has no occafion to form a new Idea of it. From whence he infers, that 'tis therefore in vain to attribute to the Soul a Power of producing its Ideas. And I think very juftly; for when the Power is without us, the afferting of it must needs be without Reason.

8. This laft Argument wants not fo much any further Confirmation as a little clearing, hat fo the full force of it may the better appear. In order to which 'tis to be observ'd, that Mr. Malebranche feems to take Idea here Relatively, bor according to its Ideal or Representative Beng, when he argues, that the Mind cannot make an Idea of an Object, whereof it has already no Idea, any more than a Painter can draw a Picture of an unknown Creature. And thus indeed he Reafons rightly. But the Argument might have been laid otherwise, and will hold as well of Idea abfolutely confider'd, or according to that reality of Being which it has in itself, without refpect to any thing out of itself. And we may as well fay, that the

Part II Mind cannot form an Idea without having fome Idea of what it forms; that is, that i cannot form an Idea without having an Idea of that Idea; as that it cannot form an Idea of a ny Object without having an Idea of that par ticular Object. And then as if the Mind has already an Idea of that Idea fhe is to make, there will be no need of making it even, as the Argument runs the other way: So that I dea at least, which is the Model of her Work, must be fuppofed as always pre-exiftent to it, and fo cannot be effected by it. The Refult of which put together, will refolve into this double Confequence, that the making of the fecond I dea is fuperfluous, and that the making of the firft is impoffible. Either of which,but especially both together, is, I think, a fufficient Ground whereon to lay the weight of this Conclufion That the Ideas whereby we understand, are not the Productions of our own Souls.

CHAP

CHA P. IX.

That the Ideas whereby we understand are not Created in us by God.

I.

"W

HenNatural and Humane Means fail,'tis both Natural and Ordinary to have recourfe to a fupernatural Cause. And therefore fince our Ideas, as we have fhewn, are not derived to us from material Objects, nor yet are of our own producing, it may be proper in the next place to enquire whether they may not be produced in us by God, whether the Author of our Natures be not alfo the caufe of our Ideas ?!

2. This is the Caufe which Men often neglect and overlook when they should refolve things by it, and as often fly to it when they fhould not, when things are otherwise accountable. God indeed is the caufe of our Senfations, and there is a neceffity of refolving them into the fettled and standing Order of his efficacious Will, if we will give any intelligible account of them. But as for our Ideas, as they are of a very different Confideration in themselves, fo do they require a very different Refolution. It may indeed be no inconfiftent Thought to fuppofe, in the general, that God who made us thinking and intelligent Creatures, should fome way or other furnish us with those Ideas where€ €

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Part II. by we think and understand (which is all that is reasonable in this Suppofition) but that this should be by the way of an efficient Caufality, as by producing or creating Ideas in us, is, I think, a very grofs and unphilofophical Thought, as will diftinctly be made appear by confidering, that if our Ideas are produced by God, either they must be once for all concreated with us, or they must be created occafionally whenever we want them, that is, as often as we think or would think of any Object. But neither of thefe is reasonable to fuppofe, Ergo, &c.

3. That the firft of thefe is not reasonable M. Malebranche fhews from the infinite variety and multiplicity of Ideas, which muft needs be fuppofed in proportion to the like variety and diverfity of Things in the World. But he confines himself to the confideration of fimple Figures, whereof it is certain that the number is infinite. Nay, if we inftance in one only, as an Ellipfis, there can be no doubt but that we may conceive an infinite number of different kinds of them, only by confidering, that one of its Diameters may be lengthen'd out to infinity, while the other continues always the fame. So in like manner as to a Triangle, fince the height of it may be augmented or diminish'd infinitely, that fide which is the Bafis remaining always the fame, 'tis plain we may conceive infinite kinds of them too: Yea, as he obferves, the Mind does in fome fort perceive this infinite number of Triangles, tho' we cannot imagine

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