Part II. of our Ideas, I think there is nothing either fo dangerous, or fo extraordinary in it, but that we may, without fcruple, in great measure, allow it him. For tho' our Ideas do not come from fenfible Objects, as any genuine Iffue or Producti on of theirs, nor are fo much as the caufal Refult of any of their Impreffions, yet there is no Abfurdity in fuppofing that the Author of Nature may establish a Connexion between certain fenfible Impreffions, and certain Ideas, as well as between fuch Impreffions and certain Senfations. Nay, we find by experience, that it is fo in Fact, that upon the Impreffions of fenfible Objects we have naturally arifing in us the Ideas of thofe Objects, as in Seeing, where in, as was before noted, Idea and Sentiment go together. Nay, we not only have certain Ideas upon certain fenfible Impreffions; but there is reafon to think that we cannot ordinarily have them without them, as it is again in the cafe of Senfation: So that I very much queftion if a Man had never feen a Horfe or a Dog, that is, had an Idea of them upon fuch a certain fenfible Impreffion (for that I call seeing) whether he would or could ever have had any Idea of thofe Animals. Thus much therefore may be granted him, tho' whether it be fo in all our Ideas, may, perhaps, admit of a reasonable Debate, particularly as to the Idea of Extenfion. For tho' we cannot have the Ideas of particular Bodies, without fome impreffion one time or other received from thefe Bodies; yet whether

the

the Idea of Matter in general, Intelligible Extenfion, be not an Idea always prefent with us, independently upon any Bodily Impreffion; and if fo, whether again we may not be able fo to modifie it in our Thoughts, as to have the Ideas of certain Mathematical Figures, may deferve to be confidered. But however this be (for I am not concern'd much to infift upon it) the Author is to be put in Mind, as well as those that read him, not to look upon this (if this be his meaning) as any peculiar Hypothefis, either concerning the Origin or Nature of our Ideas, or the manner of our Understanding by them: For let our Ideas be what they will, as to their Nature, or whence they will, as to their true Principle or Caufe, it may still be faid of them, that we ordinarily have them, or at least perceive them by our Senfes, according to this latter meaning of that Propofition. And accordingly I did not think fit to enlarge the Divifion laid down concerning the feveral ways of Humane Understanding, or kinds of Ideas whereby we understand, by the Addition of this as an Hypothefis diftinct from the reft, because indeed it is a fort of a Tranfcendental, too common to all to be fet up in oppofition to any, and fo the Divifion is compleat without it.

26. Come we next to that famous Axiom of the Schools, that there is nothing in the Understanding but what was firft in the Senfe. This has been varioufly difputed, and may ftill B b 3

be

Part II. be fo without any hopes of coming to a final Iffue of the Queftion, till the fense of it be better fettled than it is; for I think it is very loose and indeterminate as it ftands, and confequently very dark and obfcure: But by the light of the foregoing Measures it will be much clearer what Judgment is to be made of it. For if, when they fay there is nothing in the Underftanding but what was firft in the Senfe, their meaning be that there is nothing in the Underftanding but what came first from fenfible Objects, and was by them tranfmitted and convey'd through the Senfes; that is, through the Organs of Sense to the Mind, 'tis apparent by the Premises, that their Maxim fo underftood is to be rejected, fince it is fo far from being thus true that every thing that is in the Understanding was first in the Sense; that indeed, according to this meaning, there is nothing in the Understanding that was firft in the Sense. But if they mean no more than this, that there is nothing in the Understanding, or to exprefs it more clearly, that the Understanding perceives nothing, but by the occafion of fenfible Impreffions; this may in great measure be allow'd, as was faid in the other inftance, tho', perhaps, not altogether fo freely or fo far in this cafe as in the other, because indeed (which is of obfervable importance) this Propofition is much larger in its extent than the other, that going no further than our Ideas, whereas this takes in all intelligible Objects, even whatever the Mind perceives,

perceives. But we perceive God, tho' we have not properly any Idea of him; and it is not very eafie to conceive how the Perception of a Being that is intimately prefent to our Minds, and whom accordingly we perceive by himself, fhould depend upon any fenfible Motions and Impreffions made upon the Body. We have alfo Ideas of pure Intellect as well as of Imagination; fuch I mean as are reprefentatively Immaterial,and fo feem to carry no relation to Matter or Motion, fuch as the Ideas of Order, Truth, Juftice, Goodness, Being, &c. with a numerous multitude of fuchAbstract and purely intelligible Objects of Metaphyfical and Moral Confideration. There are alfo eternal Truths which we perceive, especially those which result from these purely intelligible Ideas; and 'tis not fo very congruous to think, that the Perception of thefe things should be owing to, or depend upon the Impreffions of Matter, nor indeed that any thing else should,but only the Ideas of those Bodies by which the Impreffion is made. It seems to be futable and proportionable enough, that Bodies, by their feveral Motions and Impreffions fhould ferve as occafions to raise in us the Ideas of themselves; but that the Perception we have of the other intelligible Objects which have no Affinity with Matter or Relation to it, fhould depend upon the Impreffions of it, seems not fo congruous or reasonable to fuppofe. As it does neither to fuppofe, that a thinking Being as Man is, and that has at least one intelliBb 4 gible

Part II. gible Object always intimately present with him to think of, fhould yet have no manner of Thought or Perception, but remain as ftupid as a Block of Marble, fuppofing either his Organs not to have been difpofed for fenfible Impreffions, or that he has been always in a vacuum where no fuch Impreffions could be made; which yet must be maintain'd, if according to this latter meaning of the Propofition, it be univerfally true, that there is nothing in the Understanding but what was firft in the Senfe. But however this Matter be determin'd, 'tis fufficient to our prefent purpose, if the Ideas whereby we understand, do not come to us from fenfible Objects, which feems to have been abundantly proved.

That the Ideas whereby we understand,are not the Productions of our own Souls.

1.

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Aving dry'd up that great Fountain of Ideas, which is fuppofed to be in fenfible Objects; fo that there appears no hope or poffibility of our being ever furnish'd with them that way, we are concern'd to carry our Inquiry further, and to confider whether that 1deal Spring, which fails without, may not poffi

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