The excellency of this rule may be comprehended under the two following particulars, ift, Its certainty. 2dly, Its perfpicuity.

The first of thefe will admit of little difpute. As God is infinitely holy in his own nature, every discovery that he has made to any of his creatures, muft carry this impreffion upon it, and have a tendency to promote holiness in them. And, as this is manifeftly the defign of the facred oracles, and that fyftem of divine truth which they contain, every thing by way of opinion, or practice, that pretends to derive its authority from them, may lawfully be tried by this rule, Will it make us more holy than before?

It is of moment here to obferve, that this rule hath a deep and folid foundation. It proceeds upon the fuppofition, that all natural are inferior to moral qualities; that even the nobleft intellectual abilities are only fo far valuable, as they are subfervient to moral perfection; or in other words, that truth is in order to goodnefs. It is not (as has been often faid) in his Almighty power, his infinite wifdom, or the immenfity of his being, that the glory of God chiefly confifts, but in his immaculate holiness and fpotless purity. Each part of the divine character, indeed, derives a luftre from the other. It is the union of greatness and goodness that makes him truly God, His moral excellence becomes infinite

infinite in value and efficacy by residing in an infinite fubject. But if it were poffible to fe parate his natural perfection from his moral excellence, or could we fuppofe them joined to malignity of difpofition, he would be the proper object, (let us fpeak it with reverence) not of fupreme love, but of infinite deteftation.

This is more than fufficient to fupport the order in which things are reprefented above, and fhow, that its moral influence is the proper touchftone and trial of religious truth. Thefe doctrines only come from God, which tend to form us after the divine image. Thus far, perhaps, all will allow it to be true; at least the affertion is common. But be pleased to observe, that this neceffarily fuppofes the fure and infallible efficacy of real truth in promoting holiness, and the infufficiency of error and falfhood for this purpose. If these were not both alike certain, the rule would be equivocal and abfurd. If men by believing lies could attain to unfeigned goodness and true holiness, then their moral effect could not in the least serve to distinguish between truth and error. It is no lefs plain that if so absurd a fuppofition is admitted but for a moment, the value of truth is wholly destroyed, and no wise man will employ his time and pains in endeavouring to discover, to communicate, or to defend it.

The

The other particular comprehended under the excellence of this rule, is its perfpicuity; That, it is not only fure and infallible in itself, but capable of an easy application by those who have occafion to use it. Here, if any where, there is room for doubt and difputation. Here, it may be alledged, all the confufion and uncertainty returns, which was before complained of, and for which a remedy was required. Men will still differ in their opinions as to what is true goodnefs. Befides, they will still debate the fincerity of many pretenfions, and the reality of many appearances; and, as art and hypocrify will always be used on the one hand, delufion must be the unavoidable confequence on the other.

This, however, is no more than the neceffary confequence of human imperfection. It cannot be denied, and it may, without any hesitation, be confeffed, that men are liable to err, and that many have erred in the application of this rule. But, who can from thence jufty infer, that it is not of fufficient clearness, to direct those who will honeftly make use of it, and to lay the er ror of those who are misled entirely at their own door?

It pleafed God to write his law upon the heart of man at first. And the great lines of duty, however obfcured by our original apoftacy, are till fo vifible, as to afford an opportunity of

judging,

judging, what conduct and practice is, or is not agreeable to its dictates. It will be found from experience, that men are able to determine on this point, with far greater certainty, than on any other fubject of religion that is to fay, they. can perceive the excellency of the end, when they are ia much doubt about the means, in themfelves, or feparately confidered.

Such authority hath natural confcience ftill in man, that it renders those who, in their own conduct, defpife its reproofs, inexcufable in the fight of God *. But it is of importance in the prefent argument to obferve, that every one is able to pass a far furer judgment on the moral character of another, than his own. The pollution of the heart brings a corrupt biass on the judgment, in a man's own cafe, and makes him palliate and defend those fins, to which he is ftrongly inclined, or of which he hath been already guilty: whereas in determining the characters of others, this biafs is lefs fenfibly felt. This is perhaps the true and only reafon why any deference is paid to virtue as praife-worthy, by those who are enemies to it in their hearts, or any public honour and respect given to the fervice of God in the world, where fo great a majority are evidently in the interests of another mafter.

* Rom. i, 20,—ii. 14.

One

One fingular excellence of this rule is, its being the most univerfally intelligible. It is level to the capacity of men of all degrees of underftanding. There is little difference, if any, in this respect, between the wife and the unwife, the learned and the ignorant. Perhaps this circumftance alone ought to give it, in justice the preference, to every other teft of religious truth. Religion is the concern of all alike, and therefore, what relates to it fhould be open to all. It was the character, and the glory of the gofpel, at its first publication, that it was preached to the poor. And by this it is ftill diftinguished, not only from many or moft falfe religions, but especially from those philofophical fpeculations, in which the enemies of all religion place their chief ftrength. When we peruse a system or theory of moral virtue, the principles of which are very refined, or the reasoning upon it abstracted and above the comprehenfion of the vulgar, it may be ingenious, but it carries in itfelf a demonftration, that, because it is unfit, it could never be intended for general use.

Here then, lies the great advantage of the rule laid down by our Saviour. The bulk of mankind, thofe of lower rank, and even thofe among them of weakest or leaft cultivated understanding, are able to judge of the effects of principles, or to fee the beauty of an excellent character, when