sovereign God." But if they have "a covenant right to the strivings of the Holy Spirit," if they have "a promise," then they do not lie at God's sovereign mercy in the case, but may plead the covenant and promise of God.

2. In his first book, he endeavors to prove that the covenant with Abraham (Gen. xvii.) was not the covenant of grace, because it might be broken," which implies, that it had some condition, which if not fulfilled, all the blessings of it would be forfeited. But in his second book, he endeavors to prove, that the covenant with Abraham (Gen. xvii.) was not the covenant of grace, because it had no conditions, but all the blessings of it were promised to Abraham and his seed "absolutely and unconditionally;" on which hypothesis this covenant "could not be broken." But his two books are not only inconsistent with each other, but this last book is inconsistent with itself. And to the instances which have already been taken notice of in the preceding sections, some few more may here be pointed out. 3. That man must be a moral agent, possessed of every qualification essential to moral agency, previous and in order to his being bound by God's law, is a fundamental point with Mr. M. That man may be bound by the moral law to be a moral agent, to have the qualifications essential to a moral agency, is with him another fundamental point. But as these two fundamental points in his scheme are inconsistent with each other, so they cannot both be true. He says, "Self-love is essentia! to moral agency;" and yet this essential qualification of a mora. agent "is a duty required of us by God's law." But according to him, the law cannot bind us unless we are already moral agents; therefore it cannot bind us to be moral agents, for then a man need not be a moral agent, previous and in order to his being bound by the moral law; which yet he maintains.

4. He says, "that Adam, by becoming guilty, was totally depraved," and yet, according to him, Adam's depravity was not total, for he still continued to exercise that love to himself which the law of God requires, in a conformity to which the image of God consisted, in which he was created. "Perhaps " he also continued to exercise toward God "the love of esteem and benevolence."

5. He says, that the divine law requires us "to love God with all our hearts," and that it also requires us to love ourselves." And he adds, that this "self-love is absolutely inconsistent with the love of God." So that, according to him, the divine law requires of us, in our guilty state, two duties, in their own nature absolutely inconsistent. And therefore he boldly affirms, that it is "contrary to the law of God" for us, while in our guilty

state, to love God with all our hearts; and yet he says, that God has "given us his law to show us what our duty is," and that we are justly condemned to eternal misery for not obeying of it. And this law he calls "a glorious law," and the character exhibited in it he calls "glorious;" and even supposes that the Son of God became incarnate, lived, and died to "honor this law," and to "vindicate and maintain the honor and dignity of the divine character exhibited in it." Whereas for God to give us a rule of duty, requiring things in their own nature absolutely inconsistent, on pain of eternal death, would be an infinite reproach to the Deity. And to give his Son to die to do honor to such a law, would be inconsistent with all his perfections. And yet he asserts that the gospel, which is supposed to reveal this shocking scene, is "glorious," and even "more glorious than the law;" whereas, if his scheme is true, there is no glory in law or gospel; unless it be glorious to require inconsistencies on pain of eternal death; and glorious to do the highest honor, before the whole intellectual system, to a law in its own nature contradictory.

6. He represents the divine law as requiring things not only inconsistent in their own nature with each other, but also inconsistent with our moral agency; for he says, "A principle of selflove is essential to us moral agents." And yet he asserts that this "self-love must be totally excluded from any place," in the heart of a guilty creature, if he loves God; for "love to God and self-love are absolutely inconsistent." And so, according to him, the moral law requires of us that love to God which is inconsistent with our being moral agents. And yet, according to him, if we are not moral agents, we cannot be bound by the moral law to any obedience at all. Therefore,

7. He is necessitated to maintain, that man by the fall ceased to be a moral agent, and that it was no longer his duty to love God, for the law did not bind him; "its binding authority respected not his obedience." This was the state of Adam before the revelation of a Mediator, "because it was inconsistent with self-love to exercise true love to God." And he asserts, that "mankind at this day, antecedent to their exercising faith in Christ, are in much the same condition as Adam was after he sinned;" particularly he says, "that they are under the same inability of loving God that Adam was;" namely, it is "absolutely inconsistent with that self-love which is essential to moral agency." And therefore the unregenerate are not moral agents, nor bound by the moral law to obedience. And where there is no law, there is no transgression. And therefore Adam's total depravity, which took place after the first sin, was not of a crimi

nal nature; and the same is true of the unregenerate now, who "are under the same inability of loving God that Adam was.” And therefore total depravity does not disqualify for sealing ordi

nances.

And yet, in direct contradiction to all this, he affirms, that the unregenerate, while such, are moral agents, bound by the law to the same perfect obedience which was required of Adam before the fall. "This I will readily grant man is a moral agent, bound by the moral law to love God with all his heart; and therefore God may consistently require this of him, and man is wholly to blame for not loving;" for "nothing short of perfection may be looked upon as the whole of what is required." For he adds, "To suppose that God has receded from his original demand of perfection, made in the law, implies that this law was not good," which is "evidently a reflection upon the Divine Being, whose law it is," and "a reproach upon Christ, who has honored that law." And accordingly he affirms, that "God has given his law to show us what our duty is ;" and he adds, "that by the law is the knowledge of sin;" which supposes that "the binding authority of the law does respect our obedience," as much as it did Adam's before the fall; and that therefore we are moral agents, with respect to the law of perfection, as really as he was; and that therefore it is not inconsistent in any child of Adam, with that self-love which is essential to moral agency, to yield a perfect obedience to the moral law; and that, therefore, we are not all depraved by nature. For this supposed inconsistency, he says, "is the true reason, and the only reason," of the depravity of our nature; for had it not been for this inconsistency, Adam would have continued to love God after the fall as he did before; "he would have continued still to exercise the same delight in the divine perfections as he had done before." And yet he had said, that "Adam, by becoming guilty, was totally depraved." And if he was totally depraved, and if total depravity and moral agency are consistent; if God "may consistently require us to love God with all our hearts," and if we "are wholly to blame" for not loving; then our total depravity is totally criminal. But to persist obstinately in this crime, that is, to continue impenitent and unreconciled to God, after all the means used with us by God himself, disqualifies a man to be active in sealing God's covenant, for the same reason that obstinacy in any other crime does. Or, if he will say, "to love God is the same thing as to love misery," and so our depravity is a calamity, but not a crime; then he must say, that we cease to be moral agents, and the law ceases to bind us; which, to use his own words, "implies that this law was not good, which is evidently a reflection upon the

Divine Being, whose law it is, and a reproach upon Christ, who has honored that law."

7. Mr. M. is very zealous for a preparatory work, and to have the unregenerate sinner strive; but without any consistency with himself. For, on his scheme, what can the sinner consistently strive to do? Not to love that character of God which is exhibited in the law; for this, according to him, is the same thing as to "love his own misery," which is "contrary to the law," and in its own nature impossible. Not to love that character of God which is revealed in the gospel, for the unenlightened sinner is by him supposed not to know it, and to love an unknown character, implies a contradiction, and so is absolutely impossible. What, then, would Mr. M. have the sinner do, or strive to do? Let us attend to his own words. God "has given us his law, not only to show us what our duty is, but also to set light before us, whereby we may obtain a proper conviction of our guilt." "By the law is the knowledge of sin." He has repeatedly commanded them to consider their ways; and calls upon them to exercise their reason. "Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord." But if God has given us his law to show us what our duty is, and if by the law is the knowledge of sin, and if we consider this, and if we exercise our reason on the subject, then we must conclude, that it is now every day the duty of all mankind to love that character of God which is exhibited in the moral law; and that it is the duty of all to whom the gospel comes, to love that character of God which is revealed in the gospel; and that it is exceeding sinful to live in the neglect of these duties. But if a sinner should thus begin to consider and exercise his reason, Mr. M. would soon stop him, by saying, "The unenlightened do not know that character of God which is revealed in the gospel, and so cannot love it; and to love that character of God which is revealed in the law, is the same thing as to love their own misery, which is contrary to the law, and ought not to be done." What then shall the sinner do? or what shall he strive to do? Mr. M. says, that "such a conviction of our guilt, and just desert of suffering the curse of the law, as shall humble us, and bring us to submit to a sovereign God, is necessary to fit and prepare our hearts to close with Christ." But by what means shall such convictions be obtained? How will you convince the sinner, that he deserves eternal damnation for not continuing in all things written in the book of the law to do them, particularly for neglecting to love God, while he firmly believes, that "the love of God and self-love are absolutely inconsistent "? and that, therefore, it is "contrary to the

law," which requires self-love, to love God. The more the sinner considers, and exercises his reason, the more clearly will he see the inconsistency of these things. Or will Mr. M. tell the sinner, (as in p. 53,) to strive "to obtain those discoveries of God through Christ, by which he will be reconciled to God"? But why, seeing, on Mr. M.'s scheme, the sinner has no prejudices against this character of God to combat and strive against, but is naturally disposed to love it as soon as known why, if this be the case, should not the discoveries, already made in the Bible, be immediately received and embraced? Did not Jacob love Rachel the first time he saw her? or did he spend two or three months, or as many years, after the first sight of her person, striving for a discovery of her beauty?

8. Mr. M. says, that to Adam, after his fall, it must appear, "in every view, inconsistent with the divine perfections," that he should escape the curse of the law. But in these circumstances, "to delight in God was the same thing as to delight in his own misery;" and therefore he adds, "that Adam, by becoming guilty, was totally depraved," because now "the love of God and self-love were absolutely inconsistent." And he says, "This was the true reason, and the only reason, why Adam could not love God after the fall." And therefore, as soon as a door of hope was opened by the revelation of a Mediator, Adam instantly returned to the love of God; "and there is nothing in our fallen circumstances to prevent" our doing so too; and that without any new principle of grace. But if these things are true, it will follow, 1. That as soon as any man believes that there is forgiveness with God for sinners through Jesus Christ, he will cease to be totally depraved; because now "the true reason, and the only reason," of his total depravity, is removed; and therefore, 2. Every man who believes the gospel to be true, is regenerate; and therefore, 3. Every man who knows that he believes the gospel to be true, does with equal certainty know that he is regenerate; because this belief and regeneration are infallibly connected, according to Mr. M. But, 4. According to him, "none but such as profess the Christian religion ought to be admitted into the church." And, 5. According to him, none ought to profess that they believe the gospel to be true, unless they are infallibly certain that they do believe it to be true. For, speaking of the profession which is made when any join with the church, he says, "Suppose a man brought into a civil court, as a witness to a particular fact; and, being sworn, should positively declare the thing to be fact; and after he comes out of court, his neighbor should ask him whether he had any