Without much calculation, we are enabled by the above to arrive at one comfortable conclusion, the assurance of an essential diminution in the progress of taxation. The next table is of greater length.

Estimated Amount of the Sinking Fund, at the 1st of August in each Year, according to the Old System, and according to the Proposed Plan, upon the foregoing Suppositions.

*In 1830, the sinking-fund, according to the existing system, is reduced from 41,031,719l. its amount on the 1st August of that year, to 19,745,200l. in consequence of the redemption of the debts consolidated by the act of 1802.

The point, on which the reader must fix his attention, as explanatory of the similarity of result in the two plans, is the arrangement for the year 1830. On the old plan, the sinkingfund was to undergo no suspension of accumulating progress until that year; whatever might be the amount of our bur

dens, and whether peace or war was to be our lot, this fund was to proceed on the plan of compound interest until that year; at which time a sum of taxes to the amount of nearly twenty millions was to be taken from it, and either repealed or declared applicable as a provision for the interest of fresh loans. Now, that which was to be delayed until 1830, and which was to be done in a mass, is to be done forthwith and progressively. The change, however, is little else than a change of calculation; the year 1830 having been inserted in the old plan with no other object than to exhibit, in a definite point, the sweeping results of the sinking-fund.

We present, in the third place, a comparison of the effects of the two plans with regard to the method of keeping the accounts of the public debt.

Statement of the Periods of Redemption of the Funded Debt contracted prior to 1813, according to the Old System, and according to the Proposed Plan; continuing the foregoing Suppositions.

Here, as in the rest of this official Outline, credit appears to be assumed for much more than is performed. The unsuspecting reader naturally takes for granted, from the imposing sound of the word redemption,' that the new plan is actually of superior efficacy in the liquidation of the national debt. Nay, there appears in the first line a difference of not less than seventeen years; a difference, however, which will be found to be nothing more than a distinction of account. On the old plan, the liquidated stock remained in the hands of the commissioners of the sinking-fund; while, on the new plan, the stock, as we mentioned before, is accounted cancelled, and the securities producing interest are held applicable either to farther reduction or to other purposes.

By way of preventing alarm or injury to public credit, from the promulgation of the new plan, several palliatives and apparent advantages have been coupled with it. An immediate annual addition of 870,000l. is given to the sinking-fund; a provision of one per cent. on unfunded exchequer-bills is to be made for the purpose of their gradual liquidation; and a farther precaution is taken for those years in which the addition to the public debt may exceed its reduction. Amid all these explanations, however, a scrupulous silence is observed as to the main point; namely, that, the imposition of fresh taxes to the extent required being impracticable, we have found it necessary to trench on the sinking-fund. It was indeed high time to have recourse to a new expedient; the demands for the present year, in the shape of loans, being for Great Britain and Ireland (Huskisson's Speech, p. 36, 37. 68.) little short of 40 millions. In a late important transaction, (we mean the funding of the exchequer-bills in the end of March,) Mr. Vansittart was obliged to grant stock at an ascertained loss of 15 per cent. to the public. Nothing, therefore, could be more opportune than the recent change on the Continent for the support of our stocks, and for the introduction of a financial arrangement which, under different circumstances, would have been productive of serious alarm. Other considerations likewise have had a tendency to co-operate towards its favourable reception. Few persons, even among stock-holders, comprehend the plan in its extent: but they are satisfied that it leads to no immediate injury, and they look to time and chance for a balance to remote disadvantages. An assurance of having no new taxes, for four years is a most consolatory point, and is alone sufficient to form a powerful counterpoise to unfavourable anticipations. The pacific character, too, of the measure, the disposition which it discovers to keep our expences within compass, and the acknowlegement of the necessity of husbanding our resources,

are

are points calculated to recommend it as much to the capitalist as to the philosophic advocate for peace. It has one more merit also, according to Dr. Hamilton's principles; inasmuch as it is more profitable to the public to prevent the creation of debt than to provide for its subsequent extinction.

After having bestowed these epithets of commendation on the new plan, it becomes necessary to make a few remarks of an opposite character. The measure discovers, it must be confessed, very little ingenuity; and the minister has had the discretion to found on it no personal claim for reputation. Gladly should we add that the praise of candour were equally due to the minister, or to the author of the official Outline,' when he comments on the state of our funds: but the confident observations in this respect, and still more Mr. Vansittart's subsequent speech (31st March) on the new taxes, are of such a nature as forcibly to remind us of the tone of plausibility and exaggeration which becomes habitual to men in office, and of the truth of the Frenchman's remark, "Qu'on ne peut point regner innocemment." We need only give, for example, the assertion (Outlines, p. 18.) that the great and ultimate object of the sinking-fund is to relieve the nation from the burden of taxes which would be entailed on it by the indefinite extension of the public debt.' This assertion is brought forwards with as much gravity as if the sinking-fund itself were derived from any thing else than taxes; or as if the writer were serious in the belief that, by some inexplicable charm, it operated to reduce the burdens of the people. Another allegation, less gross indeed, but equally unfounded in point of policy, is the argument (p. 17.) respecting the advantage of keeping in reserve the means of funding a large sum (suppose 100 millions) as a resource against war.' This declaration is particularly calcu lated for popular effect, and is maintained with as much confidence as if the fund, thus provided, were not wrung from the productive capital of the country. It would be,' says this writer, the first example of an immense accumulation of public property, formed without the impoverishment of any individual;' as if this accumulation could be raised otherwise than by taxes, and as if taxes were wholly passive as to retarding population, depreciating money, or injuring our manufactures and trade. How necessary is it to recall to such writers the maxim of Vauban, "Que l'argent le mieux employé est celui que le Roi laisse entre les mains de ses sujets." We have had in England no example of a government hoarding up money taken from the subject, since the days of Henry VII.; a prince certainly not the fittest in our history for the imitation of a Chancellor of the Exchequer.

1

Singular, however, as this pamphlet is, it deserves attention for the official hints with which it is interspersed. A hope is expressed (p. 4.) that our continental expences will not be of long continuance; and it is admitted that an addition to our war-taxes would be felt as a very heavy burden. It is afterward confessed (p. 16.) that to avoid additional taxes is the true way to render the present taxes productive; and it is taken for granted (p. 33.) that the rate of interest may fall in peace to four per cent. These admissions are remarkable in the eye of any person who is accustomed to watch the language of ministers, as indicative of an approximation to a change of politics. Until Lord Liverpool's accession to his present station, our cabinet and the subordinate departments spoke no other language than that of an indefinite prolongation of war. It is amusing, likewise, to trace a similar change in the more elaborate speeches of Mr. Huskisson. He, who was formerly so resolute an advocate for adding sacrifice to sacrifice, now deems it proper to admit (Speech, p. 53.) that the extension of our debt can raise the interest of money to six or seven per cent.; and that this high rate of interest has a prejudicial effect on our manufactures, our commerce, and above all, on our agriculture.' The official Outlines' conclude with a copy of the "Resolutions" submitted to parliament, the substance of which may be comprized in a few sentences, and will serve to throw some light on Mr. Vansittart's mysterious plan.

The amount of national debt contracted before 1786 (nearly 240 millions of stock,) is now discharged by the operation of the sinking-fund.

An official declaration shall be made that this, and such farther sums of national debt as may be bought up, are satisfied and discharged.

After such declaration, the stock so satisfied shall be formally cancelled by act of parliament; in order to make provision for charging any future loan on the funds hitherto appropriated to the payment of the interest of the stock thus redeemed.

The sum of 867,9631. a-year shall be forthwith added to the sinking-fund; and all monies belonging to that fund shall continue applicable to the reduction of the national debt, except in as far as these Resolutions otherwise provide.

We are now to take leave of Mr. Vansittart and his financial calculations, for the purpose of making a few remarks, in our critical capacity, on the compositions of Mr. Huskisson and Dr. Hamilton. The chief merit of the former consists in perspicuous definitions of official measures; such as (p. 6. 10. 19.) of the nature of Mr. Pitt's sinking-fund; (p. 33.) of the object of the new plan; with a variety of details, (p. 19, 20. 27. 50.) on