public lectures on this department of science; and this elementary treatise may perhaps have been put together with a view to promote such a purpose: but the author speaks of it with great modesty, and declares that he shall be amply satisfied if his compilation be accounted an useful introduction to the standard work of Dr. Smith.' I ART. XI. Historical Sketches of Politics and Public Men, for the Year 1812. To be continued annually. 8vo. Pp. 212. 78. Boards. Longman and Co. 1813. MPARTIALITY is so rare a feature in publications relative to the current politics of the day, that reviewers, in common with other readers, have almost ceased to expect it. Above all, they have learned to distrust the pretensions of those who usher in their works with reiterated declarations of their exemption from prejudice or party-attachment. The modesty of the notice prefixed to the volume before us was calculated to excite a different expectation, and a perusal of it has fully confirmed the favourable impression: since the writer, whoever he be, brings to his task a much larger share of information, reflection, and calm temper, than generally belongs to the authors of temporary productions. His plan will be best understood from his table of contents. 1. General View of the Character of the different Parties; → the Ministerial Party;-the Opposition; the Popular Party. 2. Ministerial and Party Changes during the Year. 3. The Foreign Policy of Great Britain. 6. Russian Politics;- Campaign in the North. 8. Ireland and the Catholic Question. 9. The East India Company. 10. The Question of Peace, A spirit of deliberate inquiry and a cool judgment are conspicuous, not on some merely, but on all the topics discussed. Whether we turn to the character of Bonaparte and the question of our foreign policy; to the conduct of the war in Spain; to the domestic questions of the India Company and of Catholic-emancipation; or to the still more delicate ground of the respective merits of our political parties, we trace a writer always devoid of intentional misrepresentation, and not often liable to inaccurate conclusions. Much, however,.as we approve this volume, we shall not offer to our readers any specimens of its composition; since the leading topics of disE e 4 ussion cussion are fresh in the public recollection, and, in a work which is to be continued annually, the exposition of any defects which it may contain is a task of more utility than a diffuse exhibition of its merits. In treating of the depressed state of our trade during the last three years, this writer appears (p. 173.) to lay too much stress on Bonaparte's prohibitory edicts. He does not seem to be aware that the obstructions prescribed by the letter of the French law were very frequently not enforced; and that the interval of sixteen months, from autumn 1810 to the end of 1811, was almost the only time of rigorous exclusion. The clamour raised by Bonaparte in support of the continental system was excited more with the view of extending his military occupancy, and in course the subjugation of his neighbours, than with the hope of overthrowing the trade of Great Britain. In another point, too, the origin of conspiracies under the French government, this author does not appear to have fathomed the depths of revolutionary artifice. He believes (p. 151.) that Bonaparte was more strongly affected by the plot at Paris in October, than by the loss of his grand army. That plot, however, we considered, like the more recent conspiracies at Amsterdam and Genoa, as in a great measure promoted by the arrangements of government. With a people so much guided by appearances as the French, the display of a defeated project of insurrection is greatly calculated to strengthen the hands of the ruling power. We remember to have heard it remarked by Parisian politicians in the year 1796, that the exposure of the conspiracy of Brotier and La Villeheurnois produced to the Directory as much good, and to the Royalists as much harm, as all the Italian victories of that eventful campaign. In 1804, also, we saw with what rapidity Bonaparte turned to his own account the popular impression excited by the failure of Pichegru's enterprize. It had long been a part of the Jacobin creed to have a resource of this nature in reserve for the hour of emergency. Persons against whom might be brought proofs of delinquency to a certain extent were confined, but were kept from trial until a season when it became expedient to strike terror by their punishment into their disaffected neighbours. Such, we have no doubt, was the case very recently in Holland and Italy; and if the previous disturbance at Paris was less directly the contrivance of government, it is evident that Bonaparte, on his return from Poland, expatiated on it more loudly and more frequently than the fact required. His object evidently was to draw away the attention of the French nation from the dreadful catastrophe which had befallen his military force. With regard to domestic affairs, the chief misapprehension of this writer consists in overrating the political importance of Marquis Wellesley and Mr. Canning. In enlarging (p. 8.) on the eloquence of the latter, we are surprized that it should escape him that proficiency in public speaking is seldom accompanied by those solid acquirements which constitute real statesmen; and he who analyzes the gradual progress of the mind, and who ascertains the ungracious truth that a length of time, much beyond ordinary calculation, is necessary for the attainment of the knowlege which is indispensable to a public man, will be disposed to regret that our ministers should be obliged to pass so much time within the walls of parliament. To this cause he will trace the principal failures of Mr. Pitt, and the striking contrast between his eloquence in the senate and his powers of judging in the cabinet. With respect to Marquis Wellesley, we should have supposed that the declaration on the part of this author, of his Lordship's repeated errors in home-transactions, (pp. 46. 53.55.) would have produced more caution in his encomiums (p. 15.) on this nobleman's amazing talents as a war-minister. Those who are fond of representing a public man as foolish in one way, and wise in another, remind us of the eulogists of General Mack; who maintained, even after the overthrow at Ulm, that there was not in Europe an abler officer, for the "Plan of a Campaign." We would advise this writer to read Lord Wellesley's speech in March last, on his favourite subject, the conduct of the war in Spain; and to examine how far his Lordship's character for close inquiry, attentive comparison, or deliberate conclusion, will be raised by that elaborate hardngue. At the same time we discover an equal desire of impartiality on this as on other topics; the author speaking (p. 53.) without reserve and without compliment on the motives which he conceived to actuate his favourite statesman. We proceed to notice a few mistakes of subordinate importance. The Milan decree is represented (p. 161.) as preceding instead of following our Orders in Council. Prussia is said (p. 130.) to have been compelled to bring her whole military force (instead of 30,000 men) into the field against Russia. The portion of French troops withdrawn last year from Spain was greatly short of the 50,000 mentioned in p. 130.; and the junction of Marshal Victor to Bonaparte, after the battle of Borodino, took place only in our newspapers. Wittgenstein's offensive operations in October were directed, not as it is said (p. 142) on Moscow, but to the obstruction, by all possible means, of the retreat of Bonaparte's army. We cannot coincide with this author in giving our late ministers credit for a conciliatory disposition, as to the impressment of seamen from American ships; since they were perfectly aware that our naval officers were in the habit of impressing American citizens, but never chose to attach any penalty to the commission of this dangerous irregularity. The recall of Admiral Berkeley and the mission of Mr. Rose, after the affair of the Chesapeake frigate, were caused much less by the moderation attributed (p. 168.) to our cabinet, than by a desire to prevent the American nation from rising up, as one man, against our Orders in Council. After these animadversions, we return to the more welcome task of expressing our approbation of the merits of this writer; whose style is clear, correct, and frequently elegant. Were the majority of new publications composed with the perspicuity and method which are exhibited in this work, the task of reviewing would be incomparably more attractive. In the conclusion, the question of peace is treated very briefly, but with the same good sense which is manifested in discussing the claims of the India Company, and of the Irish Catholics. The familiarity of most of the subjects, and the calm tone of the composition, may convey to some readers the impression of want of novelty or energy; but they who take time to weigh the author's arguments, and appreciate his reasoning, will be inclined to form a very different conclusion. ART. XII. A cursory Inquiry into the Expediency of repealing the Annuity-Act, and raising the legal Rate of Interest; in a Series of Letters. By Edward Burtenshaw Sugden, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister at Law. 8vo. pp. 60. 2s. 6d. Murray, THOSE fortunate individuals among his Majesty's subjects, who conduct their money-matters with such prudence as to stand in no need of borrowing, may be at a loss to know what is meant by the Annuity-Act, cited so familiarly in Mr. Sugden's title page: to such persons, then, be it known that this kingdom includes a great number of men who, being unable to borrow money at the legal rate of interest, are willing to go for a time considerably beyond it. They are partly in and partly out of trade; engaged generally in the pursuit of objects which they expect will return them the money laid out with a large profit; and sometimes desirous, without any such expecta tion, of buying the means of present accommodation by mort gaging a part of their income. As the law imposes no limit on the rate of interest in the case of a perishable security, the ordinary expedient of needy people has been to accomplish a loan by engaging to pay a life-annuity at a high rate. The life in in question may be either that of the lender or the borrower, or of any third person named by the lender; or, a plurality of lives being seldom objectionable, the annuity may be made payable during the life of any two or three persons named by the lender. The addition of one or two lives makes very little difference in the yearly rate, because these contracts generally give the borrower a power of redemption; and few men incur such disadvantageous debts without the intention of speedily getting out of them by repayment of the principal. The members of our Houses of Lords and Commons, knowing very little more of the difficult questions involved in the limitation of interest than that a definite point had been fixed by law, thought that the best plan was to make individuals act up as closely as possible to the statute. It never occurred to our legislators forty years ago (and we apprehend that it hardly does now) to regard the compulsory limitation of the rate of interest as fundamentally impolitic, and as the work of an age very little acquainted with the principles of trade. We can trace, therefore, no attempts on the part of parliament to open the rate of interest generally, but very decisive efforts to modify the practice of borrowing on annuity. The most remarkable of these was the act of 1777, commonly called the Annuity-Act; the chief provisions of which are: 1. That a memorial of every annuity-transaction shall be enrolled in the High Court of Chancery, containing the date, the names of the parties, and the conditions of the contract. 2. If from any cause the full sum has not been paid up by the lender, the deed may be cancelled by the Court. 3. No contract is valid with a person under twenty-one years of age. 4. Annuities of several kinds are excepted from the operation of this act, such as annuities or rent-charges given by will or mar riage-settlement, or granted by corporate bodies, or under any trust created by act of parliament, or below the sum of rol. Such is the substance of the Annuity-Act. At the time of its passing into a bill, a parliamentary committee was ap pointed to take into consideration the important question of giving the borrower, in all cases, the power of putting an end to his unprofitable contract, by repaying the principal. Though it was not judged fit to incorporate a resolution to that effect into a law, the right appeared so clear that the courts of justice have made a rule to support it on almost every occasion; and it has now become a common clause in such contracts that the borrower shall be at liberty to redeem. One of the chief objects of the Act was to discourage these annuities by the publicity attendant on an official enrolment; an intention which was very soon defeated by the great number of transactions which |