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the concept of an air-launched ASAT. Bold Orion, which was tested by the Air Force four times starting in October 1959, launched rockets from a B-47 bomber. In the two Hi-Ho tests in 1962, the Navy launched rockets from an F-4 fighter. Both the Bold Orion and Hi-Ho ASAT test programs of the early 1960's used the Altair as a second stage, the same upper stage as the new American ASAT.

The New Prototype Miniature Air-launched SystemPMALS

The new American ASAT program, the Prototype Miniature Air-Launched System (PMALS) began in the early 1970's, with full-scale development initiated in 1977. In early 1981 a series of major contracts was awarded for the production of test prototypes.

The booster for the ASAT is a small two-stage rocket, about 18 feet long and a little more than 18 inches in diameter, with a total weight of 1200 kilograms. Apart from the heat-seeking homing sensor used in the ASAT's Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV) warhead, the PMALS is based on well-proven technology for which there is limited need for an extensive test program. But the ASAT heat-seeking sensor is very similar to that used in the Army's Homing Overlay Experiment ABM test program, which has failed on both of its two initial tests this year. The remaining elements of the PMALS ASAT are based on "off-the-shelf" technology. The launch platform for the PMALS is the F-15 fighter, which has been in service with the Air Force since the mid-1970's. The first stage of the PMALS is a derivative of the nuclear-tipped Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM), which was first deployed in 1972, with over 1500 missiles delivered. The second stage of the PMALS is the Altair, which is a solid rocket motor that is also the fourth stage of the Scout space launch vehicle. The Scout has achieved over a 90% reliability in more than a hundred launches over the past two decades.

PMALS Operational Concept

PMALS will be carried to high altitude by an F-15 fighter, which will launch the rocket to attack and destroy satellites in much the same way as air-to-air missiles shoot down airplanes. The ASAT will be launched by F-15 fighters that are normally assigned to other duties. Because these airplanes can take off from short runways, they can transform almost any airport into a base for war in space. The F-15 fighters will receive targeting and guidance instructions from the Space Defense Operations Center at Cheyenne Mountain. They will seek to maneuver to directly under the path of the target satellite. In order to minimize the relative velocity between the two craft, the PMALS is fired along the course of the target satellite, which quickly overtakes the ASAT. The PMALS Miniature Homing Vehicle will home in on the heat of the target satellite, using very small on-board rockets for terminal course corrections. The impact of the target satellite destroys both the MHV and its target.

The maximum speed attained by PMALS is less than four kilometers per second, and the velocity of the MHV at impact is considerably less. Press reports that suggest a

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maximum speed of 8 miles per second (about thirteen kilometers per second, well in excess of escape velocity) are in error.

PMALS Testing

Initial engineering testing of the first prototype began in late 1981, and the prototype was first fitted to its F-15 carrier in December 1981. In 1982 the PMALS was flown on the F-15 to study electrical connections and handling characteristics. But the advanced heat-seeking sensor has encountered a series of problems which have led to a number of program delays. The overall schedule has slipped by several years. As of 1982 the first test against a target in space was planned for March of 1983, but technical problems have postponed this test by about a year.

The first test firing of the PMALS is scheduled for late 1983, but no MHV will be included. In early 1984 the second PMALS test will fire an MHV toward a "point-inspace," rather than an actual target. The first test of the ASAT against an actual target will be in the spring of 1984, when PMALS will be fired toward a 6-foot-diameter balloon placed in orbit by a Scout rocket launched from Wallops Island, Virginia. A total of six Scout launches are planned, and each Scout will carry two of these balloons, which are known as the Instrumented Target Vehicle (ITV), permitting at least a dozen intercept tests over the next three years.

PMALS Capabilities

The performance of PMALS is surprisingly modest. Although the exact figures are classified, based on the known characteristics of the two rockets that are its booster, the maximum altitude at which it can engage a target satellite is probably no more than 500 kilometers, and 400 kilometers probably represents a limit on the normal effective maximum altitude. Another ASAT performance variable is known as reach, which is the ground track distance from the launch point of the ASAT to the intercept point. For the PMALS itself the nominal reach is probably on the order of 50 to 100 kilometers, and of course there is a trade-off between reach and altitude.

The reach of the PMALS is greatly augmented by the range of the F-15 carrier aircraft. Under normal circumstances the F-15 would have a radius of action of 2500 kilometers. Aerial refueling can extend this radius of action to 7500 kilometers.

The initial operational capability of the PMALS ASAT is planned for 1987. However, there are reports that the Air Force may declare the system operational after the fifth successful test against a target. The initial PMALS force will consist of 28 modified F-15s with 56 rockets, stationed at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. A second wing of F-15s at McChord Air Force Base, Washington, will subsequently bring the entire force to 112 PMALS. These airplanes could be relocated to any other Air Force base that is prepared to service the F-15 and, with some additional effort, to any airfield that could be so modified on an emergency basis.

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The American ASAT Miniature Homing Vehicle is less than 30cm in diameter, and can be adapted for a variety of launch vehicles.

The launch rate of the PMALS is limited only by the number of aircraft available for ASAT service and the rate at which targets come within range of the F-15s. In practice, this means that all the satellites that are vulnerable to PMALS can be destroyed within a matter of a few hours. Because the MHV uses a passive sensor, there is no warning of attack, and the entire sequence from rocket launch to intercept takes about ten minutes.

PMALS Costs

When first studied a decade ago, the cost of the Miniature Air Launched System was projected to be about half a billion dollars. As recently as a year ago, costs of the system were estimated at about $1.5 billion. Now the Air Force predicts that the total system cost will be in excess of $3.6 billion. Earlier this year the General Accounting Office reported that the ultimate cost of the system could run into the "tens of billions of dollars." These cost estimates do not include the expense of operating the global tracking system needed to support the ASAT, or the costs of acquiring and operating the F-15 fighters that will be used to launch the ASAT. These additional elements of the ASAT would further increase these already-high cost estimates.

Residual ASAT-Homing Overlay

There is a great deal of similarity between ASAT technology and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) technology. The PMALS Miniature Homing Vehicle is very similar to the intercept vehicle employed in the Homing Overlay Experiment ABM test program. This test program and its follow-ons could create a limited ASAT capability against a small number of low-altitude targets.

Residual ASAT-the Space Shuttle

On various occasions the Soviets have expressed con

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cerns about the ASAT capabilities of the Space Shuttle which are not entirely without basis in theory, if not in planning. The Shuttle could maneuver to within a few hundred feet of a Soviet satellite, which could be disabled by the Shuttle's Remote Manipulator System 'robot arm,' or by a space-walking astronaut. But it is unlikely that the US would risk bringing the Shuttle so close to a hostile satellite. The Shuttle could carry out the task of disabling a Soviet satellite from a safe distance by using its Teleoperator Maneuvering System, which is a small rocket with robot arms, guided by television from the Shuttle.

Perhaps the most troubling ASAT potential of the Shuttle from the Soviet perspective would involve the capture of a Soviet satellite, for return to Earth for analysis by American intelligence agencies. There is some evidence that this concern has already lead the Soviets to install selfdestruct mechanisms on their electronic intelligence satellites to prevent their capture. The reality of this threat to the Soviets should not be underestimated. The unique ability of the Shuttle to return satellites from space to Earth must seem reminiscent of the CIA using the Glomar Explorer to recover parts of a Soviet submarine that had sunk in the Pacific Ocean.

Advanced Miniature Air Launched System-AMALS

Given the limited altitude of the PMALS, some work has been done on defining an advanced version that would use a larger first stage to attack satellites in higher orbits. Although no design details on this system have been released, it is possible to determine an upper range for the performance of such a system. The pylon on the F-15 that is used to carry the PMALS has a maximum design strength of 2300 kilograms, with a 5.5 G safety margin. Since the F-15 is not required to be highly maneuverable during the interception, it is possible to relax the stress margin on the centerline pylon, so that a 5000-kilogram payload can be accommodated. A Castor solid rocket, which is the second stage of the Scout, would fit into this weight envelope and give the Advanced Miniature Air Launched System the ability to attack virtually any satellite in lower orbits. The estimated cost of such a system, which would probably take less than two years to develop, is $2 billion.

Advanced Miniature Ground Launched System-AMGLS

A more capable system that could use the MHV to attack satellites in geosynchronous orbit would require a booster too large to be air-launched. But the principal advantage of air-launch is the ability to maneuver the launch platform to under the target's ground track, which is not really a requirement for high altitude targets. A Trident SLBM would be an excellent high-altitude booster for the MHV and could be based in silos, or in other ways if needed. The cost for such a system would be about $1.5 billion for research and development, and procurement of the operational system would cost about $6 billion.

Directed Energy Weapons

The United States has an extensive program of research on directed energy weapons, particularly lasers. One of

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these programs could provide a near-term ASAT capability. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Triad program consists of the Alpha twomegawatt infrared chemical laser, the Talon Gold pointing and tracking system, and the Large Optics Demonstration Experiment (LODE). These programs are intended to support a decision by 1988 as to whether to proceed with an integrated test in space of these systems, which could take place by 1992. The Triad laser would have a significant capability against a variety of Soviet satellites. Other ground-based and space-based laser experimental programs that may be accelerated as part of the 'Star Wars' effort will also have a significant ASAT capability. Indeed, they may be portrayed as ASATs in an attempt to quiet concerns over compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty. The initial costs of such systems could range from $2 to $6 billion, and the ultimate cost of a space laser ASAT could approach $50 billion.

SOVIET ANTI-SATELLITES

In 1968 the Soviet Union began testing its own antisatellite weapon, launched atop a modified version of its largest ICBM, the SS-9. The rocket places a multi-ton satellite into low Earth orbit, and this interceptor satellite maneuvers to within striking range of its target. When the interceptor comes within a few kilometers of its target, a small explosive charge is detonated, showering the target satellite with shrapnel. Delicate satellites would be immediately destroyed by this explosion.

SUASAT Testing

The Soviet ASAT has been tested 20 times, in three different forms, each of which uses the same basic satellite. The maximum altitude at which this system has demonstrated an interception is about 1500 kilometers. From 1968 to 1971 an interceptor was tested that used an active radar to home in on its target within two orbits after launch, achieving a 70% success rate in 7 tests. This intercept trajectory requires the ASAT to be placed into an initial orbit that is very similar to that of its target. This imposes significant limits on how readily targets can be attacked.

In 1976 the Soviets began testing an active radar interceptor that would attack its target on the first orbit, which made it possible to attack targets in orbits that are somewhat different from that of the initial orbit of the interceptor. However it also results in a greater difference in the relative velocities of the ASAT and its target, which accounts for the lower success rate.

The Soviets also began testing that year of a more advanced interceptor that homes in on the heat emitted from its target. This system, which is less vulnerable to countermeasures such as evasive maneuvering and jamming, has failed in all 6 attempts, including the most recent ASAT test in June 1982. Continued testing of the two-orbit radar interceptor has yielded a 66% success rate in 3 tests since 1976.

SUASAT Status

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The Soviet ASAT is not operational in any meaningful sense of the term as it is commonly used in the United States. The Soviets' ongoing search for a satisfactory guidance system and a more direct intercept trajectory indicates the experimental nature of the Soviet ASAT. And the actual military utility of the Soviet ASAT is open to doubt. During the SALT II hearings Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Allen noted of the Soviet ASAT that "it is difficult to assign it a very high degree of credibility because it has not been a uniformly successful program and they have changed parameters with many of the different launches they have made...we give it a very questionable operational capability for a few launches...it is a threat that we are worried about, but they have not had a test program that would cause us to believe it is a very credible threat."

SUASAT Capabilities

In addition to the two dedicated ASAT launch pads at Baikonur, there are at least two other F-LV launch pads there, as well as four others at the Plesetsk launch center. If all eight of these pads were used in an ASAT campaign, they would be able to shoot down US satellites at the rate of about one a day, and a campaign against all 18 US satellites in low Earth orbit would require several weeks to complete. Such a campaign could require as many as fifty F-LV launches. During 1982, by contrast, there were just 8 F-LV launches from Baikonur and only 2 from Plesetsk.

Residual ASAT-Galosh

Although the Soviet Galosh ABM interceptor missiles could also have residual capabilities to destroy satellites, there are limits to the seriousness of this threat. Because it uses a high-yield nuclear warhead, application of the Galosh to the ASAT role would entail a risk of collateral damage to Soviet satellites, as well as to their command and control facilities in the Moscow area, as a result of the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) phenomenon.

Other Residual ASATS

The Soviets have two other rockets that can launch a payload as heavy as the Soviet ASAT interceptor. The A-LV, which is used to launch the Soyuz manned spacecraft and the unmanned Progress resupply vehicle, is limited by its use of unstable fuels, and there are only a handful of pads that can launch this rocket. The D-LV, which launches the Salyut space station and various satellites to geosynchronous orbit, has demonstrated a very low launch rate and reliability. Both could provide a marginal residual ASAT capability, against a limited number of targets.

Directed Energy ASATS

During the late 1970's there were a number of allegations concerning possible Soviet development and use of laser and particle-beam weapons. The nuclear research facility at Semipalatinsk was said to be building a large nuclear-pumped particle-beam weapon, but nothing seems to have come of it. Sensor problems on various early warn

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ing satellites that some argued were the result of laser attacks are now generally believed to have resulted from natural phenomena.

There is a belief in certain quarters that the Soviet Union is actively working on a space-based laser that would perhaps be launched by the G-type launch vehicle (equivalent to the American Saturn V moon rocket). The first flight of this space laser could come within the next few years. Because the Soviet Union typically goes to a fullscale prototype of a weapon system much earlier in the development cycle than does the United States, the actual military utility of this space laser is likely to be quite marginal. But the political impact on American decisionmakers of such a 'big-flashlight' is likely to approach or rival that of Sputnik, impelling the United States toward an accelerated development of similar weapons.

ASAT MISSIONS

The starting point for any evaluation of anti-satellite weapons must be an assessment of the role they perform in a country's strategy and force posture. It is not sufficient to merely note that a country has an ASAT capability. Rather, it is necessary to relate the performance characteristics of specific ASATS to various target sets of satellites of a potential opponent. The question then becomes whether the ASAT performs a unique and significant military function.

There seem to be three general categories of ASAT missions. The first are those that are of marginal military significance and can also be performed by non-dedicated residual ASAT capabilities, such as attacks on small numbers of low-altitude photographic or radar reconnaissance satellites. The second group includes attacks on a small number of other satellites, such as passive electronic intelligence satellites, that are at the margins of the performance of the present generation of ASATs. The third category consists of large-scale attacks on many high value satellites, requiring capabilities greatly in excess of those of existing dedicated and non-dedicated ASATS. Because of the very negative impact that the ability to perform these missions would have on arms race and crisis stability, it would on the whole be preferable to avoid a situation in which either or both sides could plausibly contemplate such attacks.

Photographic Reconnaissance Satellite

It is difficult to imagine that ASATs would be employed against photo reconnaissance satellites for the purpose of preventing treaty verification. Such an act would be far more provocative than merely abrogating or withdrawing from a treaty, and would be considered an act of war, or certainly a prelude to a conflict in which the denial of verification would pale to insignificance.

In addition to treaty verification, photo reconnaissance satellites provide information on fixed targets for strategic forces, as well as information on mobile targets for strategic and conventional land, sea and air forces. This latter function is performed under the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) program. The improved resolution and real-time data return provided by

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the KH-12 photo reconnaissance satellite will further increase the utility of satellites to tactical situations.

But these tactical applications are of interest primarily in low-threat conflicts in which an ASAT attack is quite unlikely. In these and more serious conflicts between the US and the USSR it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which this capability would be a major concern, or provide the Soviets with a meaningful, let alone decisive, advantage. In the European theater these satellites could provide warning of an impending Soviet attack. However in previous instances the warning provided was not unambiguous, with anticipated moves not materializing and actual invasions coming as something of a surprise. Paradoxically, the most valuable use of photo reconnaissance satellites in such a situation might come if they were destroyed by an ASAT, thus providing an unambiguous signal of intentions. Of course recognition of this fact would discourage an attack until very late in the game, by which time various aerial sensor platforms would come into play.

The United States is developing systems to be added to low-flying satellites, such as the KH-12 photographic reconnaissance satellite, that will detect the radar beam of the Soviet ASAT and maneuver the satellite to avoid attack. Such systems are the reason that the Soviets have sought, thus far without success, to develop heat-seeking guidance sensors that will not provide warning of an impending attack. Thus the present Soviet ASAT poses a limited and declining threat to low-altitude American satellites.

Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellites (RORSATs)

The new American ASAT is usually justified on the basis of a need to shoot down the Soviet Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite (RORSAT) that the Soviets use to keep track of American carrier battle groups. But the significance of this threat, and the unique requirement for an ASAT to meet this threat, seems to have been overstated. The Soviets do not seem to place great reliance on the system, perhaps because of its significant operational limitations. American naval forces will face many threats in combat, which can be countered by means that will be equally effective against the RORSAT. There is little reason to believe that the RORSAT provides a unique targeting platform for weapons that the fleet is not equipped to counter, and in the final analysis, the survival of the fleet during a central nuclear conflict is neither likely nor significant. The United States has studied for many years the use of radar satellites, and these studies have consistently concluded that such systems would be of marginal utility. There is no reason to believe that the Soviets have perfected a more capable system.

This re-enforces the conclusion that the primary mission of the new American ASAT is political, a bargaining chip for negotiations, rather than military. Given a political requirement to develop a credible short-term ASAT capability to gain bargaining leverage, the Prototype Miniature Air-Launched System was a very marginal capability in search of a mission. Fortunately, the orbit of the RORSAT