been privileged to serve together. You have been very objective on this issue and very well informed on it. TACAMO I have one last question. Earlier, Senator, we looked into the TACAMO Program. Admiral Layman, will you or the Secretary within the system promptly inform this committee with respect to the Secretary of Defense's decision? Do you anticipate that within the next few days it would be forthcoming? Was there a reason for the deadline of March 31 on that? Admiral LAYMAN. There was not a deadline of the 31st. The Secretary submitted a letter. Based on the work that I have done with the OSD staff members, I was advised that they expected an answer within the next 2 or 3 days. I certainly will advise the committee what that answer is. Senator WARNER. Are there any implications to the prime and subcontract structure as to the timing of this decision in terms of their own work and order requirements? Admiral LAYMAN. That is a separate issue, Senator, with respect to the release of the fiscal year 1984 money which has been hanIdled within the Department of Defense. Without any money and without any APN money in fiscal year 1985, we would have to do, as you recognize, a restructure of the program that would have some total program impacts in a number of ways. Senator WARNER. What is the average life on the existing TACAMO air fleet? Admiral LAYMAN. I would like to answer that precisely for the record. Admiral LAYMAN. However, I believe that we have aircraft that have been operational for on the order of 18 years. We are, of course, receiving two new EC-130's within the next year. Senator WARNER. For this program? Admiral LAYMAN. Yes, for this program. Senator WARNER. I think you should provide the committee with a profile of all the TACAMO aircraft and their life expectancy and the extent to which they have been extended beyond that, even though the modernization may have contributed. The EC-130 does not have the operational capabilities to fully service the Trident Program, does it? Admiral LAYMAN. Not in the Pacific theater. Are there any other questions, Senator Levin? Senator WARNER. Very well. We will now go into executive session and will take a 5-minute break. [Whereupon, at 10:08 a.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene in executive session.] EXECUTIVE SESSION The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:15 a.m., in room 232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Quayle, and Exon. Staff present: Robert F. Bott, William E. Hoehn, Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., professional staff members; Douglas R. Graham, research assistant; and Karen A. Love, staff assistant. Also present: Gerald J. Smith, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Bernard R. Toon, assistant to Senator Quayle; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon. Senator WARNER. I am informed by counsel to the committee that the room is now secure so we may proceed in executive session. I understand that Dr. Harper will be our first witness. Dr. Harper, when did you join the Department of the Navy? Dr. HARPER. About 4 years ago, sir, I came from the Bell Telephone Laboratories. Senator WARNER. What is your title, sir? Dr. HARPER. I am technical director of the SSBN Security Program. Senator WARNER. Thank you. Please proceed. STATEMENT OF EDWARD Y. HARPER, TECHNICAL DIRECTOR, SSBN SECURITY PROGRAM Dr. HARPER. Sir, in the next 20 minutes, I will give you a few words on the methodology used in the security program and give you an example of how the program pursues a specific submarine detection technology. I am going to use [deleted] not because we are concerned about that particular technology, but because I think it serves as a generic example of how we prosecute a technology. THE SSBN SECURITY PROGRAM This brief is classified secret. Agenda (20 minutes); a few words on methodology, an example of how the program pursues a specific submarine detection technology-[deleted]. A listing of current SSBN security projects, a few words and images concerning satellite detection technology, Synthetic Aperture Radar [SAR]; a few words about countermeasure developments—[deleted]. I want to give you a listing of the current SSBN security projects that we have studied. That is an extensive set of technologies, and, obviously, I do not have time to detail them all. I want to give you a few words and show you some images concerning [deleted] I am going to use the [deleted] as an example. I want to give you a few words about countermeasure developments. In particular, I will talk about [deleted] detection of the [deleted] and the countermeasure for that, and the [deleted] and our ability to develop a countermeasure to [deleted] detection. May I have the next slide, please? Goal: Avoid surprise in ASW. METHODOLOGY Approach: Conduct research to resolve technical uncertainty in submarine detection technologies; develop countermeasure concepts before intelligence reveals a threat. Intelligence on Soviet activity: Close coordination_with_intelligence community [DNI, CIA, NSA, DIA]; cannot rely on intelligence alone; Soviet research [deleted]; must look 20 to 30 years out; must consider concepts not yet discovered by Soviets. Transend intelligence estimates by relying on laws of physics: Theoretical analyses; laboratory research; computer simulations; technology advances; at-sea experiments; operations analyses. In terms of methodology, our goal in this program is to avoid surprise in ASW. The approach is to conduct research to resolve technical uncertainty in submarine detection technologies, and to develop countermeasure concepts before intelligence reveals a threat. We do have intelligence on Soviet activity. In fact, we work closely in coordination with the intelligence community through the Director of Naval Intelligence, the CIA, NSA, and DIA. But we cannot rely on intelligence alone. First of all, Soviet research is [deleted]. We must look 20 to 30 years out. We must consider concepts that perhaps the Soviets have not yet even thought of. In order to transcend those intelligence estimates, we rely on the laws of physics, which apply to the Soviets as well as to ourselves. Senator WARNER. Really? [General laughter.] Dr. HARPER. Well we hope so. Otherwise we really will have a problem. We conduct theoretical analyses, laboratory research, computer simulations, technology advances-and I will give you some examples where we really have had to push technology in order to make these assessments. We do at-sea experiments-and you will see an example—and we conduct other operational analyses to see whether these concepts make any sense from an operational point of view. METHODOLOGY Strong management team: Three scientists; operations analyst; four submarine officers, intelligence officer. Contractors: Universities; Government laboratories; corporations. Coordination: Other ASW programs; United Kingdom (restricted); operational fleet; intelligence community. Reviews: Internal Navy; DOD; University faculty (Jason); unscheduled; Townes MX Basing Committee; Scowcroft Commission. We have a strong management team, comprised of three scientists, all Ph.D.'s, an operations analyst, four submarine officers, and an intelligence officer. Our contractors are quite varied, and include universities, Government laboratories, and private corporations. We have a great deal of coordination with other ASW programs, both within Navy and within DOD. We have some coordination with the United Kingdom, but it is restricted for security reasons to certain limited topics. We coordinate with the operational fleet and with the intelligence community. We also have a number of reviews. We have a considerable amount of internal Navy technical review. The program is reviewed by the Department of Defense. We invite certain wellknown university faculty members to look at certain technical aspects of our program. One group in particular is known as the Jasons, the membership of which includes a number of Nobel Laureates, and it has reviewed our programs. We try to have those reviews every summer. We also have what are called unscheduled reviews-for example, the Townes MX basing committee and the Scowcroft Commission had a great deal of interest in the subject of the SSBN security program. Now, I could tell you that the way we pursue a technology is to build a detection model, to conduct experiments, and to develop the sensors required to understand and believe that model. But that really is sort of an amorphous description. So, what I will try to do with the next series of slides is to illustrate that process. [Slide deleted.] What you are looking at here is [deleted] a submerged submarine. This is what we call a [deleted]. Senator WARNER. What is the depth? Dr. HARPER. I will get into that, Senator. Hopefully it will all be clear. If it is not after the next three Vu-Graphs, please ask that question again. Senator WARNER. Did you call that a [deleted]? Dr. HARPER. A [deleted]. I will tell you what the [deleted] is and how to understand the [deleted]. This was done in a controlled experiment on a range with an aircraft flying over an a priori known location of the submarine with [deleted]. This [indicating] is [deleted] the submarine. You also see this track [indicating]. This track is the [deleted] from a surface vessel, which is trailing the submarine with [deleted] and I will explain why that is happening. The point I want to make here is that this [deleted]. Senator WARNER. [Deleted.] Dr. HARPER. Yes, sir. May I have the next slide? [Slide deleted.] Now I will tell you a little bit about the [deleted] submarines. First of all, if the submarine is on the surface, it has what we call [deleted]. This is [deleted]. When the submarine submerges, this [deleted] or very quickly disappears, and we do not worry about that as a detectable item. There is also a [deleted], which is just the mixing of water by the hull. Senator WARNER. Excuse me. Would you go back to the [deleted]. Dr. HARPER. [Deleted.] Senator WARNER. So, this is on the surface, [deleted]. Dr. HARPER. That is correct, so we do not worry about [deleted] for submarines, because that disappears so fast with depth. We do have the [deleted]. We have a miniscule displacement at the surface because, after all, the fluid is compressible and has to get out of the way for the submarine. But that miniscule displacement at the surface is completely swamped by the wave action at the surface. So, in recent years, when people have tried to do submarine detection, they have concentrated on [deleted]. One of these is called [deleted] and as the name suggests, we do create [deleted]. Those [deleted]. Another [deleted]. These [deleted]. Also, they stabilize the submarine. If you have ever seen an aircraft land on an airport on a dusty day, [deleted]. Now, these [deleted] and the mixing of the ocean actually helps that [deleted]. If that [deleted]. Senator WARNER. So, there is a [deleted]. Dr. HARPER. Yes, sir. The [deleted] is there. What has happened is the [deleted]. Senator WARNER. Going back to call upon the ancient knowledge that I used to have many years ago, [deleted]. Dr. HARPER. Sir, the [deleted]. Senator WARNER. Well, there is the fact of depth. Dr. HARPER. Sir, it [deleted]. [Deleted] and there is not time for [deleted]. That [deleted] and then it does dissipate. Senator WARNER. Now, will you be going into the depth matter in a moment? Dr. HARPER. Yes, sir. [Slide deleted.] There is a theory due to a rather well-known professor [deleted]. Of course, we are concerned about this maximum height [indicating]. If that maximum height is [deleted]. That [deleted] is driven by three parameters: [deleted]. As a matter of fact, this theory was published in the open literature way back in 1972. The reason was that there was an interest and concern about [deleted]. [Slide deleted.] Given that theory and that model, we went to sea with a submarine on a range, and we instrumented the submarine with two kinds of [deleted] with the [deleted] was able to [deleted]. Here [indicating] you can see that for a certain set of parameters that I told you were important to this problem, we have mapped out the [deleted]. |