The reason we put so much money into that is because-well, it can be represented starting with this slide. This shows the average age of our ICBM's. In essence, what it says is that the average age of the Soviets' ICBM's are around the 5-year mark, while the United States is twice that much, over the 10-year mark. And that is easily understood when you look at this chart. You see that the last ICBM that entered into our force was the Mintueman III, and subsequent to that time the Soviets have entered all of these types down here [indicating], in addition, to adding a significant number of MIRV'd warheads. As a matter of fact, about 660 new missiles have been entered into their inventory and over 6,000 warheads. Senator WARNER. Now, from Minuteman III to date what percentage of warheads have they added? General Russ. I can show that on the next slide, sir. Here is a good representation of that. You can see where the Minuteman III goes back in here [indicating]. You can see what has happened to the reentry vehicles. It shows that we have stabilized here at the Minuteman point [indicating], and we are a little over 2,000 reentry vehicles. They are at about three times that many. So that shows the dramatic change in the 1970's, when the number of reentry vehicles were added to the force. When we look at these sort of things, we ask ourselves, what are we going to do about it? Dr. COOPER. I might add, General Russ, before we leave that, not only have the numbers increased, Mr. Chairman, but also the sophistication and the capability of those warheads in terms of accuracy. Senator WARNER. Now, in terms of the missile itself, those curves look flat. General Russ. This represents the U.S. missiles, our total missiles in 1968. Dr. COOPER. What that represents, Mr. Chairman, is the fact that in that early timeframe the Soviets came upon MIRV technology, the ability to put on more than one warhead per launcher. And so, as you see, although their launchers have not gone up significantly, in fact they have dropped, they have now fractionated. And the SS-18 is limited to 10 warheads, as you know, but they have a capability to carry many per launcher, as opposed to 1 per launcher in the late sixties. Senator WARNER. The MIRVing is the "Y" in the road there? General Russ. Here is where we started MIRVing and you can see what happened to us when we MIRV'd [indicating]. The Soviets started a major MIRV effort right about here, and as you can see, the line goes almost straight up [indicating]. We have set upon a three-part program to redress those imbalances. It is composed of the 100 Peacekeeper missiles, the small ICBM mobile missile, and technology programs to support both of these. I would now like to have General Fornell discuss with you where we are in these programs, and where we plan on going in the next few years. STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. GORDON E. FORNELL, USAF, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR ICBM MODERNIZATION U.S. ICBM MODERNIZATION PROGRAM General FORNELL. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to be able to present this progress report, which I think significantly shows you that we have stepped out in a very energetic and enthusiastic way in implementing the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission. Last year at this time we were right in the middle of the debate, working very hard with the Department of Defense, the administration and the Congress in taking the Scowcroft Commission recommendations and putting them into a Presidential format directing the Department of Defense to carry out the Scowcroft recommendations. Additionally, of course, the Congress voted specifically on those recommendations and implementation plans, which were turned into direction to the field. We then came through the 1984 authorization and appropriations process, most significantly with the approval for production of the first 21 Peacekeeper missiles and beginning the engineering design of the small mobile missile. We are continuing our basing technology efforts that have been underway in previous programs. |