of 422 ships per year. Commencing in 1922 and through 1933, w 148 ships aggregating 1,281,761 gross tons, or an average of 120 per year.

During 1934 through 1936, when the U.S. Shipping Board was ordinated to the Department of Commerce, we built 12 ships of gross tons, or an average of four ships per year.

Commencing in 1937, after the U.S. Maritime Commission had constituted as an independent bipartisan agency, and through 19 built 5,359 vessels of 40.8 million tons, or an average of 382 ships year. Those figures include the World War II years, 1942 th 1945, inclusive, when we built 4,915 ships of 37 million gross tons.or average of 1,228 ships per year.

From 1950 through 1961, after the Federal Maritime Board again been subordinated to the Department of Commerce, we s 277 ships of 4.3 million gross tons, or an average of 23 ships per re From 1961 through 1966, with the Federal Maritime Administra still under the Department of Commerce, we built 105 vessels of million gross tons, or an average of 17 ships per year.

These figures are based on the following table supplied by Shipbuilders Council of America, 1730 K Street NW, Washing D.C., thanks to the good offices of Mr. Ed Hood, president.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit now for the reporter, a of which you already have available, this table that I have referred to so that the record would be complete on it without? necessity of boring the committee with the reading of all the year and the tonnage breakdowns, if I may, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered. (Table follows:)

TABLE 24.-GROSS TONNAGE AND NUMBER OF STEEL SELF-PROPELLED MERCHANT VESSELS, BY TYPES OF BUILT IN THE PRIVATE SHIPYARDS OF THE UNITED STATES AND DELIVERED IN THE YEARS INDICATED BE (INCLUDES ONLY VESSELS OF 2,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER)

BLE 24.--GROSS TONNAGE AND NUMBER OF STEEL SELF-PROPELLED MERCHANT VESSELS, BY TYPES OF SHIPS, UILT IN THE PRIVATE SHIPYARDS OF THE UNITED STATES AND DELIVERED IN THE YEARS INDICATED BELOW NCLUDES ONLY VESSELS OF 2,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER)-Continued

Year

Cargo

Tanker

Passenger and passenger-cargo

Total

Number Gross tons Number Gross tons Number Gross tons Number Gross tons

Note: Period 1946-59 includes 28 small craft, totaling 85,141 gross tons.

Mr. HALL. It must be emphasized that this rate of building ships is not adequate to replace obsolete vessels, let alone to build up and upgrade our merchant fleet. Reviewing these facts, it must be noted that only in time of war have we had an adequate shipbuilding program, and each war in this century has found us with a woefully inadequate fleet.

That is our condition at present, as has been demonstrated by the war in Vietnam, which has compelled the Government to take ships out of their normal and regular service and use them to carry men and materiel to Vietnam. If another serious outbreak occurred in another quarter of the globe, we would be compelled to resort to undependable foreign-flag ships to supply our Armed Forces, and our economy.

It is also interesting to check the nature of the maritime agency against the size of our merchant fleet.

In 1939, about 3 years after the 1936 act had become effective. had a total of 1,235 privately-owned ships in the American merci marine, with a gross tonnage slightly in excess of 7 million.

During World War II, 1942 through 1945, we built almost 5,000 s aggregating almost 37 million gross tons. But as a result of the sale ships to foreign countries and the decline in shipbuilding, by 1949 had only 1,188 ships of 9.5 million gross tons.

A tabulated story of the precipitous decline of our merchant mara from that date, with the brief interlude of the Korean war, is suppla for your information.

Then, Mr. Chairman, I would like, if I may, sir, to submit for record this chart indicating the number of vessels from years rang 1939 through 1966, the number and gross tons in thousand lots and deadweight tons in the thousand lots.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered without objection. (The table follows:)

Mr. HALL. Recently I appeared before the Bartlett subcommitte of the Senate Committee on Commerce, and there set forth in so detail the events which compelled us to favor an independent ma time agency. I should like to briefly summarize these events now.

In the autumn of 1963 our Government negotiated a large sale! wheat and other foodstuffs to Russia and her satellites. This was nece sary to meet a rapidly developing condition of famine in those cont tries. In announcing the sale, President Kennedy also pointed out t the sale would enable us to dispose of surpluses, would therefore be fit our farmers and would provide employment for longshore. seamen, and other maritime workers.

Originally President Kennedy announced that all of the goods would be transported on American vessels. The grain was purcha out of Government surpluses and exported by private companies. T private exporters (but not the farmers) could make more profit transporting the cargoes on foreign-flag ships, and they designe program and restored to stratagems to accomplish that

purpose.

T

ad the active support and encouragement of the Department of Agrilture and other executive agencies concerned. The result was that e percentage of cargoes carried on American-flag ships never reached ) percent, and at times declined to a fraction of that percentage. The american industry, management and labor, resisted these manipula

Fons.

Eventually the longshoremen found it necessary to boycott foreignag ships to which cargoes has been awarded. In order to complete The program, President Johnson promised the industry that a minium of 50 percent would be carried on American-flag ships and also reated two committees intended to facilitate that program. They vere known as the Grievance Committee, established to consider dayfo-day complaints of the maritime industry, and the Maritime Adisory Committee, which had the responsibility of formulating long

ange programs.

As a result the boycott was lifted, and all segments of the industry greed to and did cooperate with the committees. We lost every griev nce heard by the Grievance Committee. In spite of all our efforts, Government agencies continued to deprive American vessels of their air share of the cargo.

The Maritime Advisory Committee was a most impressive group. The members were appointed by President Johnson. It consisted of Cabinet officers and other heads of Government agencies, and the inlustry was represented by the presidents of shipping companies and of maritime unions. The public was represented on the committee by men who had distinguished themselves in the maritime field as mediators, arbitrators, et cetera.

Eventually, the public members of the committee prepared what became known as the MAC report, which embodied a long-range maritime program. It was overwhelmingly approved by the committee, the only dissenters being presidents of shipping companies which operated large fleets of foreign-flag vessels.

I am informed that the MAC report was also approved by the Secretary of Commerce, who presided over the committee, and by the Secretary of Labor. Nevertheless, the MAC report was given no consideration by the other Government members of the committee and so far as we know never reached nor was considered by the President. Now let me describe briefly how the Government members of MAC sabotaged the MAC program.

While MAC was working most diligently on its report, and while the Government members of MAC were attending MAC committee meetings, apparently in good faith, these Government members nevertheless were secretly engaged in preparing their own report, wholly without any consultation with or participation by the nonGovern

mental members.

The person who assumed the leadership of the Governmental members of MAC, and who must therefore bear the primary burden of the program of those members was Mr. Alan S. Boyd, then Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation, and now the Secretary of Transportation.

The program formulated under Mr. Boyd's leadership was entitled "Interagency Task Force Report," commonly known as the Boyd re

port. It was published on October 4, 1965-and I mean publish. A the very time it was being presented to MAC and in an adjoiningra it was released to the press and, stimulated by Mr. Boyd and Cr was given nationwide publicity. It was rejected almost unani by MAC on the date it was presented. The MAC report was net pleted until November 22, 1965 and, as I have said, was proc and overwhelmingly adopted by MAC.

Thus, as the result of the appointment of a special high-level mittee by the President charged with the responsibility of forme ing a long-range maritime program, the actual result was th programs were formulated. The MAC report was adopted by the mittee; the Boyd report was rejected by the committee. The MA port was buried in some bureaucratic backwater, while the Bord port was submitted to the President and nationally advertised. Now, the two reports were irreconcilable.

The MAC report was based on the 1936 act and dedicated to preservation and promotion of all segments of the maritime ind

The Boyd report proposed a wholesale revision of the 1936 a scrapping of the policy of that act, experimental tinkering with subsidy system, phasing out of cargo preference, and the outrigh peal of a maritime law almost as old as our Nation, namely, that st engaged in the domestic and subsidized segments of our industry be built in American yards.

I have called the Boyd report a program of sabotage against MAC report. I denounce it now as a sabotage of the American chant marine. And it is impossible that Mr. Boyd can escape respo bility for these unwholesome results.

You can imagine the anxiety of the maritime industy wher learned that the administration intended to include the Maritime A ministration in the proposed Department of Transportation, and Mr. Boyd had already been selected to head up that department the ensuing months, during the movement of the Department of Tr portation legislation through the Congress, Mr. Boyd led in its motion, and thereby, as I have elsewhere said, became the symb Executive hostility to the maritime industry.

It was these facts, it was this history, which compelled all segme of the maritime industry to unite for self-preservation. We k from these experiences that submergence of the Maritime Adm tration in a gigantic department headed by Mr. Boyd would s the death-knell for our hopes of revival of the merchant marire

There was no segment of in the industry which withheld its sur from the movement to exclude the Maritime Administration from NoBoyd's department. Maritime management, subsidized and uns sidized, liner and tramp, bulk carrier and tanker, and all of t associations, joined with all maritime unions affiliated with AFL-C to promote complete independence of the Maritime Administration. You gentlemen here certainly know the result. By an overwhelm vote, ably and enthusiastically led by this committee, the House cluded the Maritime Administration from the Department of Tr portation. That position was upheld by the conference, carried both Houses of Congress, and was signed by the President.