Images de page
PDF
ePub

(3) The 35-cent provision is "plucked
from thin air," Texas Gas Transmission Corp.,
28 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,118 (July 24, 1984), and no
justification for its reasonableness or its
relation to necessary incentives to run the
pipeline has been provided. Part VI (B), supra.

(4) The Settlement Agreement's resolu-
tion of rate base issues by amortizing
$450 million over six years is not supported
by substantial evidence in two respects. There
is no record evidence as to the true effect of
the amortization provision on the TAPS rate
base, although it appears to approximate a
$177 million full exclusion. There is not
substantial evidence to support a rate base
reduction of less than $1.8 billion.
Part VIII(A), supra.

D. The Settlement Agreement Is Unlawful.

Besides the numerous genuine issues of material fact that exist with respect to the Settlement Offer, the Offer, if approved, would be unlawful in a number of respects.

Generally,

the Settlement Offer taken as a whole results in unjust and unreasonable TAPS tariffs, but the Offer is also unlawful in a number of particular respects:

(1) The offerors have failed to provide a "reasoned explanation" justifying the numerous noncost-based provisions of the TSM. Farmers Union II, 734 F.2d at 1502;

(2) The Settlement Offer's improper treatment of tax allowances and property accounting violates regulatory precedent;

(3) The Settlement Offer would have an adverse economic impact on competition, production and development on the North Slope;

(4) The Settlement Offer unjustifiably transfers economic rents from landowners and shippers on the North Slope to the TAPS Carriers;

E.

(5) The Settlement Offer fails to deduct imprudent costs from the rate base;

(6) The Settlement Offer discriminates
against ASRC and other shippers by giving
Alaska preferential rights with respect to
enforcement, use of dispute resolution, and
rebates for litigation expenses;

(7) The Settlement Offer takes statutory
jurisdiction away from the Commission by
limiting enforcement to Alaska and depriving
anyone of the right to protect statutory man-
dates with respect to new rate base invest-
ment, pumpability and operating expenses; and
(8) The Settlement Offer is not sup-
ported by substantial evidence to justify a
determination by the Commission that the
Settlement Offer is just and reasonable and
should be imposed upon nonconsenting parties.

Commission Review of the Settlement Offer Prior to

October 31 Is Not Required Because It Is Unreasonable and Unnecessary.

Section III-2 of the Settlement Agreement gives its offerors the right to cancel if the Commission "fails to approve or reject this Agreement by October 31, 1985." The settlement offerors have invoked this self-imposed deadline to suggest that the offer must be approved by that date because settlement thereafter will lose its value to the offerors. See Opposition of the State of Alaska and the United States Department of Justice to Arctic Slope Regional Corporation's Motion for Extension of Time and Other Relief at 2, 6 (filed May 17, 1985). This contention that time constraints preclude careful review of the Settlement Offer is ill-advised, and suggests that the offer cannot withstand such It is the Commission's statutory mandate to set just

scrutiny.

and reasonable TAPS tariffs, and self-imposed deadlines by some of the parties should not affect that mandate.

The

The suggestion that a "rush to judgment" is required is illadvised because it would jeopardize nearly eight years' careful preparation in this proceeding. Part II (B) of these Comments details the elaborate record that the parties and presiding officers have prepared for the Commission's review and decision. number and complexity of outstanding issues in this case is still such that a reasoned rapid resolution of them is simply not possible. A hasty review process by the parties and the Commission would create a substantial risk of error.

Unless the six

A hasty review would also be unnecessary. other TAPS Carriers consent to the Settlement Agreement, the Offer will resolve issues only as to shipments on ARCO and BP portions of TAPS. This proceeding will have to continue to determine just and reasonable tariffs for 62 percent of the pipeline. To the extent that uncertainty about future TAPS tariff rates is a concern requiring haste, see Alaska/DOJ Explanatory Statement at 78, it will not be eliminated by the Settlement

Offer.

Moreover, Section III-2 of the Settlement Agreement gives the offerors a right to cancel if the Commission makes approval of the Settlement Offer contingent on any modification of the Agreement. Thus, the offerors have attempted to restrict the Commission's review of the Settlement Offer both substantively

and temporally.

If the Commission determines that a single term

of the Settlement Offer--no matter how small or insignificant-must be changed to yield just and reasonable and non

discriminatory tariffs, each offeror will then have a right to cancel the Settlement Agreement for any reason. In view of the

range of problems with the Settlement Offer that have been identified in these comments, Commission approval of the Offer without modification of some kind is quite unlikely. The offerors may not restrict the nature of the Commission's review by attempting to impose an "all or nothing" ultimatum.

Because the Settlement Offer will not resolve the entire case and will become optional among its proponents in any event when necessary modifications are required, the time for review of it should be that required to produce a reasoned decision on the merits without regard to the artificial and illusory October 31, 1985, deadline.34

For these reasons, ASRC respectfully requests that this contested Offer of Settlement not be certified to or approved by the Commission and that the Commission's process for its deter

mination of just and reasonable and nondiscriminatory tariffs be completed as rapidly as possible.

34

In pointing out that review of the Settlement Offer is not constrained by the offerors' self-imposed October 31 deadline, ASRC is not suggesting that prompt resolution of this proceeding is not desirable. Throughout this proceeding ASRC has consistently sought and petitioned for early resolution of issues. ASRC is concerned, however, that a hasty and superficial review of the Settlement Offer could have the final result of delaying resolution of this proceeding by several years rather than expediting it.

[blocks in formation]
« PrécédentContinuer »