United States-Soviet relations: hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, first session, Partie 2U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983 |
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM Treaty ACDA achieve administration agree allies American answer arms control agreement arms control proposals arms reduction ballistic missiles bargaining believe bomber builddown concept builddown proposal Chairman committee Congress counting rules cruise missiles defense deployed deployment destabilizing deterrent effort Europe freeze resolution Geneva going ICBM issue land-based launchers limit ment military MIRV'd ICBM's MIRVed modernization move mutual MX missiles national security national technical means NATO negotiations nuclear arms race nuclear arsenals nuclear forces nuclear freeze nuclear war nuclear warheads nuclear weapons number of warheads Pershing Pershing II political position President Reagan President's problem programs question Rostow SALT Scowcroft Commission report Senator BIDEN Senator BOSCHWITZ Senator COHEN Senator KASSEBAUM Senator KENNEDY Senator Nunn Senator PELL Senator PRESSLER sides SLBM Soviet Union stability statement strategic arms submarines survivability Test Ban Thank threat throw-weight tion TSONGAS U.S. Senate United verifiable vote vulnerability weapons systems
Fréquemment cités
Page 12 - IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES JANUARY 3, 1985 Mr. MATTINGLY (for himself, Mr. EVANS, Mr. THURMOND, and Mr. ARMSTRONG) introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to allow the President to veto items of appropriation. 1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives...
Page 236 - But, to speak practically and as a citizen, unlike those who call themselves no-government men, I ask for, not at once no government, but at once a better government. Let every man make known what kind of government would command his respect, and that will be one step toward obtaining it.
Page 259 - There is no issue at stake in our political relations with the Soviet Union, no hope, no fear, nothing to which we aspire, nothing we would like to avoid, which could conceivably be worth a nuclear war.
Page 156 - Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
Page 7 - Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time...
Page 143 - Argentina, for example, could have the capability to build a nuclear device within five years and has stated that it is keeping its nuclear option open. If Argentina had the bomb during the Falkland Islands crisis, can anyone say for sure that it would not have used it? Six nations are now members of the nuclear club — the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China and India. But about thirty more nations have the technical capability to build the bomb within a decade. Pakistan...
Page 239 - Union should: (a) pursue a complete halt to the nuclear arms race: (b) decide when and how to achieve a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems; and (c) give special attention to destabilizing weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to achieve.
Page 2 - Now, therefore, be it 1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep2 resentatives that...
Page 176 - Soviet operational missile performance in wartime may be somewhat less accurate than performance on the test range, the Soviets nevertheless now probably possess the necessary combination of ICBM numbers, reliability, accuracy, and warhead yield to destroy almost all of the 1,047 US ICBM silos, using only a portion of their own ICBM force.
Page 157 - It was understood by both sides that the prohibition on "development" applies to activities involved after a component moves from the laboratory development and testing stage to the field testing stage, wherever performed.