Documents on DisarmamentUnited States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1991 |
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Page 13
... remain in effect even beyond that date if the United States for its part also stops nuclear tests . We propose once again to the United States to join in this initiative whose significance is evident to practically everyone in the world ...
... remain in effect even beyond that date if the United States for its part also stops nuclear tests . We propose once again to the United States to join in this initiative whose significance is evident to practically everyone in the world ...
Page 15
... remain a mere declaration . The Soviet delegation in Geneva will be instructed to act in strict compliance with that agreement . We expect the same constructive approach from the United States side , above all on the question of space ...
... remain a mere declaration . The Soviet delegation in Geneva will be instructed to act in strict compliance with that agreement . We expect the same constructive approach from the United States side , above all on the question of space ...
Page 19
... remain indifferent or stand aloof . This concerns each and everyone . Each State , large or small , socialist or capitalist , has an important contribution to make . Every responsible political party , every social organization and ...
... remain indifferent or stand aloof . This concerns each and everyone . Each State , large or small , socialist or capitalist , has an important contribution to make . Every responsible political party , every social organization and ...
Page 28
... remain concerned about Soviet violations of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act and the Limited Test Ban Treaty , there is no unambiguous evidence of new 1985 Soviet violations of these two treaties . With regard to the Biological and ...
... remain concerned about Soviet violations of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act and the Limited Test Ban Treaty , there is no unambiguous evidence of new 1985 Soviet violations of these two treaties . With regard to the Biological and ...
Page 68
... remain in a position to persuade the stronger party not to attack it , out of fear of an " unacceptable punishment " . This is still one of the main obstacles to war , as Mr. Gorbachev stated during his visit to Paris last October.3 The ...
... remain in a position to persuade the stronger party not to attack it , out of fear of an " unacceptable punishment " . This is still one of the main obstacles to war , as Mr. Gorbachev stated during his visit to Paris last October.3 The ...
Table des matières
1 | |
4 | |
5 | |
6 | |
11 | |
19 | |
36 | |
58 | |
448 | |
456 | |
464 | |
471 | |
480 | |
490 | |
515 | |
541 | |
69 | |
88 | |
107 | |
124 | |
146 | |
168 | |
173 | |
207 | |
208 | |
213 | |
226 | |
237 | |
260 | |
266 | |
269 | |
279 | |
283 | |
292 | |
302 | |
323 | |
335 | |
337 | |
346 | |
371 | |
376 | |
388 | |
417 | |
438 | |
608 | |
615 | |
622 | |
634 | |
654 | |
658 | |
661 | |
665 | |
678 | |
682 | |
683 | |
698 | |
722 | |
732 | |
738 | |
749 | |
767 | |
782 | |
785 | |
787 | |
795 | |
799 | |
802 | |
807 | |
823 | |
829 | |
854 | |
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
Documents on Disarmament United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Affichage du livre entier - 1962 |
Documents on Disarmament United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Affichage du livre entier - 1980 |
Documents on Disarmament United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Affichage du livre entier - 1966 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM systems ABM Treaty achieve activities agreed American arms control arms control agreements arms race arms reduction Article ballistic missiles binary chemical weapons capability chemical weapons commitment Committee compliance concern Conference on Disarmament confidence Congress continue Convention cooperation countries delegation deploy deployment deterrent Documents on Disarmament effective efforts elimination ensure Europe facilities Foreign Geneva Ibid ICBM implementation important issues launchers measures meeting military Minister moratorium mutual NATO negotiations Non-Proliferation nuclear arms nuclear explosions nuclear forces nuclear testing nuclear weapons nuclear-weapon-free zones offensive outer space participating Parties peace political possible President Reagan problem progress prohibition proposals radar request Reykjavik SALT agreements SALT II Treaty Secretary Gorbachev seismic session side Soviet noncompliance Soviet Union stability Statement stockpile Strategic Defense Strategic Defense Initiative talks Test Ban threat tion U.S. Representative United Nations USSR verification violation warheads Warsaw Pact zone
Fréquemment cités
Page 544 - Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices...
Page 331 - The Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international significance...
Page 724 - Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars...
Page 299 - Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher...
Page 748 - Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925...
Page 298 - Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile landbased.
Page 474 - Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 628 - We believe such a ban must be viewed in the context of a time when we do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability and when we have achieved broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and greater balance in conventional forces.
Page 599 - State thirty days after the date of expression of consent. 5. (a) This Convention shall be open for accession, as provided for in this article, by international organizations and regional integration organizations constituted by sovereign States, which have competence in respect of the negotiation, conclusion and application of international agreements in matters covered by this Convention. (b) In...
Page 93 - By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, and in order to...