-A strictly supervised lowering of the levels of military capabilities of States to limits of reasonable adequacy;

-Disbandment of military alliances, and as a stage towards this, renunciation of their enlargement and of the formation of new ones; -Proportional and commensurate reduction of military budgets. 2. The political sphere

-Unconditional respect in international practice for the sovereign right of each people to choose the ways and forms of its development; -The just political settlement of international crises and regional conflicts; -Elaboration of a set of measures aimed at building confidence among States, and the creation of effective guarantees of protection against external attack and of the inviolability of their frontiers;

-Elaboration of effective methods of averting international terrorism, including methods of ensuring the safety of international land, air and sea communications.

3. The economic sphere

-Exclusion of all forms of discrimination from international practice, and renunciation of the policy of economic blockades and sanctions, if this is not directly provided for in the recommendations of the world community;

-The joint search for ways to achieve a just settlement of the problem of indebtedness;

-Establishment of a new international economic order guaranteeing the equal economic security of all States;

--The elaboration of principles for utilizing part of the funds released as a result of a reduction of military budgets for the good of the world community, and especially the developing countries;

-The pooling of efforts in the exploration and peaceful use of outer space and in solving global problems on which the destiny of civilization depends.

4. The humanitarian sphere

-Co-operation in the dissemination of the ideas of peace, disarmament and international security; greater flow of general objective information and greater opportunities for peoples to acquaint themselves with each other's way of life; reinforcement of the spirit of mutual understanding and concord in relations between them;

-Eradication of genocide, apartheid, advocacy of fascism and every other form of racial, national or religious exclusiveness, and also of discrimination against individuals on these grounds;

-The extension, while respecting the laws of each country, of international co-operation in the realization of political, social and individual human rights;

-The solving in a humane and positive spirit of questions related to the reunification of families, marriage, and the promotion of contacts between individuals and between organizations;

-The strengthening of and the search for new forms of co-operation in culture, art, science, education and medicine.

These principles follow logically from the provisions of the Programme of CPSU. They are fully in keeping with our practical foreign-policy initiatives. Guided by them, it would be possible to make peaceful coexistence the highest universal principle of inter-State relations. In our view, these principles could become the point of departure and a sort of guideline for a direct and systematic dialogue between leaders of countries of the world community, both bilateral and multilateral.

Since, moreover, this concerns the fate of peace, such a dialogue is particularly important among the permanent members of the Security Council-the five nuclear Powers. They bear the primary burden of responsibility for the destiny of humanity. I emphasize: it is not a privilege, not a foundation for claims to "leadership" in world affairs, but a responsibility, and nobody has the right to forget this. Why then should their leaders not gather at a round table and discuss what could and should be done to promote peace?

In our view, the entire existing mechanism of arms-limitation talks should also start to function at top productivity. Can one really "grow accustomed" to the fact that for years these talks have been proceeding on parallel course with a simultaneous build-up of armaments?

The USSR is giving considerable attention in international forums, as well as within the framework of the Helsinki process, to the problems and prospects of the world economy, the interdependence between disarmament and development, and the expansion of trade and scientific and technological co-operation. We feel that in the future it would be important to convene a world congress on problems of economic security, at which it would be possible to discuss in a package everything that encumbers world economic relations.

We are prepared to consider seriously any other proposals aimed in the same direction.

In the battle to prevent war it is vital to strive for success. This would be an epoch-making victory for the whole of humanity, for every person on earth. CPSU sees active participation in this battle as the essence of its foreign-policy strategy.

23. House Joint Resolution 3: Nuclear Weapons Testing, February 26, 1986'

Whereas the United States is committed in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 19632 and in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 19683 to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time;

Whereas a comprehensive test ban treaty would promote the security of the United States by constraining the United States-Soviet nuclear arms competition and by strengthening efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

'Congressional Record, February 26, 1986, pp. H603, H642-H643. The vote was 268

in favor, 148 opposed, and 18 not voting.

2

For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291–293. 3 Ibid., 1968, pp. 461-465.

Whereas the Threshold Test Ban Treaty was signed in 19744 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty was signed in 1976,5 and both have yet to be considered by the full Senate for its advice and consent to ratification;

Whereas the entry into force of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty will ensure full implementation of significant new verification procedures and so make completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty more probable;

Whereas a comprehensive test ban treaty must be adequately verifiable, and significant progress has been made in methods for detection of underground nuclear explosions by seismological and other means;

Whereas, at present, negotiations are not being pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union toward completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty; and Whereas the past five administrations have supported the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That at the earliest possible date, the President of the United States should

(1) request advice and consent of the Senate to ratification (with a report containing any plans the President may have to negotiate supplemental verification procedures, or if the President believes it necessary, any understanding or reservation on the subject of verification which should be attached to the treaty) of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, signed in 1974 and 1976, respectively; and

(2) propose to the Soviet Union the immediate resumption of negotiations toward conclusion of a verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty.

In accordance with international law, the United States shall have no obligation to comply with any bilateral arms control agreement with the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union is violating.

24. Statement by the U.S. Representative (Lowitz) to the Conference on Disarmament: Nuclear Test Ban [Extract], February 27, 19861

In sum, the United States hopes that the progress foreshadowed by recent meetings and statements will be translated into concrete results. Concrete results in resolving the security issues with which our negotiations are concernednuclear, chemical, and conventional-and in resolving the security and political problems posed by regional conflicts and differing political systems, will provide a necessary basis for further steps toward nuclear disarmament.

One of these steps would be a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear explosions-what our Conference describes as a nuclear-test ban. Surely it is unnecessary for me to describe the United States position on this question—a position which remains unchanged-at greater length than I have done in past interventions. A nuclear-test ban is an objective which can be realized in the context of the steps that I have discussed above-steps involving deep reductions in nuclear weapons; steps addressing the security concerns posed by the conventional force imbalance between East and West and the resulting need of the West to maintain an effective and reliable nuclear deterrent posture; and steps for the development and improvement of means that would be applied to the verification of compliance with such a ban.

We have taken due note of that part of the message from Mr. Gorbachev to the Conference on Disarmament on 20 February,2 as read by Minister Kornienko, that the Soviet Union will accept on-site inspection to verify compliance with a nuclear-test ban, as well as "the use of all achievements in seismology". On-site inspection is an issue which would be highly appropriate for practical work in an Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 1 in the Conference on Disarmament. It was, in fact, an issue on which consideration had only begun in the summer of 1983 when the work of the subsidiary body ended for the year. The failure of this Conference to take the necessary steps to resume this work has, accordingly, precluded an in-depth consideration of the many aspects of this matter.

The United States has long advocated a dialogue with the Soviet Union to arrive at the improved verification procedures necessary for any nuclear testing limitation. To the extent that Mr. Gorbachev's statement may reflect the development of common ground on this crucial issue, it is hopeful. We would welcome any dialogue with the Soviet Union that would narrow differences on this issue.

It is clear to my Government that the existing seismological assets available for monitoring a nuclear-test ban would not constitute an adequate basis for such an agreement. It would be important for the Conference on Disarmament to continue its consideration of this matter in a committee charged with doing so. In this way delegations that have argued in this body that seismology now provides a basis for verification can lay out their views in detail so that other delegations may benefit from their analyses. Clearly, this also would permit other delegations to present alternative positions. It is not only the problem of monitoring the underground environment under normal circumstances that is at issue here. A verification system also must work against attempts to evade a test ban. Such attempts would involve taking steps to hide an explosion: by lowering its yield, by masking the seismic signal, by concealing the nuclear test in a large chemical explosion, or by still other means. Let me cite one example in this regard. In his 25 February statement, Ambassador Gonsalves argues that existing seismological means are sufficient and that cheating would be too difficult, even statistically impossible. But how would seismic means ensure that nuclear

2 Document 19.

3 CD/PV.342, pp. 21-22.

explosions were not masked by large chemical explosions? Other approaches, such as on-site inspection, would also be needed.

In our view, it is important to continue work on the technologies and means of verification. We had a very useful contribution to this work in the seismic workshop sponsored last June by Norway. Closer to home, work is continuing in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. With regard to the GSE, I welcome the support for the continued efforts of this outstanding body expressed by Mr. Kornienko in his statement last Thursday.4

The nuclear-test-ban issue is one of long standing, as we all know. We hear statements in this body that the verification problem has been "solved", and we hear that because the problem has supposedly been solved, it is only a matter of "political will" that blocks the immediate initiation of multilateral negotiations to work out an agreement. If those who make this argument are suggesting that the United States is acting in a cavalier or capricious way, then they underestimate the seriousness with which my Government approaches this issue. In fact, it is because, in the United States view, the question of nuclear testing is directly related to our security and that of the Western alliance-through the role testing plays in the maintenance of a reliable nuclear deterrent, a deterrent made necessary by the hard facts of international life in our day-that our position on this issue is a careful and principled one.

The inseparability of the question of a nuclear-test ban from that of international stability and security extends as well to our unwillingness to enter a moratorium on nuclear testing. Our experience with simple, unverified declarative cessations of nuclear tests has not been encouraging. I have previously referred to the 1958-1961 period, at the conclusion of which the Soviet Union abruptly resumed its own testing programme with the detonation of some 40 explosions in the space of several weeks. It is clear that at the conclusion of a moratorium, testing can resume with full or increased intensity on the basis of preparations undertaken during the moratorium period. Moreover, it would be relatively easy, at a point when immediate testing objectives had been satisfied, to introduce a hiatus in testing on the assumption that the United States could not reciprocate. It also would be easy to include offers to apply verification measures that would in fact require careful and painstaking negotiation and application within a treaty framework.

What, then, should the Conference on Disarmament do about agenda item 1 at this time? I think that the answer is straightforward. It should take up work where it left off in 1983. It should respond to the proposal for a mandate, contained in document CD/521, under which an ad hoc committee should operate, a proposal which was offered in 1984 and which remains fully valid. We should not forget that that mandate was offered in response to the views expressed by others. It was a response that, so far as I can determine, was simply set aside. Thus, on the crucial point that appears to prevent further work-that of initiating negotiations now-setting aside the Western response had the predictable result of a deadlock. Deadlock is unfortunate. It has the readily apparent result: no progress in an area where important progress is possible.

4 Document 20.