alternatives for satisfying the military-related requirements, the President has decided that the candidate installations for these garrisons should include 10 additional Air Force bases. Information on these candidates will be provided in the near future. The President has also decided to develop the small intercontinental ballistic missiles, weighing approximately 37,000 pounds and carrying a single reentry vehicle, in hard mobile launchers in two basing modes. These modes are called hard mobile launcher at Minuteman facilities and hard mobile launcher in random movement. The initial operating capability for the small ICBM would be achieved in 1992 with the first systems positioned at Minuteman facilities at Malmstrom AFB, MT. After activation of the missiles in Montana, follow-on systems could be deployed at other Minuteman facilities at F.E. Warren AFB, WY (with locations extending into Nebraska and Colorado), and Ellsworth AFB, SD. Later missiles could be deployed in random movement on large tracts of government land located in the southwestern portion of the country. This could involve deployments at a Texas-New Mexico complex consisting of Ft. Bliss, White Sands Missile Range, and Holloman AFB, and at an Arizona complex consisting of the Luke Air Force Range and Yuma Proving Ground. Holloman AFB and Yuma Proving Ground would serve as main operating bases for the respective complexes. The total quantity of systems to be produced and the extent to which the missiles are to be deployed will be dependent upon the size of the Soviet threat and progress reached on arms control agreements. 241. Joint Statement by the Leaders of Six Nations: Preventing an Arms Race in Space, Ending It on Earth, and Eliminating Nuclear Arms, December 31, 19861 1. On the eve of the new year, we wish to call attention once again to the threat of nuclear war which would affect all the inhabitants of our planet. But we also wish to underline the opportunities which 1987 provides for agreements which can strengthen our common security. 2. At Reykjavik, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev came very close to reaching agreements which would have been historic in their sweep and significance. These could have paved the way for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. There was widespread disappointment that, although both leaders went far in initiatives and responses, these agreements foundered on differences over the space systems issue. 'CD/739, pp. 2-3. The statement was signed by Argentinian President Alfonsín, Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, Mexican President de la Madrid, Swedish Prime Minister Carlsson, and Tanzanian President Nyerere. 3. However, the Reykjavik meeting demonstrated that it is possible, given political vision and commitment, to go beyond old doctrines and to break new ground in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It is heartening that the proposals from Reykjavik are still on the table and have not been withdrawn. 1987 therefore provides an opportunity for the Soviet Union and the United States to agree on a number of important disarmament measures, including deep cuts in nuclear arsenals. We urge the leaders of these two nations to take advantage of that opportunity and to build on the understanding of Reykjavik, without any weakening of the commitments made there. As long as agreement is not reached, the nuclear arms race will ineluctably continue to escalate and the survival of all of us will become more and more precarious. 4. For these reasons, over the last two years, in Delhi, in Ixtapa and on other occasions, we have called for an immediate halt to nuclear testing, cessation in the production and development of all nuclear weapons, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. These priorities not only remain valid, but have assumed greater urgency in the light of recent developments. In this context, the problem of a balanced reduction in conventional forces in Europe must also be given appropriate attention. 5. In Ixtapa, we drew attention to the unfortunate and dangerous trend of erosion of existing treaties to suit the convenience of nations. We reiterate at this critical juncture that treaties, especially those relating to disarmament and arms limitation, should be honoured both in letter and spirit. We urge in particular the Government of the United States to reconsider its decision to exceed the SALT II ceilings. 6. We have noted the recently announced decision of the Soviet Union to terminate its unilateral moratorium and to resume nuclear testing following the first United States test in 1987. We regret this decision, which we hope is not irreversible. At the same time we recognize that there is still room for a bilateral moratorium. There is no justification for nuclear testing by any country. We appeal once again to the United States to reconsider its policy on nuclear testing so that a bilateral moratorium can be established. Our offer to help ensure adequate verification of such a moratorium remains valid. We are ready to start implementing it at any moment. 7. We have stressed that the development of space weapons would trigger off a new arms race of unprecedented scope and increase the danger of a nuclear war. Negotiations should focus on the elimination of nuclear weapons, rather than on programmes based on the assumption that nuclear weapons will threaten us all indefinitely. 8. In these closing days of 1986, we urge the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States to recommence comprehensive talks, as soon as possible in the new year, to fulfill their stated objective-to prevent an arms race in space and terminate it on earth and ultimately to eliminate nuclear arms everywhere. The entire international community expects them to live up to their obligations. 1 CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS Page Annual Report by President Reagan to the Congress on Nuclear 1 2 Television Address by President Reagan to the Soviet People, January 1, 1986....... 5 3 Television Address by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to the Statement by President Reagan on the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, 7 4 5 6 Statement by General Secretary Gorbachev, January 15, 1986...... 19 7 8 White House Statement on the Soviet Proposal, January 16, 1986 20 21 9 Delhi Statement by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and 10 Report From President Reagan to the Congress: Soviet Noncompliance 27 11 12 13 Address by the Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of Address by the U.S. Representative to the Conference on Confidence- Pravda Editorial: European Arms Control, February 4, 1986....... ........................................................ Page 17 Pakistani Paper Submitted to the Conference on Disarmament: Fact- 63 18 Statement by the French Representative (Jessel) to the Conference on 66 19 Message From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to the Conference on Disarmament, February 20, 1986 ..... 68 Statement by the Soviet First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs 70 Statement by President Reagan: The Soviet Proposal of January 15 and Report of the CPSU Central Committee Delivered by General Secretary 25 92 26 93 27 Joint Message From the Leaders of Six Nations to President Reagan and 93 28 28 Report of Specialists Appointed by UN Secretary General Pérez de 95 29 29 309 Statement by the Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany Letter From President Reagan to the Senate Majority Leader (Dole): Program Adopted by the Twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU 107 107 32 Address by the Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of 108 33 Reply by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to the Leaders of Six 115 ......... 34 Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Conference on 117 98 |