prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction;

4. Calls upon all States, pending the elaboration of such a convention, to cooperate in efforts to prevent the use of chemical weapons and in efforts to establish facts in cases of reports of such use, and to be guided in their national policies by the need to curb the spread of chemical weapons.

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and of their destruction,

Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,

Taking note of the Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by consensus on 26 September 1986, and in particular of article IX of its Final Declaration,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament,12 which incorporates, inter alia, the report of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons," and noting that following the precedents set in 1984 and 1985, consultations are continuing during the inter-sessional period, thus increasing the time devoted to negotiations,

Convinced of the necessity that all efforts be exerted for the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, 1. Takes note of the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1986 session regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons, and in particular appreciates the work of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on that question and the progress recorded in its report;

2. Expresses again none the less its regret and concern that notwithstanding the progress made in 1986 a convention on the complete and effective prohibition

"Part D was introduced in the First Committee by Poland at the 35th meeting, on November 6. It was sponsored also by 23 states, including Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, FRG, Greece, Japan, and the U.K. Both the First Committee and the General Assembly adopted it by consensus.

12

General Assembly: Official Records: Forty-first Session, Supp. No. 27 (A/41/27). 13 An excerpt of the report is printed in Document 155.

of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated;

3. Urges again the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its 1987 session, the negotiations on such a convention and to reinforce further its efforts by, inter alia, increasing the time during the year that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for this purpose with the 1986 mandate;

4. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session on the results of its negotiations.

227. General Assembly Resolution 41/59 J: Compliance With Arms Limitation and Disarmament Agreements, December 3, 19861

Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 40/94 L of 12 December 1985,2

Conscious of the abiding concern of all Member States for preserving respect for rights and obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law,

Convinced that observance of the Charter of the United Nations, relevant treaties and other sources of international law is essential for the strengthening of international security,

Mindful in particular of the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them,

Stressing that any violation of such agreements not only adversely affects the security of States parties but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and commitments stipulated in those agreements,

Stressing further that any weakening of confidence in such agreements diminishes their contribution to global or regional stability and to further

1 A/RES/41/59. This resolution is part J of resolution 41/59 entitled “General and Complete Disarmament". It was sponsored by Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark. France, FRG, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and the United States. It was introduced by the United States in the First Committee at the 26th meeting, on October 30, 1986. A revised version with a new seventh preambular paragraph was submitted on November 13 by the original sponsors plus three additional states (Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland). Both the First Committee and the General Assembly adopted it by consensus.

2 Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 917-918.

disarmament and arms limitation efforts and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system,

Recognizing in this context that, inter alia, full confidence in compliance with existing agreements can enhance the negotiations of arms limitation and disarmament agreements,

Believing that compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements by States parties is, therefore, a matter of interest and concern to the international community, and noting the role that the United Nations could play in that regard, Convinced that resolution of non-compliance questions that have arisen with regard to agreements on arms limitations and disarmament would contribute to better relations among States and the strengthening of world peace and security, 1. Urges all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions of such agreements; 2. Calls upon all Member States to give serious consideration to the implications of non-compliance with those obligations for international security and stability, as well as for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament;

3. Further calls upon all Member States to support efforts aimed at the resolution of non-compliance questions, with a view to encouraging strict observance by all parties of the provisions of arms limitation and disarmament agreements and maintaining or restoring the integrity of such agreements;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to provide Member States with assistance that may be necessary in this regard.

228. Statement by the Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) Before a Panel of the House Committee on Armed Services: Developments in the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks Since the Reykjavik Meeting, December 4, 19861

This morning, I will review briefly the developments over the past several months in the nuclear and space talks (NST). I will describe separately the developments in each of the three negotiating areas of INF, START, and defense and space, with reference to the status of each area prior to the Reykjavik meeting and its evolution during the Reykjavik and Vienna meetings. My statement will conclude with a brief description of where I think we should go from here.

The progress to date is significant. We have expanded the potential area of common agreement between our negotiating position and that of the Soviets. Yet, we still face a long, difficult task ahead. Much hard work remains, and important obstacles must be overcome in order to conclude arms reduction treaties that are

1

Department of State, Current Policy No. 906. Mr. Nitze spoke before the Defense Policy Panel.

in our national interest and that can be implemented. We must both nail down the details of the agreements that we have achieved in principle-for example, reductions in longer range INF missiles—and address issues that are only now maturing to a point where a serious dialogue is possible-for example, what strategic defense development and testing activities are permitted and prohibited by the ABM Treaty2 and the conditions under which the sides would agree not to exercise, for a period of time, their existing right to withdraw from that treaty on 6 months' notice.

During the coming months, the Soviet Union will take a full account of the state of U.S. executive-legislative branch relations, especially as it relates to arms control. The ability of the United States to negotiate worthwhile arms control agreements will continue to depend upon close cooperation, coordination, and consultation between the Administration and the Congress. This relationship should be based upon realistic expectations and assessments of the progress achieved and the remaining obstacles at each future step in the negotiations. We must reduce the degree to which different perceptions or views between the executive and legislative branches regarding the negotiations are taken by the Soviets as an opportunity to hold out for concessions or to create friction and delay.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

Our long-term policy goal with respect to longer range INF missiles is to eliminate this entire class of U.S. and Soviet weapons on a worldwide basis. Because the Soviets were unwilling to go that far at that time, the United States agreed at the 1985 Geneva summit to focus efforts on an interim agreement to reduce these missiles.

The United states set forth, at that time, a number of guidelines for such an approach. We required that both the United States and Soviet Union have equal rights and limits and that those limits be global in scope, owing to the range, mobility, and transportability of LRINF systems. We stated that we would not negotiate commitments regarding the independent strategic nuclear deterrents of third counties and that no compensation be afforded because of such thirdcountry systems. We ruled out reductions in dual-capable systems, to prevent degradation of NATO's conventional capabilities. Last, we required that any agreement be verifiable.

Pre-Reykjavik. As a result of the experts' meetings in Moscow and Washington last summer and the September meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the United States achieved several of these objectives. The sides agreed on an end goal of eliminating the entire class of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles. The sides agreed that, as an interim step, they would be prepared to limit the total number of warheads on LRINF missiles deployed in Europe to an equal level above zero. Both sides were also prepared to agree to equal global limits on the number of LRINF missile warheads. Discussion during this period focused on five issues: the specific numbers for numerical limits,

2 For the text of the Treaty, see Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 197–201.

Asian deployments, deployment mix, shorter range INF, and the duration of the agreement.

The Soviet Union proposed reductions to a level of 100 warheads in Europe but offered only a freeze on SS-20s deployed in Asia; that would have left a global residual or more than 600 SS-20 warheads. The United States suggested in the experts' meetings that the limit be set at 200 warheads for each side worldwide, with no more than 100 warheads in Europe.

The United States reiterated that LRINF warheads deployed in Asia should be reduced proportionately and concurrently with those in Europe but that a reduction to equal levels in Europe and Asia could also be acceptable if the specific level was agreeable to the United States. Although the Soviets refused to agree to any reductions of SS-20s in Asia, or even to specify existing levels, they stated that they would "limit" the number of LRINF warheads deployed in Asia.

The Soviets proposed that the LRINF missile mix after reductions in Europe include only GLCMs on the U.S. side and SS-20 ballistic missiles on the Soviet side. The United States said that the mix between U.S. GLCMs and Pershing II ballistic missiles could be discussed further, but that Pershing II missiles must constitute a part of the U.S. force.

The sides agreed on the need for constraints on SRINF missiles. The United States insisted that this issue be resolved concurrently with the establishment of ceilings on LRINF missiles. The Soviets argued that the SRINF issue could be resolved after agreement on LRINF reductions.

The United States insisted that an interim agreement on INF should remain in effect until superseded by a later agreement providing for further reductions— and should not be a "temporary" measure of short duration as the Soviets suggested.

Reykjavik. The Reykjavik meeting created considerable movement in the substantive areas of INF, although there was no closure on the major areas of concern. The President and General Secretary agreed to eliminate U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Europe. Worldwide deployments would be limited to 100 warheads on each side, with Soviet missiles deployed in the Asian U.S.S.R. and U.S. deployments limited to U.S. territory.

With regard to SRINF missiles, the Soviets proposed to freeze SRINF deployments at the current level and to address their reduction in a subsequent negotiation. The United States agreed to a ceiling at the present Soviet level on Soviet SRINF and to the proposal for follow-on negotiations on SRINF missile reductions but demanded a right to equal SRINF missile deployments.

Movement on verification also occurred in Reykjavik. Although the discussion was not detailed, there was Soviet agreement to the U.S. proposal that an effective verification package must include a comprehensive exchange of data before and after reductions, onsite inspection of the elimination of weapons, and effective onsite monitoring of the remaining INF systems and associated facilities.

Since the Reykjavik meeting, the Soviets have attempted to relink progress in INF to progress in the defense and space negotiations, reversing their position of