There is no need to repeat that chemical weapons represent a real threat, since along with nuclear weapons, they are the only weapons of mass destruction currently in the arsenals of States. The Soviet Union has consistently advocated the prohibition and complete elimination of these weapons and regards this objective as entirely realistic. For many years now, the Conference on Disarmament has been negotiating a ban on chemical weapons. These negotiations have dragged on far too long and we see it as our task to ensure that they are successfully completed in 1987. Have the necessary pre-conditions for doing so been met? I sincerely believe that they have. Negotiations have already gone beyond the stage of identifying and comparing positions. The time has come to take decisions. The work that was done during the 1986 session at the Conference on Disarmament to produce a relevant international convention has, in our view, been useful. We managed to make some headway in working towards agreement on key provisions of a convention, and the positions of States have been brought closer together on some issues that only a short time ago seemed insoluble. A not inconsiderable contribution to those positive results was made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In amplifying the fundamental provisions of the statement by Mikhail Gorbachev on 15 January 1986, the Soviet Union last April submitted at the Conference a broad proposal for the elimination of the production base for the manufacture of chemical weapons.' We expressed our willingness to notify in good time the location of chemical-weapons production facilities and the halting of production of such weapons, as well as our readiness to embark, shortly after the relevant convention enters into force, upon the elimination of stockpiles of chemical weapons. All this would be carried out under strict control, including international on-site inspection. In putting forward these proposals, the Soviet Union took into account the views and concern of many States and accommodated their wishes. Many of the participants in the negotiations have pointed out that the progress achieved at the Conference on Disarmament this year was made possible, in no small measure, by the introduction of those proposals. That does not, however, mean that all the problems relating to work on a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons have now been solved. One of the most difficult of the problems still to be resolved is the question of the non-production of chemical weapons in the commercial, namely, civilian, chemical industry. Although that problem has long been under consideration at the negotiations, and although useful seminar was held in the Netherlands this summer on that subject, no sign of a solution has yet been glimpsed. In the circumstances, and having analysed the situation in the negotiations, the Soviet Union has decided to make the following proposal. In our view, a compromise solution to the problem of the non-production of chemical weapons would be facilitated if all chemicals were to be divided into four categories, each having a different régime governing limitation and verifi 2 Document 5. 3 Document 64. cation. There would also be special categories for super-toxic lethal chemicals possessing properties characteristic of agents for chemical warfare, as well as chemicals that are key components of binary chemical systems and super-toxic lethal chemicals produced for permitted purposes-for example, for medical, pharmaceutical and other purposes. Depending on the degree of danger posed by various chemicals and their possible diversion to weapons purposes, and depending too on the volume of production of such chemicals, international inspections could take various forms: the permanent presence of international inspectors, systematic inspections or individual, on-site challenge inspections. In light of the particular danger posed by multipurpose production facilities that can be used for manufacturing chemical warfare agents, particularly the key components of binary chemical systems, those facilities should be subject to a special régime. We express the hope that these new Soviet proposals will make it possible in the very near future to reach agreement upon the relevant provisions of a convention, taking into account as they do the views of other States as well as the extent to which the problem has already been explored at the negotiations. However, the Soviet Union makes no claim to a monopoly in introducing compromise proposals at the talks. We are prepared to listen carefully to the opinions of all States and to consider proposals strictly on their merits, regardless of who the sponsors may be. In this connection I should like to refer to the fact that for many years, the problem at the negotiations of developing the procedures for on-site challenge inspections acceptable to all States has constituted the stumbling block. On the one hand, the United States and its allies have been unwilling to agree to our position that such inspections should be conducted on a voluntary basis. On the other hand, many States, including the Soviet Union, could not accept the United States proposal for a so-called open invitation because it was unrealistic. A whole series of attempts have been made to work out a compromise approach but, unfortunately, they have been to no avail. Now, it appears that such an approach has been found. We suggest that the proposal submitted last summer at the Conference on Disarmament by the United Kingdom delegation* be used as a basis for reaching mutually acceptable procedures for on-site challenge inspections. Since we are most desirous to reach agreement as soon as possible on one of the most important questions of any future convention, we believe that the United Kingdom proposal could form the basis for a compromise solution, provided, of course, that it is properly elaborated. If that approach is acceptable to the United States and other parties to the negotiations, a way would thus have been found to reach agreement. With regard to the work of elaboration to which I just referred, we believe that consideration should be given the question of how to formulate, in as clear a manner as possible and based on the United Kingdom proposal, the criteria that would determine the exceptional circumstances that would, on the one hand, allow us the initiation of a challenge for inspection and, on the other, would allow a rejection of such a challenge. It is our belief that, with respect to challenge inspection, the decision should be made by the Executive Council by a two-thirds majority. That approach would 4 Document 127. be the most democratic. We believe that no one should make any claims to exclusive rights here, because chemical weapons are a threat to all. Our efforts in the field of chemical disarmament are not, however, confined to these proposals. We would like to see concrete measures taken now to facilitate the earliest possible conclusion of a convention. In this connection the Soviet delegation has been instructed to state that, as a step towards the elimination of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union would be prepared to agree to declare, together with the United States, a mutual moratorium on the production and deployment of chemical weapons, on the understanding, of course, that such a moratorium would be comprehensive and would cover binary chemical weapons as well. We hope that that proposal will not be found unacceptable by the United States, since, according to statements by United States officials, the United States does not at the present time produce chemical weapons. The Soviet Union sees an alternative to the manufacture of the means of chemical warfare in an expansion of international co-operation to develop a peaceful chemical industry. It is our conviction that as many States as possible should participate in such cooperation regardless of their social and economic systems or their level of development. Of course, the broadest possibilities for such co-operation would be opened up as a result of banning chemical weapons and freeing the resources devoted to them for peaceful and creative purposes. We are convinced that the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones in Central Europe and the Balkans-which is the objective of the well-known initiatives of the Governments of the German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Republic of Romania3-would also help to rid our planet of chemical weapons more quickly. However, we should not overlook what is hampering negotiations by creating particular barriers to the development of an effective system for verifying full compliance with a future convention. I am referring to the dangerous United States plans to start manufacturing a new generation of chemical weapons, namely, binary weapons, and deploying them in Western Europe. In the light of the efforts of the Soviet Union to achieve the earliest possible agreement on an international convention prohibiting all types of chemical weapons and providing for their total elimination, those United States plans seem particularly unjustified. We call upon the United States, instead of preparing for the production of new sophisticated types of chemical weapon, to engage responsibly in the work of achieving an international convention which would once and for all remove the chemical threat. Unfortunately, the United States has not as yet demonstrated such a responsible approach at the negotiations. The United States position has been frozen at the 1984 level. Since that time the United States has not made a single concrete proposal and has not budged an inch to accommodate the positions of other participants in the talks. One cannot help wondering whether the United States is not deliberately acting in this way so as to prevent any 5 See Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 601-602, 821-822. convention from seeing the light and to start up binary weapons assembly lines regardless of any other considerations. The Soviet delegation calls on the General Assembly to speak out resolutely in favour of the earliest possible conclusion of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons-we would hope as early as 1987-and to call for the prevention of a new round of a chemical arms race. We are confident that by taking such a decision the General Assembly would be living up to the hopes that have been placed in it by the peace-loving peoples of the world. Today we would like to touch upon one more issue. Recently the United Socialist Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany took a new important initiative in the field of disarmament. They drafted and presented principles for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe. This initiative is based on the recommendations of the Palme Commission and provides for the establishment in Central Europe, on the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor 150 kilometres wide on each side of the border between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Treaty countries. We wholeheartedly support that new joint initiative of the United Socialist Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany and believe that its constructive substance convincingly demonstrates the ability to achieve concrete disarmament agreements when new, realistic approaches to the problem of security prevail despite differences in political philosophy. 210. News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Shultz Following His Meeting in Vienna With Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze [Extracts], November 6, 19861 We came here well prepared to build on the results of Reykjavik. We are also prepared to be patient in doing so, as we must be, since the rhythm and pace of this negotiation cannot be forced by either side. I cannot report the kind of progress we would like, but we will continue to work for progress in all areas of our extensive agenda with the Soviet Union. I have just concluded over 5 hours of talks with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, including about 3 hours of private time. The meetings dealt with all four areas of our agenda. The U.S. purpose in coming here was to confirm and build on the results of Reykjavik. We brought along our top experts so we could have the kind of intensive discussions that have brought progress over the last few months. The experts met last night for more than 3 hours. I can't say that the meetings have moved arms control matters along in any significant way, and I regret this. We did move along in other areas, and I'll review them. Documents on Disarmament, 1982, pp. 233–236. We had extensive discussions about nuclear arms control. Since Reykjavik, our objective has been to build on the results of Reykjavik and translate them into action at Geneva. In fact, the United States has already been doing this by formally incorporating the Reykjavik results into our negotiating positions at Geneva. Thus, we came to Vienna prepared to confirm the progress made at Reykjavik. In addition, there are still some very important areas of disagreement in each of the three negotiating areas of Geneva-START [strategic arms reduction talks], INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces], and defense and space. We came there hoping to discuss these differences, to clarify them, and, if possible, to narrow them. In other words, we came prepared to move forward. We brought our arms control experts, and we had prepared papers covering each of the major nuclear arms control subjects. These papers reflected areas of agreement, and where there were differences, we stated clearly our positions and our understanding of the Soviet positions. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to move ahead as we had hoped. These issues will continue to be pursued by our negotiators in Geneva, who will continue explaining the new U.S. proposals reflecting the progress in Reykjavik. To maintain momentum, we also proposed that the U.S. and Soviet experts get together between the nuclear and space talks rounds-the current one will end early next week and the next one won't start until January—so we proposed that experts get together as they did last summer between rounds and see if they can make some progress as they did last summer. That offer is on the table. We suggested language that would permit initiation of negotiations on nuclear testing. The Soviets didn't seem to be interested. The Foreign Minister and I discussed conventional arms control and chemical weapons. I emphasized that progress in these areas was a necessary complement to progress in reducing nuclear arms. I also pointed out a key to existing negotiations on both subjects was verification. And, we are still waiting for a serious Soviet effort to address our proposals in this regard. We gave them a package which set out what we believe was agreed at Reykjavik and where there are differences, set forth our position and our understanding of their position. On START, the point of departure is the agreement at Reykjavik to 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers. There would be no more than 6,000 warheads on these systems. That was agreed. We repeated the counting rule for bombers that was worked out at Reykjavik. Now, the next step which we proposed is to add sublimits to this framework. We proposed sublimits of 4,800 ballistic missile warheads, 3,300 ICBM warheads, and 1,650 warheads on permitted ICBMs except those on silo based, lightand medium-ICBMs with six or fewer warheads. These numbers represent substantial movement in the direction of the Soviet position. These reductions would be carried out in a phased manner and completed by the end of 1991. We also put forward verification ideas that were discussed and agreed in principle in Reykjavik. These call for a comprehensive exchange of data, on-site |