196. Congressional Conference Report on the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1987: Matters Relating to Arms Control [Extract], October 14, 19861 TITLE X-MATTERS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS ADOPTED SALT II compliance (sec. 1001) The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 1210) that would express the sense of the Senate that the United States should continue voluntary compliance with the central numerical sublimits on delivery systems of the strategic offensive arms agreements with the Soviet Union, provided that the Soviet Union complies with those sublimits. The House amendment contained a provision (sec. 1061) that would deny funds to deploy weapons in excess of the numerical sublimits in the SALT II agreement unless the President certified that the Soviets had exceeded these sublimits. The conferees agreed to accept non-binding language that incorporated the sense of the Senate provision in the Senate bill, and the definitions of the numerical sublimits in the House amendment. The House recedes with an amendment. Nuclear testing (sec. 1002) The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 1230) stating it was the sense of the Congress that the President should request advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty3 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosives Treaty and that he should propose to the Soviet Union immediate negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty. The House amendment contained a provision (sec. 3036) that would prohibit funds from being spent on nuclear tests above one kiloton yield for one year starting January 1, 1987 unless the President certified that the Soviets had conducted a nuclear test above one kiloton after January 1, 1987, or had refused to accept and implement verification measures. The House recedes. The conferees took this position in light of the October 10, 1986 letter from the President giving his commitment to take two important steps limiting nuclear testing. First, he pledged to inform General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik that as a first order of business for the 100th Congress, if the Soviet Union will, prior to 1 Congressional Record, October 14, 1986, pp. H10325-H10326. 21.e., the interim agreement of 1972, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 202 ff., and the SALT II Treaty of 1979, printed ibid., 1979, pp. 189 ff. 3 Printed ibid., 1974, pp. 225–229. 4 Ibid., 1976, pp. 328-332. the initiation of ratification proceedings in the Senate next year, agree to essential TTBT/PNET verification procedures which could be submitted to the Senate for its consideration in the form of a protocol or other appropriate codicil, he will request the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the TTB and PNE treaties. However, if the Soviet Union fails to agree to the required package of essential procedures prior to the convening of the 100th Congress, he will still make ratification of these treaties a first order of business for the Congress, with an appropriate reservation to the treaties that would ensure they would not take effect until they are effectively verifiable. He will work with the Senate drafting this reservation. Second, he pledged to inform the General Secretary in Reykjavik that, once our verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties have been ratified, he will propose that the United States and the Soviet Union immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program-in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons-of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing. Military impact statement by the joint chiefs of staff on United States noncompliance with existing strategic offensive arms agreements (sec. 1003) The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 1220) that would require the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to submit to Congress by October 1, 1986, classified and unclassified versions of a report on matters related to a U.S. policy on noncompliance with existing strategic offensive arms agreements. It would also withhold funds for JCS studies and analyses pending receipt of the report on October 1, 1986. The House bill contained no similar provision. The conferees agreed to adopt a modified version of the Senate bill, changing the date the report is due to October 15, 1986 in order to accommodate to the date of enactment of the fiscal year 1987 Defense Authorization Act. Sense of Congress expressing support for a central role for nuclear risk reduction centers (sec. 1004) The House amendment contained a provision (sec. 1027) expressing support for the President's willingness to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union establishing Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and recommending that the U.S. center be assigned a central role in the coordination of federal risk reduction activities. The Senate bill contained no similar provision. The Senate recedes with an amendment. The conferees strongly support the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center initiative and agree that the U.S. center should be the the locus of U.S. nuclear risk reduction activities specified in any agreement that may emerge from the ongoing negotiations with the Soviet Union. The conferees amended the language of the House amendment to make clear that, if an agreement with the Soviet Union establishing the centers is reached, the responsibilities of the U.S. center should include making recommendations to the President's National Security Advisor regarding additional risk reduction arrangements that might be proposed to the Soviet Union in any future negotiations on this subject. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS NOT ADOPTED Strategic arms agreements The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 1211) that would express the Sense of the Senate that, consistent with international law, it is not in the U.S. national interest to continue to comply with any strategic arms agreements that the Soviet Union is violating. The House amendment contained no similar provision. 197. White House Statement: The Meeting in Reykjavik, October 15, 19861 General Secretary Gorbachev's report to the Soviet people was unprecedented in its detail.2 He emphasized the same areas of progress upon which U.S. officials have commented over the past 2 days, namely, strategic arms reductions and potential agreement on intermediate nuclear forces. He also clearly indicated, just as we have done, that the sticking point which prevented an overall agreement in Iceland was the Soviet Union's demand for an end to the U.S. program on strategic defense. It is our view that the agreements and positions reached in Iceland remain on the table. The meetings, which reconvene in Geneva today, will begin where we left off in Iceland. The Iceland talks were a very important and significant step in moving negotiations forward. We want to build upon the groundwork of Reykjavik. We take note of some of the political rhetoric in the General Secretary's speech, but that was expected and unexceptional. What was remarkable was General Secretary Gorbachev's explanation of the progress made. We are pleased to note that, both at his press conference in Reykjavik3 and his address to the Soviet people, General Secretary Gorbachev stated that the work that was done in Reykjavik will not go to waste, and the way has now been cleared for further movement towards significant arms reduction. That is our view. We believe we can go forward from this moment in a businesslike way. We must listen to each other, each explore the views of the other, and seek common 1 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, October 20, 1986, p. 1388. The statement was read by Larry M. Speakes, Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President, to reporters assembled in the Briefing Room at the White House. 2 Document 195. 3 Document 192. approaches and agree on solutions. We think that goal was accomplished at Reykjavik and should be the goal whenever we meet. We, like the General Secretary, believe that the meeting overcame obstructions and minute details and that new approaches have been developed. We believe there is no going back on what was developed at this meeting, and we look forward to continued negotiations which will build on the progress achieved in Reykjavik. 198. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1987; Matters Relating to Arms Control [Extract], October 15, 19861 TITLE X-ARMS CONTROL MATTERS SEC. 1001. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO SALT II COMPLIANCE (a) Continued ADHERENCE TO SALT II Numerical SublIMITS.—It is the sense of the Congress that it is in the national security interests of the United States to continue voluntary compliance with the central numerical sublimits of the SALT Il Treaty as long as the Soviet Union complies with such sublimits. (b) Definition.—For purposes of this section, the central numerical sublimits of the SALT II Treaty include prohibitions on the deployment of the following: (1) Launchers for more than 820 intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles. (2) Launchers for an aggregate of more than 1,200 intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles carrying multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles. (3) An aggregate of more than 1,320 launchers described in paragraph (2) and heavy bombers equipped for air-launched cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. SEC. 1002. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS ON NUCLEAR TESTING (a) FINDINGS.-The Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States is committed in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 19633 and in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. Congressional Record, October 14, 1986, pp. H10185-H10186. 2 Printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1979, pp. 189 ff. 3 Ibid., 1963, pp. 291-293. 4 * Ibid., 1968, pp. 461-465. (2) A comprehensive test ban treaty would promote the security of the United States by constraining the United States-Soviet nuclear arms competition and by strengthening efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (3) The Threshold Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty was signed in 1976, and both have yet to be considered by the full Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. (4) The entry into force of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty will ensure full implementation of significant new verification procedures and so make completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty more probable. (5) A comprehensive test ban treaty must be adequately verifiable, and significant progress has been made in methods for detection of underground nuclear explosions by seismological and other means. (6) At present, negotiations are not being pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union toward completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. (7) The past five administrations have supported the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible date, the President should (1) request the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification (with a report containing any plans the President may have to negotiate supplemental verification procedures, or if the President believes it necessary, any understanding or reservation on the subject of verification which should be attached to the treaty) of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, signed in 1974 and 1976, respectively; and (2) propose to the Soviet Union the immediate resumption of negotiations toward conclusion of a verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty. In accordance with international law, the United States shall have no obligation to comply with any bilateral arms control agreement with the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union is violating. SEC. 1003. REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON UNITED STATES NONCOMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AGREEMENTS (a) IN GENERAL.-The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit to Congress a report containing a detailed assessment of (1) the military consequences to the United States of a policy decision by the United States to discontinue compliance with the major provisions of existing strategic offensive arms limitations agreements (including central numerical sublimits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in the SALT II accord) would have on the security of the United States; and (2) the likely military responses of the Soviet Union to such a policy decision. (b) MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED.-The assessment required by subsection (a) shall focus on what the likely Soviet military responses would be during the period between 1987 and 1996. In making such assessment, the Chairman shall specifically consider the following: (1) The effect on the ability of United States strategic forces to accomplish their nuclear deterrent mission (including the effect on the survivability of United |