that, since the approval of binary weapon production, the pace of the negotiating effort in Geneva has picked up.

In brief, the clear preference of the United States, as of all NATO members, is to ban all chemical weapons rather than to build new ones. The US Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament has thus received instructions to try to speed up the pace of negotiations. Furthermore, it should be recalled that at the November 1985 Geneva summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, the two sides agreed to "accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention" on chemical weapons. As part of this process, the US and Soviet delegations in Geneva have held a series of bilateral discussions since November 1985 on outstanding issues relating to the draft convention, and have particularly focussed on ways of achieving mutuallyacceptable solutions to difficult technical problems.

State of negotiations

Negotiations this year in the Ad Hoc Committee have been carried out under the leadership of Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom, who has served as the Committee's chairman. These negotiations are built on what is by now a substantial investment of effort on the part of many countries to elaborate an agreement.

It should be noted that the role of the Western states in the Conference has been a very positive one. In April 1984, Vice President Bush, on the specific instruction of President Reagan, tabled in the Conference the United States proposal for a draft convention. In addition to the important contributions made by the United Kingdom, Canada held the Committee chair in 1983; Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany have chaired working groups of the Committee; the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands have hosted workshops to study verification techniques; and numerous working papers have been introduced by many Western delegations.

The convention's primary provision will be a prohibition on the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. Additional provisions will require the destruction of all existing stocks of chemical weapons and the facilities which produce them. These fundamental obligations have now largely been accepted by the states negotiating in the Committee.

In addition to these basic undertakings, a number of additional provisions are envisaged to verify compliance with the convention. These include routine onsite inspection to verify declarations on the composition and location of stockpiles, and the destruction of stockpiles and production facilities. Also, monitoring provisions, including some on-site inspection, are being developed to ensure that the chemical industry does not produce chemical weapons. Finally, a series of measures are envisioned to ensure that other questions concerning possible instances of non-compliance are rapidly answered. Important among these is the right of one state to request an immediate on-site inspection to verify another's

4 Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 866–870.

5 Ibid., 1984, pp. 269–299.

compliance. With regard to these provisions, it is clear that considerably more work will be required.

The Soviet Union has essentially accepted the Western proposals for the declaration, monitoring and destruction of chemical weapon production facilities, including international on-site verification procedures. Extensive work was carried out this year to turn this broad agreement into articles of the draft convention, but final agreement on detailed provisions has not yet been achieved. The Soviet Union has also shown a greater willingness to discuss how on-site inspections of the destruction of chemical weapons would be accomplished. Drafting of provisions on this subject has also begun.

As has already been mentioned, the Netherlands has hosted a workshop, in June of this year, to demonstrate procedures for monitoring the chemical industry to ensure that it is not used to produce chemical weapons. In addition, Australia has reported on an experimental inspection undertaken by a number of technical experts. With this impetus, work has begun on drafting procedures for chemical industry monitoring, particularly the monitoring of chemicals in widespread commercial use.

There remain three issues of major importance: (1) the declaration and monitoring of chemical weapons stockpiles; (2) measures to monitor civilian production of the most dangerous classes of compounds; and (3) the resolution of questions concerning compliance through on-site 'challenge' inspection. Solutions in all three of these problem areas are required before the draft convention would have a basically acceptable structure. Unfortunately, the position of the Soviet Delegation in each of these areas is either incomplete, inadequate or both.

Declaration and monitoring of stockpiles

An effective chemical weapons convention must require the prompt declaration of the composition and location of chemical weapons stockpiles in existence at the time the convention enters into force, as well as on-site inspection to confirm the declaration and to ensure that the stockpiles remain inactive until they are destroyed. It has been agreed that the composition of stockpiles should be declared promptly and in detail. Useful work was also accomplished in 1985 in developing a format for such declarations. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union continues to insist that the initial declaration of stockpile locations need not be made at an early stage; rather, it believes there should be a series of declarations phased over the destruction period. This is a flawed position because it does not provide any means for verifying either the accuracy and completeness of the initial declaration of the composition of stockpiles, or that the declared stocks are not moved as destruction progresses.

Civilian production of chemicals

A workable means of ensuring that civilian chemical industries are not being misused for chemical weapons production in violation of the convention's provisions will clearly be an important element. It is noteworthy that Western countries with advanced chemical industries have taken the lead in promoting the

need for effective monitoring, and in presenting concrete proposals to accomplish it. The United States has also been encouraged by General Secretary Gorbachev's acceptance of the concept of on-site inspection in arms control agreements, and by indications by the USSR that such a regime could be applied to monitoring the chemical industry. Nevertheless, Soviet delegates at the CD have not responded positively to Western proposals for random surprise inspections as the best means of monitoring the industrial production of the relevant chemicals. On-site monitoring consisting only of visits announced long in advance would be entirely inadequate, as any evidence of violation could simply be removed prior to the arrival of the inspectors.

Equally unworkable is the Soviet concept of limiting the production of a number of commercially-produced chemicals to a single national production facility, with a production limit of one ton per year. A number of these chemicals have legitimate commercial use, particularly in pharmaceuticals and agriculture. Their production in industry can be effectively monitored with no danger to the convention and without unnecessary restrictions. This is a reasonable approach, and the United States hopes the Soviet Union will eventually see it as such.

Challenge inspection

Challenge inspection provisions would allow a state harbouring suspicions about another's activities to call for an on-site inspection. But as challenge inspection would be the safety net providing the back-up to the other elements of the verification system, it would presumably seldom, if ever, be employed. Indeed, its primary function would be to serve as a deterrent to actions in violation of the convention. But if it is to assume this role, challenge inspection must be based on procedures which, if it were necessary to use them, would constitute an effective means of detecting and identifying potential violators. A deterrent that does not deter is less than worthless-it could even encourage violations.

The United States approach to challenge inspection is based on the principle that such inspections, of facilities where violations are likely to occur, must be granted. However, several states have raised concerns that this concept, if too widely applied, could cause legitimate national secrets to be compromised. The United States shares that concern, but it believes that inspection techniques, and other methods of safeguarding such information, can be devised to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. It believes that this risk is small in any case when weighed against the value to international security of the assurance that chemical weapons have been eliminated.

It is unfortunate that much of the debate on challenge inspection has tended to draw attention away from the critical concept of effectiveness. It is here that the United States believes the solution lies. The US has made it clear that Article X, the mandatory challenge inspections provision in the draft convention introduced by Vice President Bush in 1984, was not presented on a take-it-or-leaveit basis. Indeed, the United States is prepared to entertain any proposal which meets the criterion of effectiveness at the same level as the proposal contained in Article X.

Recently, the United Kingdom has introduced a proposal which embodies the concept that a state has a stringent obligation to prove its compliance if a question

about it should arise." The UK approach is a constructive one, but the Soviet Union has yet to comment on it in detail. Apparently, the Soviet Delegation continues to cling to its unpopular and unworkable 1982 proposal that challenge inspection should, in the final analysis, be voluntary. The USSR has hinted on a number of occasions that it may be ready to modify this view, but as yet no tangible counterproposals have been made.

Interim measures

As negotiations continue in the CD on a comprehensive ban, United States. concern about the dangerous spread of chemical weapons, a danger already discussed in this article, has prompted another effort to cope with this problem. Western nations have intensified monitoring of their chemical industries to ensure that chemicals being produced in the West for legitimate purposes are not being used elsewhere to produce chemical weapons. Export controls have been adopted for the most dangerous of these chemicals, and others have been placed on a 'watch list' for further monitoring.

The United States recognizes that these measures cannot by themselves prevent the spread of chemical weapons, but experience has shown that the measures, combined with diplomatic efforts, can at least hinder their spread. Such solutions are, of course, not optimal. It is imperative that work continue so that a comprehensive multilateral convention, that will outlaw once and for all the possession of chemical weapons, will rapidly be achieved.

As a suggestion for an interim measure short of the comprehensive ban, the East has proposed the creation of a chemical weapons free zone in Europe. The NATO member states, however, have clearly recognized the adverse security implications of a regime that would remove Soviet weapons no farther than to Soviet soil. These weapons could still rapidly be brought to bear on Western forces in the zone; thus an approach such as this clearly cannot remove the chemical weapons threat to NATO countries.

In addition, verifying that such a zone is and remains free of chemical weapons would be even more difficult than verifying a comprehensive ban. The United States has recently tabled a study in the CD's Chemical Weapons Committee that shows that a significant stockpile-500 tons of chemical agents- could easily be moved within a day or two. A verification system that would assure Europe that stocks could not be clandestinely moved to and from Soviet soil would be far more intrusive than that contemplated for the comprehensive ban.

From the point of view of the United States Delegation in Geneva, any serious negotiations on a chemical weapons-free zone would draw resources away from the negotiations on a comprehensive ban. There is nothing useful in slowing down the work in Geneva to attempt something that might give a false sense of security but in truth would not eliminate the threat of chemical warfare for NATO countries.

6 Document 127.

7 Documents on Disarmament, 1982, pp. 379–381.

8

See Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 601–602 and 821-822.

Conclusion

There has been some movement this year toward the conclusion of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban. But the progress has been painfully slow, and major issues must be resolved before final agreement is possible. In past years, the progress recorded in 1986 might have been sufficient for modest satisfaction. But the reasons for achieving a ban are now more pressing and the United States cannot be content with the results thus far achieved.

The taboo against the use of chemical weapons is breaking down. If the dangerous spread of these weapons continues, the effort to ban them will become even more difficult. The United States hopes that, responding to the sense of urgency imparted by the developments taking place in the chemical weapons field, the negotiations in Geneva will rapidly result in an effective convention that will finally rid the world of the scourge of these terrible weapons.

185. Twenty-first Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Confidence-Building Measures [Extract], October 1, 19861

The signatories to the Helsinki Final Act are required by the act's Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament to give prior notification of "major military maneuvers exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components." Notification is required for maneuvers that take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating state and must be made 21 days or more in advance of the start of the maneuver. The notification "will contain information of the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the maneuver, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, and the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct. The participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces."

In addition, signatories are encouraged to engage in other confidence-building measures (CBMs) on a voluntary basis. These voluntary CBMs include the invitation of observers to maneuvers and prior notification of major military movements and of exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops.

As noted earlier, signatories adopted a more ambitious and mandatory set of confidence-and security-building measures (CSBMs) at the Stockholm CDE,

1 Department of State, Special Report No. 154, p. 13.

2 The arms control portions of the Final Act may be found in Documents on Disarmament, 1975, pp. 304–308. For the complete text see Department of State Bulletin, vol. LXXIII, No. 1888 (September 1, 1975), pp. 323–350.