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seek agreement on requiring IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities in a non-nuclear-weapon state as a condition for any significant new nuclear supply commitment.

President Reagan reaffirmed his commitment to the importance of these nonproliferation guidelines, along with the similar commitment of General Secretary Gorbachev of the USSR in the joint statement issued after their November summit meeting. The relevant portion of the joint statement reads:

General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan reaffirmed the commitment of the USSR and the U.S. to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and their interest in strengthening together with other countries the non-proliferation regime, and in further enhancing the effectiveness of the Treaty, inter alia by enlarging its membership.

They note with satisfaction the overall positive results of the recent Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The USSR and the U.S. reaffirm their commitment, assumed by them under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty.

The two sides plan to continue to promote the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to support the activities of the Agency in implementing safeguards as well as in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

They view positively the practice of regular Soviet-U.S. consultations on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which have been businesslike and constructive and express their intent to continue this practice in the future. In his opening statement to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in Geneva on August 28, 1985, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Kenneth Adelman reaffirmed the basic commitment of the United States to the principles contained in that Treaty. He described the NonProliferation Treaty as a "tremendous success", and noted that "the United States remains firmly committed to the objectives embodied in this Treaty, and to its vision of a more stable and secure world for all nations." Mr. Adelman went on to describe U.S. actions which have reinforced our support of the Treaty, which include:

-Since the 1980 Review of the Treaty we have tightened our export procedures to make it even less likely that any U.S. exports would contribute to the risk of proliferation. We have also worked with other NPT suppliers to update the "trigger lists" created to help parties meet their obligations under Article III."

5 Ibid., 1985, p. 868.

6

INF/CIRC/209 (September 3, 1974) and Add. 3, Add. 3/Mod. 1, Mod. 1, Mod. 2, and Mod. 3. ACDA Director Earle's statement to the Review Conference may be found in Documents on Disarmament, 1980, pp. 367–374.

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-We have urged all nuclear suppliers to agree to require comprehensive or
full-scope safeguards on all of a non-nuclear-weapon state's peaceful
nuclear activities as a condition for significant new supply commitments.
-The U.S. has now implemented the safeguards agreement that permits
routine inspections of U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities. The IAEA now has
the right to apply safeguards on over 230 of our private and government-
owned nuclear facilities. We welcome inspections at these facilities
selected by the IAEA as a means to demonstrate U.S. support for effective
safeguards, and urge others to do likewise.

-Finally, in 1981 the U.S. ratified Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco
which creates a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Latin America.8 By this act
we have pledged not to store or deploy nuclear weapons in U.S. territories
in the zone. We had earlier ratified Protocol II of the Treaty, thereby
committing the United States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against parties to the Tlatelolco Treaty. We are now studying the new draft
treaty for a South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone with interest and
an open
mind."

Among the specific activities and accomplishments of the United States government in the non-proliferation area during 1985, the following deserve particular mention:

The Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held in Geneva from August 27-September 21, 1985. The conference concluded successfully with the adoption by consensus of a Final Declaration which reaffirmed the support of the parties for the NPT and their belief in its importance to international peace and security. The conference also strongly endorsed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its system of international nuclear safeguards. The parties expressed disappointment in the Final Declaration that more progress had not been made toward achieving the disarmament goals of Article VI, but this did not lessen the expressions of support for the NPT as a whole. The successful conclusion of the NPT Review Conference strongly serves U.S. non-proliferation and security interests, and reinforces non-proliferation as an essential international norm. 10 An agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with the People's Republic of China was signed at Washington on July 23 by U.S. Secretary of Energy John S. Herrington and Chinese Vice-Premier Li-Peng." Following completion of the statutory Congressional review periods the agreement was brought into force on December 30, 1985. In addition, the President signed into law P.L. 99-183, relating to peaceful nuclear cooperation with China. Peaceful nuclear coopera

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Secretary of State Haig's statement upon depositing the instrument of ratification may be found ibid., 1981, pp. 616-617.

"The text of Mr. Adelman's address may be found ibid., 1985, pp. 550–557. The Treaty to which he refers appears ibid., pp. 471-483. The protocols, which were being revised when he spoke, are printed post, Document 145.

"Ibid., pp. 419-428.

10 For the text of the Final Declaration of the Review Conference, see Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 641-659.

tion with China under this agreement can be expected to advance the worldwide non-proliferation objectives of the United States, enhance overall U.S. political relations with China, and benefit U.S. economic and commercial interests.

The process of negotiating the agreement with China had important implications for strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. China's decisions to join the IAEA and to adopt a policy of requiring IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states were significant steps. China's statement that it will refrain from assisting any other state to develop nuclear weapons is further evidence of the evolution of its non-proliferation policy. 12 During 1985, the United States continued the series of bilateral discussions on non-proliferation matters with the Soviet Union initiated as a result of an agreement between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko in the autumn of 1982. Two rounds of discussion were held during the year-in Helsinki in April and in Washington, D.C. in October. The U.S. and the Soviet Union have a common interest in non-proliferation which the periodic discussions have served to clarify. Both sides have discovered more areas of agreement than disagreement, and it is expected that this quiet but useful dialogue will continue.

The United States continued its efforts during the year to encourage wider adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Eight states formally adhered to the NPT in 1985 bringing the number of parties to 131. The eight new NPT adherents are: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Bhutan, Brunei, Guinea, Kiribati, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the Seychelles. The NPT remains the most widely adhered-to arms control agreement in history and continues to be an exceptionally important instrument for ensuring peace and stability in the world community.

During 1985 the United States continued to provide the fullest possible support for the IAEA and its safeguards system, a fundamental element in both U.S. nonproliferation policy and in international nuclear commerce generally. Recognizing that IAEA inspection capabilities must keep pace with advancing nuclear technology, the United States, through its Program of Technical Assistance to Safeguards, continued its extensive contribution to improving and strengthening the technical means of applying adequate safeguards.

In 1985, the members of the NPT Exporters Committee ("Zangger" Committee) expressed their agreement to update the entries on the trigger list of items for the supply of which IAEA safeguards are required. In July of this year, they agreed to revise the trigger list for items for nuclear fuel reprocessing. Together with the updated trigger list for items related to gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, this represents a substantial improvement in the multilateral control regime for sensitive technologies.

The United States also continued its efforts during the year related to a nuclear export problem of potential future significance: the need to assure that those nations which are only now entering the international nuclear market as suppliers will apply the same kind of stringent export controls as those developed by current suppliers over the past two decades. If these “emerging suppliers" fail to

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adopt responsible export policies, the current regime could be badly eroded. During 1985, the U.S. raised the emerging supplier issue with a range of other nations, including both current and future nuclear exporters. These contacts made an important contribution to alerting other nations to the problem and provided information about how responsible nuclear export policies can be effectively implemented.

As noted in previous reports in this series, President Reagan has stated that the United States will not inhibit civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development in countries with advanced nuclear programs that do not pose a proliferation risk. In keeping with this policy, the United States has been discussing with Japan and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) advance, long-term arrangements on reprocessing and plutonium use in the context of new or amended agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation. These discussions are expected to continue in 1986.

The new agreement for nuclear cooperation with Finland, which was initialed on June 20, 1984, was signed in Washington on May 2, 1985. Congressional review has been completed, and it is expected that the agreement will be brought into force in 1986.13

As in the past, a small but significant number of countries continued during 1985 to pose a real proliferation risk. The United States sought to inhibit these states and others from obtaining nuclear explosives through a wide range of political, economic and security instruments. The U.S. resorted to control and, where necessary, denial of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, and continued close consultations with other nuclear suppliers, urging similar prudence and restraint in their own nuclear export policies. The United States remains determined to maintain stringent nuclear export controls so that U.S. nuclear cooperation does not increase the risk of proliferation. Special priority is accorded to restricting sensitive nuclear activities in regions of instability and proliferation concern, such as the Middle East and South Asia. At the same time, the U.S. has not ignored, and will not ignore, the legitimate needs of developing countries that wish to share in the peaceful benefits of the atom. The U.S. will continue to ensure, bilaterally and through the IAEA, that such benefits are made available on a reliable basis to countries that share our non-proliferation goals.

2. Television Address by President Reagan to the
Soviet People, January 1, 19861

Good evening. This is Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of
America.

13 Had not entered into force as of May 1988.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, January 6, 1986, pp. 4-5. The address was recorded in Los Angeles on December 28 for broadcast in the Soviet Union January 1.

I'm pleased to speak to you on the occasion of the New Year. This is a time for reflection and for hope. As we look back on the year just concluded and on the year that is to come, I want to share with you my hopes for the New Year, hopes for peace, prosperity, and good will that the American and Soviet people share. Just over a month ago, General Secretary Gorbachev and I met for the first time in Geneva. Our purpose was to begin a fresh chapter in the relations between our two countries and to try to reduce the suspicions and mistrust between us.

I think we made a good beginning. Mr. Gorbachev and I spent many hours together, speaking frankly and seriously about the most important issues of our time: reducing the massive nuclear arsenals on both sides, resolving regional conflicts, ensuring respect for human rights as guaranteed under international agreements, and other questions of mutual interest.

As the elected representative of the American people, I told Mr. Gorbachev of our deep desire for peace and that the American people do not wish the Soviet people any harm.

While there were many areas which we did not agree, which was to be expected, we left Geneva with a better understanding of one another and of the goals we each have. We are determined to build on that understanding in the coming months and years.

One of the most important things on which we agreed was the need to reduce the massive nuclear arsenals on both sides. As I have said many times, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought; therefore, we agreed to accelerate negotiations where there is common ground to reduce and eventually eliminate the means of nuclear destruction.

Our negotiators will soon be returning to the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms, where Mr. Gorbachev and I agreed we will seek agreements on the principle of 50-percent reductions in offensive nuclear arms and an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear systems. And it's my hope that one day we will be able to eliminate these weapons altogether and rely increasingly for our security on defense systems that threaten no one.

Both the United States and Soviet Union are doing research on the possibilities of applying new technologies to the cause of defense. If these technologies become a reality, it is my dream that, well, to one day free us all from the threat of nuclear destruction.

One of the best ways to build mutual understanding is to allow the American and Soviet peoples to get to know one another better. In Geneva we signed a new agreement to exchange our most accomplished artists and academics. We also agreed to expand the contacts between our peoples so that students, teachers, and young people can get to know each other directly. If people in both countries can visit, study, and work together, then we will strengthen the bonds of understanding and build a true foundation for lasting peace.

I also discussed the American people's strong interest in humanitarian issues. Our democratic system is founded on the belief in the sanctity of human life and the rights of the individual-rights such as freedom of speech, of assembly, of movement, and of worship. It is a sacred truth to us that every individual is a unique creation of God, with his or her own special talents, abilities, hopes, and dreams. Respect for all people is essential to peace, and as we agreed in Geneva,

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