It is time to cut the Gordian knot and find a way out of the impasse. The European aspect of the Soviet nuclear disarmament plan proposes just such a bold, radical solution.

It is a question of achieving and implementing, in the first stage of the plan's implementation, a decision on the total elimination of the Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in the European zone-both ballistic and cruise missiles. And it is a question of doing this as a first step on the path toward the complete liberation of Europe from nuclear weapons.

The exceptional importance of this proposal both for Europe itself and for the whole world is obvious.

"If it was possible, without delay and without weighing the matter down with other problems, to eliminate Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles on our continent," M.S. Gorbachev noted, "We would, perhaps, have untied one of the most complex knots in present world policy and, to a considerable degree, cleared the way for a radical reduction in nuclear weapons and finally, their complete elimination."

In the European salient also, the Soviet initiative defines clear routes, guidelines, and concrete time frames. It takes into account the arguments and concepts put forward by the other European nuclear powers and the nuclear realities on our continent in general. In this connection many West European and also, in part, U.S. commentaries note not only its constructive nature, but also its genuinely innovative approach to the problem and practical suitability for attaining the great goal of liberating European soil from nuclear weapons.

There are precise time frames for the first step along this path. The elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in the European zone should take place within the period provided for by the first stage of the Soviet plan. And the relevant medium-range should be not merely “removed," but specifically destroyed. This would, therefore, be a real, cardinal measure toward nuclear disarmament in Europe, as a result of which there would be several hundred fewer missiles and more than 1,000 fewer of the corresponding charges here and indeed, in the world as a whole!

An important feature of the Soviet plan is that at the first stage it is oriented, first and foremost, toward the Soviet Union and the United States. Neither the French nor the British nuclear forces are included in the "Soviet-U.S. list" [vedomost].

However, it would be logical, in the course of resolving the question of eliminating medium-range missiles, for the United States to make a commitment not to deliver strategic missiles or medium-range missiles to other countries and for Britain and France not to build up their corresponding nuclear arms.

It is no secret that the nuclear potential of France and Britain is increasing rapidly. Given radical reductions in the corresponding Soviet and U.S. arms, this potential would account for an even more substantial "share" in the general balance of forces, particularly the European balance. As The Washington Post observed the other day, "as the number of nuclear missiles belonging to all the nuclear powers comes closer together, it will become increasingly difficult to claim that the British and French deterrence potentials are small, special forces with no influence on the overall correlation of forces."

Official statements that France and Britain will be prepared to join in the nuclear disarmament process only after a substantial reduction in the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States are well known.

In view of this it is proposed that other countries begin to reduce their nuclear arms only at the second stage, after the Soviet Union and the United States have reduced-and not merely substantially, but radically, by half-their nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territory. Moreover, under the Soviet proposal, the reduction in the other countries' nuclear arsenals would begin with the destruction of tactical weapons at the second stage, while those nuclear arms which they themselves describe as strategic would be destroyed only at the third stage, simultaneously with the completion of the elimination of the Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals.

The Soviet program for Europe as a whole is drawn up in such a way that its implementation would not be detrimental to anyone's security at any stage. That is its great strength.

Europe is the common home of all the peoples inhabiting it, including the Soviet people. We have a vital interest in ensuring security and good-neighborliness there. Soviet efforts to eliminate the main-nuclear-threat on the continent are particularly persistent. Setting an example of goodwill, the Soviet Union unilaterally removed the SS-20 missiles additionally deployed in the European zone from operational readiness and dismantled the corresponding fixed installations for these missiles. The proposal made earlier by the Soviet Union to free Europe entirely from both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons remains valid.

During the Soviet top-level visit to France last October an important proposal by the Soviet Union was made public. It is aimed at facilitating an accord on the speediest mutual reduction of medium-range nuclear means. It provides for the possibility of concluding a corresponding agreement separately, unconnected with the problem of space and strategic arms.3

It was then that the Soviet Union voiced its readiness for a direct discussion with France and Britain about nuclear affairs. The idea of an interim agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe was discussed at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva, when points of contact in this sphere were detected. What we have here is a broad panorama of ideas, proposals, and approaches advanced by the Soviet Union to resolve the fundamental problem of European security. It attests to the sincerity and earnestness of our intentions.

There is no doubt, however, that the proposal to liquidate the Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in the European zone is now assuming special significance. Given the sides' corresponding will, it can easily be implemented in practice. Having nothing to do with the U.S. "zero option," it does not infringe upon the sides' security interests and takes into account the wishes of the West European countries, above all, that a possible accord should embrace all the SS-20 missiles capable of hitting targets on West European territory. So the way to an accord is open in practice. The first step toward freeing the European

Continent from nuclear weapons now depends only on the position and the political will of the other side.

The European aspect of the Soviet plan has excited minds on our continent. The novelty, importance, and significance of these proposals have been publicly recognized in almost all West European capitals. "The questions touched on in the package of Soviet proposals," FRG Foreign Minister H.D. Genscher declared, "not only concern the United States, but equally, and in many cases far more directly, concern Europeans. Recall, for example, the question of mediumrange missiles..."

However, the clear and honest idea is being undermined. Citing "U.S. officials," the newspaper Newsday, for example says that the Soviet action is motivated by a desire to "drive a wedge between the United States and its chief allies." And trans-atlantic sources are used to intimidate West Europeans by claiming that "in the absence of U.S. nuclear missiles Europe will be left to the mercy of the huge Soviet land army" (although, in reality, approximate equilibrium exists between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in this branch of the armed forces). The "argument" is also used that, having liquidated its missiles in the European zone, the Soviet Union could “easily and quickly" transfer them there from the country's distant Asian regions. If we adopt this logic, then the Americans could even more easily and quickly transfer their Pershing-2's to Western Europe, since they are delivered there by air from the United States even now. What we see here are blatant attempts to use "provisos" to drag out an important matter and bring it to a standstill.

However, we must not delay today. In order to halt the arms race once and for all and shift the course of international events to the path of peaceful development, it is necessary to act, and to act without delay, for everyone to act— governments, parties, peoples. The proposal to liquidate medium-range missiles in Europe makes it possible to carry out a very important action in this direction and to advance the building of European security.

All conditions now exist on the European Continent for overcoming the disunity between East and West, particularly on questions of security and mutually advantageous cooperation. Europe is perfectly capable of giving its own "European answer" to the challenge of the time.

We would like to hope that Washington will objectively study and weigh the proposal for the liquidation of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles as the first step toward freeing the European continent from nuclear weapons. What is needed is a serious and businesslike reply, in order to begin drawing up the corresponding accord in practice. The peoples of Europe await it and it would benefit world security.

14. Letter From ACDA Director Adelman to the Congress Submitting the Fiscal Year 1987 Arms Control Impact Statements, February 5, 19861

On behalf of the President of the United States, I am submitting the Administration's classified and unclassified documents entitled fiscal year 1987 Arms Control Impact Statement (ACIS) pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2576, as amended. The Fiscal Year 1987 budget cycle marks the 11th year in which arms control impact statements have been submitted to the Congress. This year the ACIS has been reformatted as a single document containing the usual in-depth analyses of major weapons programs meeting the statutory requirements for an impact analysis, as well as having a new and comprehensive section on U.S. arms control policy. The new ACIS documents also contain an arms control treaty annex for reference purposes, and, as provided in previous years, abbreviated analyses on programs which have not received in-depth analyses for reasons indicated therein.

The Administration has concluded that while some defense programs will require continuing review, all of the programs analyzed in the fiscal year 1987 budget are consistent with current U.S. security and arms control policy. The specific programs planned to be carried out during fiscal year 1987 are also consistent with the terms and provisions of existing arms control agreements.

15. Message From President Reagan to the Congress Transmitting the Annual Report on Nuclear Nonproliferation, February 6, 19861

I have reviewed the activities of United States Government departments and agencies during the calendar year 1985 related to preventing nuclear proliferation, and I am pleased to submit my annual report2 pursuant to section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-242).

The report concludes that the United States during 1985 continued to make significant progress in its efforts to achieve its non-proliferation goals.

As I stated in my message to the third Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, my central arms control objective has been to reduce substantially, and ultimately to eliminate, nuclear weapons and rid the world of the nuclear threat. The prevention of the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries is an indispensable part of our efforts to meet this objective. I intend to continue my pursuit of this goal with untiring determination and a profound sense of personal commitment.

'Fiscal Year 1987 Arms Control Impact Statements . . . (99th Cong., 2d sess.; S. Prt. 99-147), April 1986, p. v. The letter was addressed to the President of the Senate (Bush) and the Speaker of the House of Representatives (O'Neill).

'Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, February 10, 1986, pp. 180–181. 2 Document 1.

16. Message From Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Cook Islands Prime Minister Davis: South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, February 11, 19861

In accordance with the request, contained in your message of November 8, 1985, to meet for consultations an official delegation of the South Pacific Forum in Moscow on February 3 and 4, 1986, the exchange of views with the forum delegation concerning the treaty providing for the nuclear free zone in the South Pacific region and the draft protocols 2 and 3 enclosed to it has taken place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

These consultations have taken place in an important period in mankind's history when the question whether the peoples manage to stop the slipping of the world down to nuclear catastrophe is of the foremost priority. Mankind is faced with the choice between survival and annihilation.

In the preamble of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty it is justifiably stated that "... all countries have an obligation to make every effort to achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the terror which they hold for humankind, and the threat which they pose to life on earth."

The fact that all the peoples of the world, including those in the South Pacific, demonstrate their deep concern with the growth of the threat of nuclear war is another proof that the task of prevention of the nuclear catastrophe has in reality become of universal importance.

The Soviet Union constantly demonstrates by practical deeds its readiness to do the utmost in order to prevent a nuclear war and to save civilization. The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev in a statement January 15, 1986 offered the concrete, practicable within a historically short period of time-the next 15 years-step-by-step programme of complete elimination of nuclear weapons-the main threat to life itself on earth— conditioned on a simultaneous ban on space strike weapons.3

In essence the Soviet programme provides for the transformation of the whole world into a single nuclear free zone. Specifically, within the scope of the programme the Soviet Union has announced the extension until March 31, 1986 of its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, put into force on August 6, 1985, the 40th anniversary of the Hiroshima tragedy. Such a decision offers the United States and other nuclear powers one more chance to adhere to the path of realism, to join in this initiative, the significance of which is evident to practically everyone in the world.

Clearly, adopting such a decision was by no means simple for the Soviet Union but the level of responsibility was too great for us not to try every possibility of influencing the position of others through the force of example. The cessation of all nuclear tests is an effective measure in order to solve the task of top priority—

'ACDA files.

2For the texts of the treaty and its protocols, see Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 471-483. For the revised protocols, see post, Document 145.