large contingents of troops and air forces are transferred to Europe from overseas. They are accompanied by a broad mobilization of human and material resources. Thus, the Autumn Forge exercise of NATO forces which will be also conducted this year involves up to 300,000 troops, approximately 4,000 tanks, 2,000 aircraft and 300 naval ships. The exercise covers the entire territory of Western Europe (from North Cape to the southern coast of Turkey) and the adjoining sea area. In the course of this exercise with the entire duration of over 2 months they practice plans of preparing and conducting the initial period of war with the use of conventional, chemical, and nuclear weapons, test new weapons and hardware and various methods of warfare. Suppose that a similar exercise would be conducted by the Warsaw Treaty organization at the same time? The situation in Europe in such periods would become critical.

We are convinced that such exercises are not required for normal training of troops and naval forces. These exercises are used as a means of military pressure. We do not conduct such exercises. Given the dangerous destabilizing nature of such exercises, the demand of most countries that major exercises must be significantly limited is quite legitimate.

There is also obviously the problem of covering the U.S. territory with confidence-building measures. We are speaking of it in terms of the future. It concerns directly or indirectly Europe. Military activities with respect to the European continent of one of the participants in the conference which possess the biggest armed forces become frequently unpredictable. The noncoverage by confidence-building measures of U.S. military activities on its territory becomes dangerous and puts at a disadvantage the other participants in the Stockholm Conference. The recent statement of the U.S. Administration on the final session of the Stockholm Conference referred to usefulness of confidencebuilding measures, to their contribution to the predictability of the military situation in Europe depends to a large extent on the predictability of U.S. action, their readiness to cover with confidence-building measures their own military activities, in particular, major maneuvers of the armed forces.

If maneuvers of troops near the Volga River and the Urals are subject to notification and verification, legitimate thoughts come to people's mind as to why the same activities are not verified near the Missouri River and Cleveland.

Avoiding this issue under various pretexts the United States seek at the same time to put under control and day-to-day training of subunits and units of land forces in areas of permanent location in the form of the so called "out-of-garrison activities." What lies behind the "out-of-garrison activities" concept? The substance of the U.S. position, upon close scrutiny, on this question means control for the state of units and subunits when they are engaged in combat training in areas of permanent location.

In order to achieve agreement on notification of any type of military activities it is necessary to define clearly what specific military activities will be subject to notification and, accordingly, verification. The "out-of-garrison activities" concept for notification or its modification, that of "outside permanent locations", provides no solution to the problem. It contains many leeways for abuse and interference into the internal affairs of states and thus cannot serve as the criterion for notification. We can say with even greater justification that the out-of

garrison concept is incompatible with inspections. Inspection must have a concrete address, i.e., maneuvers, movements, and transfers of forces which are subject to notification.

The Soviet Union is prepared to agree to any reasonable verification measures promoting the limitation of the arms race and confidence-building among countries. Obviously, verification is not an end in itself. Its scope and methods depend on the character and volume of concrete agreements regarding measures of disarmament and confidence-building.

Any attempts to portray things in such a way as if the USSR is against inspections and hence it is impossible to agree on any real disarmament steps constitute a deliberate lie. We accept the widest possible inspection to terminate nuclear testing. By the way, when we raised this question in this fashion in negotiation it turned out that our counterparts were simply being cunning: they made out of the verification problem an artificial obstacle covering up for their unwillingness to give up nuclear testing. We are ready to accept inspection in solving the problem of banning and completely eliminating chemical weapons. The Warsaw Treaty member states envisaged on-site inspections in their proposals regarding the reduction of the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. In brief, the verification problem does not exist. The USSR is agreeable to various forms of verification, including international ones. We confirm this here, at the Stockholm Conference, as well in solving questions of verification of confidence-building measures.

Of course, we regret that our most active interlocutor on the inspection issue among the participants in the conference while speaking in favour of "openness of all military activities in Europe" puts its own territory outside verification. It seems likely that in this case there is a desire to open ("make transparent") Europe to the Urals and close its own military activities.

Despite this the Soviet Government deemed it possible to agree to inspections in order to verify confidence-building measures. The USSR is doing so guided by the desire to make progress in the consideration of the questions at the conference and to conclude it by concrete results. Obviously, we believe that inspections must not be turned into an intelligence gathering instrument, i.e., they must not diminish anyone's security. Specifically, the USSR considers that each state participating in the Stockholm Conference could allow the conduct of onsite inspections on its territory within the European continent based on the quota of one to two inspections per year on requests from other participating states, if suspicions arise regarding compliance with confidence-building measures which will be negotiated.

The inspection area specified in the request of an inspecting state forms an important element in this scheme. It should be an area where a notifiable military activity takes place troops or operational and tactical exercises, movements, transfers of forces, and exercise- and movement-related concentrations of forces outside areas of permanent locations above a notifiable level. In order not to diminish security of the inspected state requests should not claim the conduct of inspections in closed areas or in military and defense installations with restricted access. At the same time we act on the assumption that such closed areas will be defined as applied to an agreement on verification of compliance with CSBMs.

Naturally, the number and extent of these closed areas should be kept within reasonable limits, i.e., they should be so as to assure compliance with agreements reached at the conference. They should not include areas where notifiable military activities take place.

There are still divergencies at the conference regarding methods for inspection: NATO countries, in particular, insist on air inspection.

I'll be frank; to us military men, inspection from the air has been a traditionally difficult question since the "open skies" doctrine proclaimed by President Eisenhower. At that time, as is known, no agreement was reached to this effect. However, time moves us to new frontiers, requires new political and military approaches to questions of ensuring peace and cooperation, confidence and security in the entire world and especially in Europe.

With this understanding and taking into account the situation at the Stockholm Conference we could think of adopting an air/ground version of on-site inspection on the clear understanding that inspections would be carried out from transportation vehicles and aircraft provided by the inspected state. In our view, delegations could consider it at the conference. Such are constructive proposals of the USSR and other socialist countries aimed at achieving agreements on the major issues of the conference. Our steps are dictated by the peaceful policies of the Soviet Union and follow from the defensive nature of our military doctrine.

Unfortunately, the conference is still proceeding slowly and there remain many unresolved issues, although time is running out. It would seem appropriate to come to grips with all the questions under discussion without putting anything off till the end of the conference so that it would complete its work on September 19 by adopting substantial agreements.

We count on a reciprocally constructive approach of all the participants in the conference. In so doing we assume that the problem of security today is our common problem and hence our common concern and our common responsibility. It would seem that this truth is evident to all. However, the work for detente, enhanced stability, and confidence in the world takes place in difficult circumstances. On the one hand, the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests has been in force for the second year; we have declared and put on the negotiating table in all fora our constructive proposals to achieve mutually acceptable agreements on arms limitation. Forces working for peace have intensified their efforts throughout the world. On the other hand, there exists a direct and open refusal to terminate nuclear testing, stubborn commitment to the arms race, opposition to peace initiatives, and disregard for the peoples' concerns about the dangerous course of events in the world.

In these circumstances it is very important to conclude the Stockholm Conference positively. The main significance of this fact would be that there would be made an important step for the better in European affairs and in international life in general.

4 Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, pp. 486-488.

159. Letter to Senator Quayle From a Deputy Negotiator (Cooper) for the U.S. Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks: Interpretation of the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty With Respect to Future Systems, August 29, 19861

As you requested, I am writing to provide the substance of our conversation last week regarding my perception, based on our negotiations since March 1985, of the Soviet views on the restraints on development and testing of "future technologies" under the ABM Treaty. I trust these thoughts will be useful to you in your discussion with your colleagues in the Senate.

The March 1985 Soviet proposal (which is still on the table) included a ban on the development, testing and deployment of so-called "space-strike arms." The Soviets have defined "space-strike arms" to include all space-based ABM systems and components, all space-based weapons capable of attacking targets in the atmosphere and on Earth's surface, and anti-satellite (ASAT) systems of all basing modes. (Notably they left our [out] ground-based ABM systems, which have been the focus of most of their ABM research, development and deployment activities.)

Their proposed ban on the latter two categories (i.e., space-to-earth weapons and ASATs) clearly went beyond existing international commitment. But their proposed ban on space-based ABM systems at first puzzled us because it seemed redundant with existing U.S.-Soviet obligations under Article V of the ABM Treaty. (They did propose to ban all "scientific research" as a part of development, which went beyond the ABM Treaty, but we never took that as a serious proposal.)

Light was shed on this puzzle last year by an intensive internal review of the ABM Treaty negotiating record. During our second round, we began to draw upon the record to refute Soviet charges regarding the legitimacy of the SDI program under the ABM Treaty. Following these initial discussions with the Soviets in the second round, a very comprehensive review was undertaken in Washington between the second and third rounds, and during the third round. That review led to the conclusion that the Soviets never agreed to include ABM systems based upon "other physical principles" in the Article V prohibition. The only limitation on such ABM systems and components agreed to by the Soviets was included under Agreed Statement D which prohibits deployment without negotiation and amendment to the Treaty, but not development and testing of such systems and components.

As Ambassador Gerard Smith makes clear in his book, “Double Talk," the Soviets opposed all limitations on future ABM systems. (See attached excepts.3) Indeed, the earliest versions of the draft Treaty tabled by both sides were understood by both sides to apply to only then-current technologies. After the

U.S. Government decided (following substantial internal debate as described by Ambassador Smith) to seek limitations of "future" ABM systems as well, the U.S. Delegation pursued that objective with diligence. Just as diligently, the Soviets opposed the U.S. objective. Careful study of the record shows that neither side was totally successful, and both sides were partially successful, in achieving their objectives. The U.S. objective of a limitation on ABM systems based on "other physical principles" was achieved, and that limitation was embodied in Agreed Statement D.4 Ambassador Smith points to this achievement with legitimate pride in his book. (See p. 344 in the attached excerpts.) But he did not get everything he wanted; the record shows that the Soviets did not accept Article V to apply for substitute “devices” for ABM components (i.e., ABM interceptors, ABM launchers, and ABM radars) in spite of the U.S. negotiators' best efforts to get them to do so.

In this light, we now understand that the inclusion of all space-based ABM systems and components in the March 1985 Soviet proposal to ban "space-strike arms" was not redundant with prohibitions under the ABM Treaty—as we first thought in March 1985. Furthermore, I believe the Soviets probably had believed since 1972, that the ABM Treaty permitted development and testing of other than fixed land-based ABM systems composed of ABM interceptors, ABM launchers and ABM radars. This was their "half-a-loaf” in 1972. Some of my conversations with my Soviet counterparts, prior to the U.S. public announcement of the results of our comprehensive review tends to confirm this view. Since then, the Soviets have adopted a uniformly contrary view. This is understandable, because our decision to constrain the SDI program to be consistent with our previously held view of the terms of the Treaty puts them in the best of all worlds. The U.S. has legitimized the "broader interpretation" for them, if there was any doubt, while continuing the narrow restraints on activities under the U.S. SDI program. Their public position is no doubt intended to provide pressure to help perpetuate this situation.

I want to emphasize again that I believe our Negotiating Group, because of our dialogue with the Soviets in Geneva, stimulated the study by Defense, State and ACDA last summer and fall. The study was not undertaken out of the blue to "torpedo the Treaty" as some have suggested. It was a logical consequence of our negotiations. Indeed, the absence of negotiations on strategic defenses since 1972 was probably the reason why this was the first time such a comprehensive study of the negotiating record was undertaken. This is itself a rather startling fact.

From my personal study of the 1972 negotiating record and the 1972 ratification hearings, I believe what happened was simply that many on the U.S. side believed they achieved their negotiating objective of including ABM systems based on "other physical principles" under the Article V prohibitions. I believe the Soviet negotiators probably returned to Moscow believing they had agreed to limit deployment of such systems, but that they had a partial victory in not prohibiting their development and testing. I have no doubt but that if we had

4 Printed as Agreed Interpretation E in Documents on Disarmament, 1972, p. 206.