toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. It further obligates each Party not to transfer to any recipient, and not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire such agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery.

The Geneva Protocol (1925) prohibits "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, material or devices...." It also prohibits "the use of bacteriological methods of warfare."

The BWC contains no obligation to declare possession or destruction of prohibited agents and equipment but only to destroy or divert them to peaceful purposes within nine months of entry into force of the Convention. The Soviets never formally acknowledged possession or destruction of prohibited items. They have stated only that they are in compliance with the provisions of the BWC.

The U.S. has formally presented its case regarding Soviet involvement in provision and use of toxin weapons in two unclassified reports to the UN and to the public (Department of State Special Report 98 of March 1982;21 and Special Report 104 of November 1982.22) These reports presented a comprehensive summary of the information, evidence, and an analysis of results the U.S. had obtained on the use of toxins and other chemical warfare agents by the Soviets in Afghanistan and by the Lao and Vietnamese, under Soviet supervision, in Laos and Kampuchea.

The evidence included refugee reports and the identification of the toxins in victims' blood and in samples from attack sites but not in control samples from either people or areas not subjected to a toxic attack. There are also refugee accounts of Soviet technicians supervising the shipment, storage, filling, and loading onto aircraft of the toxin munitions in Southeast Asia. The first physical evidence of direct Soviet use of toxin weapons in Afghanistan resulted from analysis of a contaminated Soviet gas mask acquired from Afghanistan in 1981. In August 1983 the U.S. submitted to the UN further evidence of toxin use as revealed in chemical analysis of blood taken from victims of "yellow rain” attacks.23 The U.S. submission to the UN in February 1984 summarized preliminary findings for 1983 regarding the use of chemical and toxin agents in Asia.24 The Soviets responded with a "scientific paper" presented to the UN,25 which had undertaken an investigation of the charges of use of lethal chemical and toxins in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. The Soviets contended that Fusaria spores originated from natural contamination of the elephant grass in Vietnam caused by U.S. use of Agent Orange, and that these spores were carried by prevailing winds into Kampuchea and Laos, causing natural contamination of the environment and subsequent illness among alleged victims. This Soviet explanation is not plausible.

Explanations of the presence of toxins in Southeast Asia as natural contamination of pollen-laden bee feces or other naturally occurring phenomena are not

supported by the accumulated intelligence data and scientific scrutiny. These alternative hypotheses do not, for example, take into account a large body of other evidence, including eyewitness reports of planes releasing clouds of agents and of artillery bombardment with agent-filled shells that produced trichothecene symptoms, and the findings of toxin in samples not containing pollen. Also, the occurrences of "yellow rain” have been limited to war zones; if natural occurrence theories were correct, other people throughout the region would be affected. No such phenomenon has been observed.

In addition to evidence concerning chemical and toxin weapon use, we have much evidence of the continuation of an aggressive biological weapons production and development program by the Soviet Union. The apparently accidental release of anthrax from a Soviet biological warfare facility in Sverdlovsk in 1979 probably resulting in the deaths of several hundred people is a reminder of the danger of this program. The Soviets have apparently also engaged in research on advanced genetically engineered biological agents.

During 1985, we have been unable to confirm any lethal chemical and toxin attacks in Kampuchea, Laos or Afghanistan according to our established standards of evidence (i.e., two or more corroborating reports from different sources). However, there were a number of reports, although diminished in number, of chemical attacks. These reported non-lethal agents have not yet been identified. Chemical, biological and toxin weapons have major military implications. The effect of comparatively primitive chemical weapons was demonstrated as early as World War I, when there were 90,000 deaths and 1,000,000 casualties from chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union has a prohibited offensive biological warfare capability which we do not have and against which we have no defense. This capability may include advanced biological agents about which we have little knowledge. Evidence suggests that the Soviets are expanding their chemical and toxin warfare capabilities in a manner that has no parallel in NATO's retaliatory or defensive program.

Finding

The U.S. Government judges that ongoing Soviet activities confirm and strengthen the conclusion that the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

Allegations concerning the use of lethal chemicals or toxins in Kampuchea, Laos, or Afghanistan have subsided in 1985. However, prior to this time, the Soviet Union was involved in the production, transfer and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan in violation of its legal obligation under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY

The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)) is a multilateral treaty that

entered into force for the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963. Soviet actions not in accord with this Treaty are violations of a legal obligation.

Underground Nuclear Test Venting

The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 (LTBT) prohibits nuclear weapons test "or any other nuclear explosion" in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. While not banning tests underground, the Treaty does prohibit nuclear explosions that cause "radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control" the explosions were conducted.

During hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prior to ratification of the Treaty, Dr. Seaborg, then Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), stated that "the Treaty would prohibit a test which resulted in a quantity of radioactive debris delivered outside of the country's territorial limits in amounts sufficient to establish that such contamination resulted from a recent test within that country."

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Since late 1963, many Soviet underground nuclear tests have been detected by the U.S. On numerous occasions the U.S. collected, outside the territorial limits of the USSR, atmospheric samples of radioactive matter unambiguously associated with some of these Soviet nuclear tests.

Soviet test practices are apparently designed to minimize the cost of testing at the price of radioactive release into the atmosphere in many Soviet tests. There is no unambiguous evidence of instances of venting associated with Soviet nuclear testing in 1985.

Finding

The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices have resulted in the venting of radioactive matter on numerous occasions and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of its legal obligation to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union has failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances despite U.S. demarches and request for corrective action.

THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

Nuclear Testing and the 150-Kiloton Limit

The Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, referred to as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) prohibits underground explosions with yields exceeding 150 kilotons (kt). The intent of the TTBT was to reduce significantly the explosive force of the new nuclear warheads and bombs that

26 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-eighth Congress, First Session, on Executive M, 88th Congress, 1st Session . . . August... 1963, p. 206.

could otherwise be tested for weapon systems. The TTBT was signed in July 1974.

The TTBT is a treaty signed by the negotiating Parties but ratified by neither. However, neither Party has made its intentions clear not to become a Party. As such, both signatories are subject to the obligation to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT. A single test which intentionally exceeded 150 kt could defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT. In 1976 the signatories each separately announced their intention to observe the TTBT limit.

Between 1976 and December 1985, the Soviets conducted about 190 underground nuclear explosions. The seismic data from each of these explosions has been carefully examined. The seismic data from the totality of explosions has been subjected to statistical analysis. Additional information relevant to the assessment of the Soviet nuclear test program has been analyzed. While there remains uncertainty with regard to the actual yields of Soviet nuclear devices tested, the estimated yield has exceeded 150 kt in a number of instances.

The TTBT states that compliance with it will be verified by national technical means. National technical means include but are not limited to seismometers. The Protocol to the Treaty requires, upon ratification by both Parties, an exchange of geological information on the designated nuclear test areas and explosion calibration information, including yields, for each of these areas. There are no provisions for verifying the accuracy of the data to be provided by each Party. The U.S. has repeatedly proposed discussions on verification improvements that might ultimately lead to effective verification but the Soviet Union has thus far rejected all such U.S. efforts.

Soviet testing at yields above the 150 kiloton limit would allow development of advanced nuclear weapons with proportionately higher yields than the yields of weapons that the U.S. could develop under the Treaty. Such higher-yield weapons would be suitable for Soviet counterforce weapons that are believed to be mounted on Soviet ICBMs.

Finding

The U.S. Government judges that, while ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and verification uncertainties continued in 1985, Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which banned underground nuclear tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons. These Soviet actions continue despite U.S. requests for corrective measures.

HELSINKI FINAL ACT

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in Helsinki in 1975. This document represents a political commitment and was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, along with many other States. Soviet actions not in accord with that document are violations of their political commitment.

Exercise Notification Provisions of the Helsinki Final Act

The signatories to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 are required by the Act's "Documents on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament" to give prior notification to other participating States "of major military maneuvers exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components." The notification "will contain information of the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the maneuver, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, the area and estimated time frame of its conduct. The participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces." The participating States will invite other participating States voluntarily and on a bilateral basis, to send observers to attend military

maneuvers.

The Soviet Union's August 14 notification of the September 4-12, 1981 maneuver "ZAPAD-81" did not include the maneuver's designation, nor did it provide the types of forces engaged, and most importantly, it did not include the number of troops taking part. “ZAPAD-81" may have been the largest maneuver conducted by any signatory State or group of signatory States, since the Final Act was adopted.

The United States asked the Soviet Union, through diplomatic channels, about its preparations for "ZAPAD-81" prior to the beginning of the maneuver. No further information was given by the Soviet Union until September 5, the second day of the maneuver, when the Soviet news agency TASS reported the name of the maneuver and the fact that approximately 100,000 troops were taking part. The information in the notifications issued by eastern States has normally been limited to the bare minimum of information required by the Final Act. Little, if any, additional relevant information, relating to the components of the forces engaged and the period of engagement, has been provided. The eastern countries have invited observers to fewer than half of their major maneuvers and have frequently been unwilling to allow the observers adequate observation of the exercises.

Finding

The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union in 1981 violated its political commitment to observe provisions of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act by not providing notification of exercise "ZAPAD-81." While the USSR has generally taken an approach to the confidence-building measures of the Final Act which minimizes the information it provides, Soviet compliance with the exercise notification provisions was improved in 1983. In 1984, the USSR returned to a minimalist approach providing only the bare information required under the Final Act. The Soviet Union continued this approach during 1985.