need to dismantle more MIRVed ICBMs or some SS-N-18 launchers on relatively new D-III-class SSBNs to continue observing the cumulative sublimit of 1,200 MIRVed ICBM and SLBM launchers. They have, for some time, been at the limit of 62 modern SSBNs established by SALT I; thus deployment of new SSBNs would require continued dismantling of older submarines.

The dismantlements that would derive from these actions probably would total over the next 5 years slightly more than 600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, with some 1,000-1,200 associated ballistic missile warheads. (The SNDV figure also includes heavy bombers judged to have a capacity for some 300 nuclear weapons.) Some dismantling of older systems would occur eventually in any case, with or without SALT limits. These projected dismantling actions do not take into account the Soviet potential for additional cheating, while nominally observing SALT numerical limits. This might be intended to avoid compensatory dismantlement of other ICBMs, including MIRVed ICBMs.

Representative U.S. Dismantlements. With respect to U.S. programs and dismantlements, full implementation of the strategic modernization program would require continued dismantlements under SALT of U.S. older strategic program systems, most of which are nearing the end of their useful life based on both military and economic considerations.

III. Projected Soviet and U.S. Strategic Forces

Projected Soviet Forces. In projecting Soviet strategic offensive force deployments, assuming SALT limits no longer apply, the caveats discussed above regarding assumptions and uncertainties underlying such projections are rele

vant.

To place these figures in historical perspective, since 1972 when SALT I was signed, there has been a fourfold increase in the number of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons (missile warheads and bombs) and nearly a doubling of Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight. Indeed, since the signing of SALT II in 1979, the number of Soviet strategic ballistic missile warheads has nearly doubled from about 5,000 to more than 9,000. This great expansion of Soviet strategic forces has been possible for the most part with SALT. (The agreements limited launchers and only indirectly affected deployed weapons.) As noted, however, the Soviet Union has also violated the arms control limitations imposed by these agreements.

The Soviet Union now has about 10,000 strategic nuclear weapons (missile warheads and bombs). The SALT I and II Treaties, even if fully complied with, would not prevent a very substantial further expansion of Soviet capabilities. Even assuming future Soviet compliance with SALT II-other than the continuation of current Soviet violations-deployed Soviet weapons are projected to increase to over 12,000 in the next 5 years. Moreover, by further violating the agreements, the Soviets could plausibly add in the same time period a relatively modest increase of even more weapons to their forces.

It is difficult to predict precisely what the Soviets might do absent SALT constraints. They would not necessarily expand their forces significantly beyond the increases discussed above, which are very large and would appear, in our judgment, more than enough to meet reasonable military requirements. Thus,

there might well be little appreciable difference, in terms of total weapons, between the forces that the Soviets might deploy with and without SALT constraints. It is reasonable to expect that in the absence of SALT, the Soviets would not dismantle all their older systems as rapidly as under SALT. Some classes of weapons (e.g., SSBNs) might not be dismantled at all during the next 5 years without SALT constraints. Given the great extent of the Soviet strategic modernization program, however, many of these older systems would have relatively little impact on the overall threat to U.S. security.

The Soviets have the potential to expand their forces somewhat further, should they decide to do so for either military or political reasons. If a deliberate effort were made by the Soviet Union to expand its strategic forces beyond SALT II levels, they might increase their forces somewhat further, to about 15,000 weapons by 1991.

However, the costs associated with such an expansion of capability, on top of an already very aggressive and expensive modernization program, would be a disincentive against any such Soviet effort.

With or without SALT, the Soviets are, in any case, likely to modernize their intercontinental nuclear attack forces further by replacing most of their currently deployed land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and heavy bombers by the mid1990s. This impressive Soviet modernization program, which will result in significantly improved survivability, flexibility, and hard-target capability, has been in train for a long time.

Projected U.S. Forces. The United States could achieve roughly 14,000 weapons by fiscal year 1991 in a no-SALT environment by introducing the full strategic modernization program without undertaking the dismantlements that would otherwise be required by SALT.

IV. Soviet Political and Negotiating Responses

It is difficult to predict specific moves the Soviets might decide to take politically or in the negotiations to try to increase criticism of, and build pressure against, the President's May 27 decision. They have already leveled a propaganda campaign against the decision. Ironically, in light of ongoing Soviet violations of SALT II, including violation of the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles numerical limit, they have warned that they will go beyond the SALT limits if the United States does. While they have stated that they would take the "necessary practical" steps, e.g., increasing missiles and warheads, it is not at all clear that they would further expand their forces beyond the increases already planned, as discussed above. However, they are likely to portray any expansion, including that already planned, as a response to U.S. actions.

The Soviets may decide to make political or negotiating moves as a matter of tactics that seek to discredit the U.S. decision. However, the May 27 decision is not likely permanently to alter their basic, overall objectives for negotiations or for a summit. These objectives include increasing opposition to the U.S. modernization program, particularly the Strategic Defense Initiative, and weakening the Western alliance.

We hope that the Soviet Union will join us in a framework of truly mutual restraint. For its part, the United States will continue to exercise utmost restraint

in the future, seeking to meet U.S. strategic needs, given the Soviet continuing buildup, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face as we implement the strategic modernization program, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

No policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. We hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement reached by the President and General Secretary Gorbachev at the summit meeting last November to achieve early progress in the Geneva negotiations.

Our objectives in Geneva remain the same as stated at the summit: to seek common ground in negotiating deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in strategic and intermediate-range offensive nuclear arsenals and to discuss with the Soviet Union how we could enhance deterrence and stability by moving toward a world in which we would no longer rely exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation to preserve the peace. We hope the Soviets will negotiate seriously with us toward these important goals.

142. Letter From the Leaders of Six Nations to President Reagan, August 7, 19861

In our letters to you of 24 October 1985,2 28 February3 and 10 April 1986,* we expressed, among other concerns, our fervent hope for the successful outcome of the current negotiations between your country and the Soviet Union.

We are encouraged by your replies, and we thank you for the detailed and concrete ideas which you outlined on the question of nuclear testing.

As you know, we have been meeting in Ixtapa, Mexico, over the past two days to discuss ways in which we might be able to help facilitate progress in arms control and disarmament. We have today adopted the Mexico Declaration, the text of which will be duly transmitted to you."

1A/41/518-S/18277, Annex III. On the same day, the Six Leaders sent a letter to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev which differed only in the wording of the second paragraph which read: "You will recall that we called upon both yourself and President Ronald Reagan to undertake a mutual suspension on nuclear testing, at least until your next summit meeting. We wish to express to you our sincere appreciation for having unilater ally extended your suspension of all nuclear tests." The letters were signed by the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania.

2 Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 774–775.

3 Document 27.

4 Document 56.

5 Infra.

We believe that we are in a position to make a contribution in the field of verification. We have outlined in a separate document some concrete ideas with respect to how we could assist in such verification.

We welcome the fact that the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have started bilateral talks recently on nuclear testing issues." We wish to propose to you that experts from our six nations meet with your and the Soviet experts. The details of time and place could be arranged through mutual consultations. The purpose should be to explain in detail the proposals which we have presented, to discuss how they could be implemented, and to explore other possible ways in which our six countries could facilitate test-ban verification. We suggest a very open agenda covering any verification issue that your experts may consider important. We hope that by making this invitation to both you and General Secretary Gorbachev we might be able to assist in this crucial field.

143. Mexico Declaration by the Leaders of Six Nations, August 7, 19861

We are meeting today to proclaim Humanity's Right to Peace, and to reiterate our commitment to the task of protecting this right so that the human race may endure.

Exactly 41 years ago, death and horror descended upon Hiroshima. The most dreadful war in history came to an end, and the world's nuclear nightmare began. Since then we have lived on borrowed time. All that is precious and beautiful, all that human civilization has reached for and achieved, could, in a short time, be reduced to radioactive dust.

For four decades the nuclear-weapon States have had almost sole responsibility to end the nuclear-arms race, while the rest of the world has been forced to stand anxiously on the sidelines. The nuclear-arms race has continued and become more intense. In the face of the consequent danger of common annihilation, the distinction between the powerful and the weak has become meaningless. We are therefore determined that countries such as ours which possess no nuclear arsenals will be actively involved in all aspects of disarmament. The protection of this planet is a matter for all the people who live on it; we cannot accept that a few countries should alone decide the fate of the whole world. The recent tragic accidents at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and at the launching of the Challenger space shuttle have shown once again how fragile is any security based on complex technology alone. And when an accident at a peaceful nuclear power plant has such great international repercussions, everyone can see very clearly the terrible consequences which would result from the

See, e.g., Document 137.

A/41/518-S/18277, Annex I. The declaration was adopted at Ixtapa, Mexico by President Alfonsín, Prime Minister Carlsson, Prime Minister Gandhi, President de la Madrid Hurtado, President Nyerere, and Prime Minister Papandreou, Attached to it was a document on verification measures (infra). On the same day, the Six sent substantially similar letters to President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev (supra).

use of even a small fraction of the nuclear armaments which now exist in the world. If a repetition of Hiroshima on a global scale is to be prevented, it is not merely more knowledge or new technologies which are needed, but more wisdom. We call for a binding international agreement which outlaws every use of nuclear weapons.

In January 1985 our Group met in New Delhi to consider the perilous development of the nuclear-arms race. We called for an immediate halt to nuclear testing preparatory to a comprehensive test-ban treaty, for a cessation in the production and development of all nuclear weapons and delivery systems as well as for a prohibition on the testing, production and deployment of space weapons. We also expressed our hope that the United States and the Soviet Union would make rapid progress in their bilateral negotiations towards the abolition of all nuclear weapons. We have since welcomed the declaration of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in November 1985, that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought".2 Now is the time to ensure that such a war does not occur. We are therefore deeply concerned about the lack of evident progress so far in these negotiations

We are aware, however, that both Powers have recently taken different steps that could help to overcome some obstacles and serve as a new framework for reaching agreements. We are convinced that security is not improved by increasing the capacity for destruction through the accumulation of weapons; on the contrary, true security is better ensured through the reduction of armaments. Nuclear disarmament, and ultimately the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, is an absolute priority. However, in this context, the problem of a balanced reduction in the conventional weapons must also be given appropriate attention. We remain convinced that no issue is more urgent and crucial today than bringing to an end all nuclear tests. Both the qualitative and the quantitative development of nuclear weapons exacerbate the arms race, and both would be inhibited by the complete abolition of nuclear weapons testing. Furthermore, it is clear that continued development of nuclear weapons by those who already possess them is detrimental to the efforts to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other States which have until now refrained from acquiring them. We must recognize that, just as a drug addict cannot be cured by injecting him with more and more drugs neither can an arms-addicted world be save from war by an infinite accumulation of weapons. The time to stop is now.

In October 19853 and February 1986, and again in April this year," we have exchanged correspondence with President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. We urged them to undertake a fully verifiable suspension of nuclear testing, at least until their next summit meeting. We also proposed that this suspension should be immediately followed by negotiations for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We offered our assistance to help ensure adequate verification of such a halt in tests.

2 Documents on Disarmament, 1985, p. 867.

3 Ibid., pp. 774-775.

4 Document 27. 5 Document 56.