IV. Conduct of inspection

5. On arrival at the location or facility the inspection team shall be permitted to secure the site, monitor the movement of equipment in and out of the facility and shall be provided with comprehensive access in order to conduct such investigation as may be necessary to enable a determination to be made whether the requested State is in compliance with its obligations under the Convention. 6. In the exceptional event that comprehensive access is not deemed to be feasible the following procedures shall apply:

(a) the requested State shall propose alternative on-site inspection measures to enable its obligations under paragraph 2 of Article IX to be demonstrated, and to enable the team to make a report of its findings.

(b) if the inspection team does not judge that the alternative proposals would provide sufficient information to resolve the matter which gave rise to the request for an on-site inspection, the team shall so inform the requested State which shall then be required to propose further alternative inspection measures. At the same time, the inspection team shall immediately inform the Executive Council of the alternative proposals and that a further request has been made.

(c) the inspection team may continue to request further alternative inspection measures, until it is satisfied that the matter can be resolved. The inspection team shall inform the Executive Council of steps taken by the requested State in order to demonstrate its compliance with its obligations under the Convention.

7. The inspection team shall conduct its inspection in the least intrusive manner to accomplish its purpose.

V. Completion of inspection

8. [Seven days] after arrival of the team on site, or earlier should the inspection. have been completed to their satisfaction, the inspection team shall leave the location or facility under inspection and then promptly provide a written report to each member of the Executive Council, the requesting State and the requested State. Each inspector shall have the right to have his own views included in the report, which shall contain both the substance of the findings and the steps taken by the requested party to demonstrate its compliance.

9. Nothing in the above paragraph shall detract from the right of members of the Executive Council, the requested State and the requesting State to submit their own views on the findings of the inspection.

128. White House Statement on the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, July 16, 19861

The United States has informed the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels that it is prepared to convene a special session of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) beginning on or about July 22 in Geneva.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. July 21, 1986, pp. 948-949. The statement was made by the Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

The United States will be prepared to respond to questions or concerns the Soviet Union has with respect to the President's May 27th decision on interim restraint. We would expect that in the context of such a discussion the Soviet Union will also be prepared to address U.S. concerns about Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements.

3

4

Since the President came into office, he has done everything he could to try to persuade the Soviet Union to meet its arms control obligations and to achieve agreement on significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. In 1982 he said the United States would continue not to undercut the SALT I interim agreement, which had already expired, and the SALT II treaty, which was stillborn, so long as the Soviets exercised equal restraint. Regrettably, the Soviets did not. In June 1985 the President once again called attention to the record of Soviet noncompliance and called upon the Soviet Union to join us in building an interim framework of truly mutual restraint until a new strategic arms reduction treaty (START) replaced the SALT structure." The SALT II treaty, even in its own terms, expired on December 31, 1985.

In the absence of an adequate Soviet response, the President announced on May 27 of this year that henceforth the United States would base decisions regarding its strategic forces on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet Union rather than on standards contained in SALT agreements that had expired, were unratified, and were being violated by the Soviet Union.

On May 27th the President also decided to retire two older Poseidon submarines as the eighth Trident submarine began sea trials. This means the United States will remain in technical observance of the terms of the SALT agreements for some months. Time remains for the Soviet Union to alter the situation which led the President to his May 27 decision. If the Soviet Union does, the President will take this into account.

As the President said when he announced his decision on May 27, we must now look to the future, not to the past. The primary task now facing both the United States and the Soviet Union is to build a new structure of arms control, one based on significant, equitable, and verifiable reductions in the size of existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. This is what we are proposing in the Geneva negotiations.

Until this is achieved, the United States will continue to exercise the utmost restraint. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic modernization program, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviet Union.

This special session of the Standing Consultative Commission offers us the opportunity to renew the President's request that the Soviet Union join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

2 Document 82.

3 For the SALTI interim agreement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 202-204.

129. Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Holmes) Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: Chemical and Biological Weapons, July 17, 19861

I'd like to begin by directing my remarks today to the problems posed by chemical weapons.

While working to rid the world of nuclear weapons and to create a more balanced and stable situation with regard to conventional weapons, we must also ensure that chemical weapons do not create security problems as serious as those we are trying to mitigate. Reaching a verifiable and comprehensive ban on CW is an important priority for the United States. In April 1984, Vice President Bush presented a treaty to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a comprehensive, effectively verifiable global ban on chemical weapons. Such a ban would require a mandatory on-site verification regime-a condition which we are willing to accept. At the November 1985 Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to accelerate bilateral discussions on a comprehensive CW treaty and to establish a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.3 Both of these efforts are underway.

The danger of chemical weapons-sometimes called the "poor man's nuclear weapon"-requires that we seek solutions to verification and other problems implicit in a CW ban. This is the purpose of the comprehensive CW proposals we have tabled at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. We are engaging in both multilateral negotiations and separate bilateral discussions with the Soviets in support of the multilateral talks in Geneva on this subject.

Since the summit, we have held two rounds of bilateral discussions on a CW ban-the first in January/February, the second in April. We are now nearing the end of a third round which began on July 1. There has been some progress with regard to Soviet positions on the issues of chemicals to be covered in a Convention banning chemical weapons, on destruction of CW stocks, and on CW production facilities. Unfortunately, despite their recent statement that an agreement could be reached within a year, the Soviets have refused to match the U.S. public disclosure of CW stockpile and production facilities.

Negotiating a CW ban is particularly complicated by the relative ease with which chemical weapons can be produced and the difficulties associated with achieving an adequate level of confidence that violations of a CW convention would be detected at an early stage. Also many countries represented in the talks at the Conference on Disarmament are concerned about potentially adverse impact of a CW ban on their economic interests--because of the need for rather intrusive verification measures and the similarities between legitimate chemical industry activity and CW-related activity.

ACDA files.

2 Documents on Disarmament, 1984, pp. 269–299. 3 Ibid., 1985, pp. 866-870.

These factors have led us to seek to develop verification approaches which will give the necessary confidence that violations will be detected while minimizing adverse economic effects on States. A key feature of our verification proposal is that Treaty parties have the right to demand a mandatory, short notice challenge inspection of government-owned and relevant private facilities to investigate suspected violations. A challenged state would be in violation of the Treaty if it refused to submit to such an investigation.

Our Allies also agree that tough verification measures are required. We judge that most of the neutral and non-aligned group of nations at the CD are also agreed on the need for tough verification provisions in a CW convention.

The Soviets have said they would accept routine on-site inspection in some cases, e.g., to monitor the destruction of CW stocks and production facilities, but not in others, e.g., for inspection of civilian industry production of chemicals which could be diverted to CW uses. Regarding challenge inspection-where one country would have the right to require investigation of questionable circumstances in a second country-the Soviets have talked about accepting the idea of a challenge inspection regime. It is clear, however, that they have something different in mind. They speak, for example, of the right to refuse an inspection in certain unelaborated circumstances, i.e., a non-mandatory approach. This approach contrasts sharply with general acceptance by the Western countries and most neutral and non-aligned states of the need for a stringent obligation to accept challenge inspection.

As a result of bilateral and multilateral efforts in Geneva, the Soviets have begun to address key verification requirements, particularly regarding on-site inspection of CW stockpile and production facility destruction. We also believe that the U.S. decision to begin the much needed modernization of our CW deterrent capability has stimulated the Soviets to begin engaging in serious negotiations on a CW ban.

We have noted a recent Soviet statement that an East-West ban on chemical weapons could be signed this year. Any agreement would require considerable acceleration of the current slow pace. Although we have noticed a slow advance on technical matters, the main impediment to an agreement is the Soviet unwillingness to seriously address necessary verification. We hope the current round of bilateral talks will accelerate progress, but have seen little sign the Soviets are ready to table detailed proposals on our difficult outstanding differences.

On March 5 and 6, we also initiated a dialogue with the Soviet Union in Bern with the objective of preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons. The Soviets detailed to us the chemical export controls they had recently instituted on certain chemicals useful in the production of chemical weapons. We told them of our concerns about their use of CW and, the dangers of proliferation of chemical weapons, and we described the export controls we had instituted. The meeting was constructive one and it was agreed to meet again once the discussions had been reviewed in Washington and Moscow. We will have a second meeting September 4-5. While we have made clear to the Soviets that we do not wish these discussions to divert attention from the Geneva negotiations, we are interested in pursuing ideas about limiting the dangerous spread of these

weapons to regions of instability, and which can complement our efforts to achieve a global CW ban.

I would also like to provide some background on the U.S. chemical weapons modernization program. This modernization effort does not alter U.S. policy on chemical warfare; we renounce the first use of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons. However, in the absence of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable global ban on CW which remains our foremost priority, we will continue to pursue deterrence through a strong defensive posture and a credible retaliatory capability.

The U.S. and its NATO allies have met certain conditions required by Congress for the release of funds for the binary chemical weapons modernization program.

Specifically, the legislation requires that:

NATO adopt a binary chemical weapons force goal addressed to the United States;

the United States develop, in cooperation with the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, a plan for the deployment of chemical weapons under appropriate contingencies; and,

the United States consult with Allies on that plan.

On May 15, NATO's Defense Planning Committee in Permanent Session, composed of the Permanent Representatives to NATO of the 15 nations participating in the Alliance's military structure, adopted the NATO force goals for 1987 to 1992, including the binary chemical weapons modernization force goal addressed to the United States. Defense ministers, meeting as the Defense Planning Committee in Ministerial Session on May 22, according to normal NATO procedures "noted" the Permanent Representatives' action.4 The Defense Ministers' action completes the established NATO procedure for adopting force goals for the Alliance.

The United States, in cooperation with SACEUR, has developed a plan for the deployment of binary chemical munitions to NATO Europe under appropriate contingencies. We have no plans to deploy binary chemical munitions to any foreign country in peacetime, and there will be no such deployment to NATO Europe without the approval of the receiving country.

We have conducted consultations with Allies on the contingency deployment plan. These consultations were conducted in the appropriate NATO forum: NATO's Military Committee, which is composed of senior military representatives from nations to NATO.

Modernization of the U.S. chemical weapons deterrent stockpile is critical to our nation's security. The chemical weapons threat to U.S. forces is a worldwide threat, not limited to NATO. The small, readily-deployable stockpile of binary munitions which we seek will provide the flexibility to meet and deter this threat. I would now like to turn to the subject of biological and toxin weapons.

* NATO Review, vol. 34, No. 3 (June 1986) pp. 30-31.